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Across Borders 
Diverse Perspectives on Mexico 
This publication contains a compilation of papers written by some of the 
distinguished Mexican specialists who participated in Across Borders: 
, Diverse Perspectives on Mexico, the 11'" Annual International Studies 
Symposium that took place on February 11, 2006. The symposium was 
successfully organised and fundraised by the Independent Study 
Committee on Mexico, a group of six undergraduate students from th~ 
BA program in International Studies at Glendon College, York 
University. It featured seven panels and twenty speakers, ten of whom 
have contributed to this volume. The panelists represented an array of 
disciplines - anthropology, sociology, economics, history, political 
science, international relations/studies, Canadian studies, Mexican 
studies, gender studies, environmental studies, migration studies, and 
cultural studies - and included business leaders, diplomats, and 
academics. 
Established in 2003, the Independent Study Committee on 
Mexico was created to take on the task of emulating a project designed 
by students eleven years prior. No professor started the committee, 
chose its members, or decided upon the country of study. No member 
of this committee had been to Mexico, or had even taken a course on 
Mexico. In fact, only one group member could speak Spanish fluently. 
What would lead us to taking on this seemingly incredible task? We 
can honestly say that it was the thrill of the challenge. Our goal was to 
learn more about a particular country in the world, so why not create 
opportunities for dialogue and interaction on our own with the 
individuals who could educate us and support our efforts? 
If there is anything that our program at Glendon has 
encouraged, it has certainly been to test boundaries. The symposium 
organised by the ISCMexico was a success in two ways: first, it fostered a 
dialogue among a wide variety of perspectives and subjects, and brought 
in a general audience of more than 200 individuals to the event. 
Second, it was successfully organised by a group of students who needed 
to take on an entirely new role - from students to organisers - armed 
with a great deal of enthusiasm, determination, and professionalism that 
was not, frankly speaking, often expected from us. 
As to why this may be of interest to the readers, it is important 
to understand that the papers in this volume are a product of the 
symposium, and have been edited by two members of the Committee 
who are not experts on Mexico. In publishing this volume, we hope that 
our efforts will continue to enrich the knowledge that exists on Mexico, 
and will challenge the stereotypes held by North Americans who may or 
may not know very much about their neighbour. 
We do not claim that this is a comprehensive reader or 
textbook. Rather, for those who wish to gain a sense of the complex 
relationship that the Mexican state has with its North American 
neighbours and with its diverse population 9-omestically, this volume is 
generally intended for an academic audience that seeks to learn about 
some of the current issues and lived realities that face the incredibly 
diverse groups of people in Mexico. 
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Foreword 
)udith Adler Hellman 
In April 2005, I received an e-mail from a group of International Studies 
students at Glendon College, who invited me to meet with them t9 
formulate plans for a symposium to be held at Glendon in February 
2006. This group - formally known as the "Independent Study 
Committee on Mexico" - made clear from the outset that this event 
would be organized and run entirely by undergraduate students, and 
would be the eleventh in a series of annual symposia, each focused on a 
different area of the world and on a different theme. 
Meeting over dinner, I began to propose the names of Ontario-
based experts on Mexico, but it soon became clear that the students' 
vision was to invite faculty from York University but also reach beyond 
the local pool of mexicanistas to include experts from across Canada, 
from Europe and the United States, and of course, from Mexico. 
Moreover, they hoped to bring together Canadian and Mexican 
diplomats and business leaders with the distinguished academics who 
would attend and present papers. 
To be sure, the students seemed disappointed to learn that 
February 2006 would find me on sabbatical and pursuing my own 
research in Mexico and New York. However, seeing that I had let them 
down in this regard, I tried to compensate by throwing out name after 
name of some of the most important contemporary analysts of Mexican 
politics and society, hoping that at least one or two of these leading lights 
would actually make the trip to Toronto in the middle of winter, and 
that, for the rest, the students might fill in the spaces with the 
unquestionably strong corps of experts on Mexico that we are fortunate 
to have in Toronto. 
I wished these enthusiastic students good luck, requested that 
they keep me on their mailing list, and went off on my own sabbatical 
travels. Because I was out of the loop for roughly one year, readers can 
imagine my surprise and delight to find myself, in March 2006, at the 
meetings of the Latin American Studies Association, the premier 
conference in our field, where one important Mexicanist after another 
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came up to me to say: "Wherever have you been? I was invited by a 
group of undergraduates to the most splendid one-day event at Glendon 
College, and I figured on seeing you there, and all I can say is that you 
missed a wonderful experience!" 
Thus, I necessarily felt great regret that poor timing put me far 
away from Toronto at the very moment that I might have enjoyed what 
others insisted was a wonderful day of exchange of ideas. At the same 
time, I had the great pleasure and pride to hear from Canadian and 
international colleagues of the success of our students' hard work. 
Under the circumstances, I must consol myself with the fact that the 
organizing committee had the wit to collect and publish the papers that 
were presented and that those of us who were not lucky enough to be 
present can now access at least some of the stimulating discussion that 
unfolded. 
And so it is that the thinking of experts like the renowned 
anthropologists of Mexico, John Gledhill, Matthew Gutmann, and Julia 
Murphy, the political economists, Alejandro Alvarez Bejar, Richard 
Roman and Edur Velasco, the cultural studies expert, John Stolle-
McAllister, the historian, Susie Porter, and political scientists, David 
Shirk and Duncan Wood, are now available to all of us. 
It is nothing short of remarkable that all this has been fashioned 
by a group of undergraduate students who have clearly demonstrated 
what curiosity about the world, combined with great energy and 
enthusiasm, can produce. 
Judith Adler Hellman is Professor of Social and Political Science at 
York University, and the author of books that include Mexico in Crisis 
(1978, 1983, 1988), Mexican Lives, (1994, 1998) and The Rock and the 
Hard Place: The World of Mexican Migrants, (forthcoming 2007). She 
has been editor of the Canadian journal of Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies, and is author of dozens of articles and book chapters 
on Mexico. 
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Introduction 
The challenge in creating a multidisciplinary work is to illustrate how 
various research subjects and appproaches link to foster dialogue. At 
first glance it may not appear that these papers interrelate, but reading 
them in the order presented will reveal a logical discursive thread. This 
volume is structured so that the book progresses from a macro to a 
micro level of discussion, moving from debates on state-led visions of 
progress to analyses of their effects on communities and individuals. 
For the reader who is more interested in reading about local attempts to 
inform decision-making at the state level, it is useful to read the book in 
reverse. Regardless of how one chooses to approach these essays, they 
all contribute to each other and to the overall themes discussed. 
As a nation-state that continues to progress as a strong power in 
the Americas, it is important to understand how Mexico will move 
forward with its neighbours in the North and South. Mexico has made 
every effort to integrate itself into the North American continent as an 
equal partner, yet Canada and the U.S. have been reluctant in their 
responses by comparison. In recent years, tensions have arisen among 
these three partners following a number of significant events: the 
election of President George W. Bush to office; the security concerns 
and resulting legislations passed following the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks in the U.S.; the debates that continue concerning illegal 
migration from Mexico to the U.S.; the heated 2006 presidential 
elections in Mexico with its highly contested results; and recently, 
concerns following the deaths of Canadian tourists in Mexico. 
As the essays progress to a micro level, the focus shifts to how 
national and international discourses have affected communities at a 
grassroots level. Specific case studies illustrate how groups within a 
given society can achieve their own goals, working with or against greater 
nation-state buliding efforts. Mexico is a rich resource for the study of 
social movements and mobilizations and in this volume, specific 
experiences of indigenous communities are explored. As the subjects in 
the essays shift to focus on Mexico City, further support is given to the 
dialogue concerning how class, gender, race, culture, and ethnicity are 
implicated in nationalist discourses. It is crucial to take these factors 
into account in order to understand how historically (especially since the 
Mexican Revolution in the 20'" century) efforts at building the Mexican 
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state and national identity have drastically transformed the livelihoods of 
the many diverse peoples within the country. 
Ultimately, our hope is that this volume will illustrate just how 
complex and passionate the process of building the Mexican nation-state 
has been. An incredible effort has been made by the Mexican state to 
firmly establish itself as a powerhouse in the Americas, and as a distinct 
and important ally to the U.S. and Canada. Along the way, as these 
contributors have shown, the Mexican people have worked just as 
tirelessly, fighting to ensure that their own concerns and causes continue 
to inform the way in which their futures will unfold. 
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Addressing Trans-Border Migration 
and Development 
David A. Shirk 
Note: This paper synthesizes points developed in a research brief co-
authored with Robert Donnelly for the Trans-Border Institute at the 
University of San Diego. The author would also like to thank Theresa 
Fires tine for her able assistance with maps and data. Any errors of fact, 
argument, or omission are strictly attributable to the author. 
Recent legislation passed in the U.S. House of Representatives and 
Senate seeks to add another 700 miles of fencing and additional 
manpower along the traditionally open 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border. 
Yet building walls and fortifying borders in the era of globalisation and 
economic integration holds inherent contradictions, and promises little 
in the way of effectiveness. Indeed, the failure of current U.S. border 
enforcement efforts to repel illegal border crossers is one of the most 
empirically verifiable points in the current debate on immigration. Over 
the past decade, despite tens of billions of dollars in border 
enforcement, the number of undocumented migrants in the U.S. has 
grown to over 11 million people, over half of them from Mexico. Real 
solutions to trans-border migration must take into consideration the 
challenge of making Mexico a stronger N AFT A partner by promoting 
economic development and poverty reduction. 
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
It is important to contextualize current trends in U.S.-Mexico migration. 
When we look at the multiple waves of migration to the U.S. over the 
past two centuries, there are two peaks that have both coincided with 
major expansions of the global economy. The first major wave of U.S. 
immigration - peaking around 8.8 million people from 1900-1910 -
was comprised almost entirely of Europeans. Irish, German, Polish, 
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and Italian immigrants dominated previous diasporas to the U.S., as 
they fled hardships in the Old World and sought a better life in the 
United States. In their search for opportunities, however, virtually every 
major wave of migrants struggled against a backlash of xenophobia and 
nativist fears of group competition in the U.S. Their collective 
experiences point to a frequently unacknowledged aspect of U .S. 
political culture, which is that entering the "melting pot" implies that 
new immigrant groups often undergo a trial by fire to "assimilate" and 
become "Americans." 
It is also worth noting that - in the midst of a major wave of 
European migration to the U.S. in the early half of the 19'h century -
most migration between the U.S. and Mexico was from the former to 
the latter, as U.S. nationals entered Mexican territory with thinly-veiled 
separatist notions. Then, after the 1846-48 U.S.-Mexican war, there was 
an exodus of Mexicans returning across the border that had crossed 
them. Meanwhile, for the remainder of the 19'h century, discriminatory 
. U .S. migration policies discouraged or otherwise restricted non-
European migration, especially in the case of Chinese and other Asians 
seeking opportunities in the Americas. 
Mexican Migration in Historical Perspective, 1900-2000 
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Source: "Immigration by Region and Selected Country of Lasl Residence, 
Fiscal Years 1820-2001," 
lmmjgration and NaturaJjzation Se1vjce. 
At the turn of the 20'h century, U.S. immigration policies 
became much more restrictive, particularly in response to new waves of 
Eastern European immigrants. Overall, however, the point is that U.S. 
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immigration policy has been historically coloured by nativist and even 
racist anxieties, at least until the 1960s. Thereafter, the civil rights 
movement led to a major shift in U.S. immigration policy, with the goal 
of establishing fair quotas regardless of race (and an emphasis on 
prioritizing family reunification as a determining factor in visa 
processing). Over time, the system that has evolved has proved one of 
the most liberal immigration policies in the world, and has allowed 
generation after generation of migrants to contribute their skills and 
culture to the fabric of the United States. Thanks to this shift in U.S. 
immigration policy, over the last three decades there have been major 
increases in legal migration from non-traditional sources in Asia and the 
Americas. 
Still, U.S. immigration quotas were ultimately unable to keep up 
with worldwide demand for visas, especially during the so-called "lost 
decade" of the 1980s when many Latin American countries were 
plagued by severe political and economic crises. Hence, would-be 
migrants who were unable to obtain visas simply entered the U.S. and 
sought jobs without documentation. This was especially true for 
Mexico, where for many years migration to the U.S. functioned almost 
as a pressure-release valve to alleviate economic crises and prevent 
domestic political discontent. For this reason, many Mexican politicians 
have tended to view unauthorized immigration rather benignly, if not 
outright permissively. Indeed, past Mexican administrations seemed to 
reject out of hand any collaboration with U.S. migrant-containment 
strategies, and Mexican officials frequently cited the constitutionally 
sanctioned freedom of mobility to excuse themselves from collaborative 
efforts to stem illegal border-crossing attempts. 
In any case, by 1986 the number of undocumented immigrants 
in the U .S. was so great that U.S. policymakers opted for a major 
immigration policy reform by granting most long-time undocumented 
residents amnesty and a chance to obtain U.S. citizenship. In addition, 
this new legislation - known as the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) - brought calls for increased border security to prevent 
unauthorized entry into the U.S. 
However, without significantly increased quotas, demand for 
visas continued to outmatch the supply, and undocumented migration 
continued; only now it was fuelled by the personal networks of newly 
legitimized immigrants with would-be migrants from tl1eir home 
countries. By 1990, Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) proclaimed: 
"Uncontrolled immigTation is one of the greatest tl1reats to the future of 
this country." In the next few years, the prospect of a major economic 
agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the U .S. - the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) - heightened concerns 
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about a "NAFT A Train" of undocumented immigration and organized 
crime moving across the U.S.-Mexico border. Hence, in the early 
1990s, U.S. officials began an aggressive effort to stem the flow of 
unauthorized migration and illegal drugs into the country by developing 
a strategy of "concentrated border enforcement." 
THE fAILURE OF CONCENTRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT 
Beginning in 1994, U .S. officials initiated a series of unilateral initiatives 
- from Operation "Hold the Line" (also called the "Blockade") in 
Texas, to Operation "Gatekeeper" in San Diego - that focused on 
enhancing border security primarily by establishing fencing, increasing 
the presence of border patrol personnel, and introducing lighting and 
high-tech surveillance equipment in major populated centres along the 
U.S.-Mexico border. The immediate impact of these initiatives was to 
accomplish a considerable degree of order in the areas where border 
·enforcement measures were concentrated. However, because the U.S. 
government simultaneously relaxed interior enforcement - that is, the 
use of workplace inspections and apprehensions of unauthorized 
residents living within the U .S. - those undocumented migrants who 
continued to flow through the border in unprotected areas and by other 
means were able to find employment without serious obstacles. In other 
words, while raising the hurdles for unauthorized entry, U.S. 
immigration control strategies during the 1990s and into the next 
century ultimately failed to deter undocumented immigration. 
In the final analysis, efforts to secure the border over the past 
decade have accomplished basically three things. First, while largely 
undiminished, undocumented migrant flows have been rerouted 
overland through dangerous desert and mountain areas, underground 
through sophisticated tunnel systems, and overseas along open U.S. 
coastal areas. Some experts have referred to this trend as the "balloon 
effect," since the tightening of enforcement measures in certain areas has 
simply caused migrant flows to bulge in other segment~ of the border 
region, with major crossing routes shifting from California and Texas to 
Arizona. Still, the increases in border enforcement- especially after the 
9/ 11 terrorist attacks - has effectively raised the costs and difficulties of 
land-based entry to the U.S. This has had the secondary effect of 
breaking traditionally circular or cyclical patterns of migration, whereby 
migrants travelled across the border seasonally or during economic 
crises to work in the U.S. and later returned to their home communities. 
As U.S. border controls have grown tougher, migrants are less inclined 
to return home on a seasonal or cyclical basis, and instead have opted to 
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reside permanently in the U.S. Thus, ironically, the implementation of 
tougher border controls has unintentionally contributed to a greater 
tendency toward long-term unauthorized residency. 
Second, as undocumented migrants have sought to avoid the 
perils of desert and mountain crossings, there has been a proliferation of 
people smuggling, document fraud , and visa overstays. Seeking to avoid 
detection at the border, undocumented persons increasingly rely on 
professional smugglers ("coyotes" or "polleros") to transport them 
across the border.' Such "professional" smugglers charge exorbitant 
rates (averaging around $1,500 USD), often financed by a migrant's 
friends or relatives already residing in the U.S ., and are well positioned 
to take advantage of their customers.' Meanwhile, for many migrants 
another path to unauthorized entry or residence in the U.S. is made 
possible by the ready availability of false documentation (fake driver's 
licenses, social security cards, and the like) that can be used to secure 
employment and a semblance of citizenship.3 Also, as many as one-
third of all unauthorized residents living in the U.S. are estimated to 
have fallen into unautl1orized status by overstaying tl1eir visas after 
entering the country legally. 
Finally, as a result of the new dangers involved in land-based 
crossings, too many migrants crossing in the border's scorching deserts 
and formidable mountainous regions suffer a horrible fate, with 
thousands dying in the process over the past decade. At the O ctober 
close of the Border Patrol's fiscal year for 2006, an estimated 4,045 
migrants had died of extreme temperatures and other hazards at the 
border since 1995. A record 472 of those lives were lost in the 2005 
fiscal year, while the number dipped approximately 5% in fi scal year 
2006 along with overall unauthorized flows during the same period. 
For their part, U.S. lawmakers could be much more effective at 
averting these trends if they simply stopped turning a blind eye to 
employers who hire undocumented workers. While many truly 
A study by the National Foreign Intelligence Board repmts that illegal migration is "facilitated 
increasingly by alien-smuggling syndicates and corrupt government officials." National Foreign 
Intelligence Board, Growing Global Migration & Its Implications fo r the United States (3 March 
200 1). Available at: <http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF _CIF _otherprod/migration.pdf>. 
2 Smugglers fees can be much greater than the average. In one case repOtted by IJ1e New York 
Times: "Government officials said they were deporting 319 illegal migrants, mostly from 
Ecuador, who had been detained by Mexican and U .S. Navy ships in the I;'acific Ocean. The 
migrants were traveling on two fishing boats stopped in separate incidents off the coast of 
Chiapas, in · Mexico's south. Officials said IJ1c migrants had paid smugglers as much as $4,000 
each to help iliem D·avel tlu·ough Mexico to the United States." Sec Tim W einer, "\"'orld 
Business Briefing Americas: Mexico: Migrants Being DepOited," New York Times, 12 Dec. 
2002. 
3 Most U.S. citizens rely p•imarily on official identification issued by state governments - because 
civil libertarians and individual privacy rights groups strongly oppose the creation of a national 
identity card- since IJ1e re is no mandatory system of national identification "~iliin ilie U .S. 
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innocent employers surely hire undocumented workers only unwittingly 
(thanks to false papers) , most do so with a wink. Such employers 
reckon that they need the labour, and really do not have the means (or 
the obligation) to enforce the government's immigration laws. Not 
surprisingly, cracking down on employers (read "campaign donors") has 
not been a popular idea among elected officials for some time. 
Moreover, doing so could actually negatively impact U.S. consumers 
(who benefit from lower prices made possible by low-wage migrant 
labour). 
Instead, policy makers have focused on the prospects for a 
comprehensive immigration reform - such as the so-called Kennedy-
McCain initiative in the U .S. Senate- that would create a migrant guest 
worker program to liberalize labour flows between Mexico and the U.S. 
Critics of migrant guest worker programs raise various concerns 
(unacceptable workplace conditions for migrants, lower wages for native 
workers in affected industries, and no certainty of averting 
undocumented migration) , and past experience suggests that such 
programs primarily address the needs and interests of the receiving 
country, rather than promoting economic development in the sending 
country. 
Moreover, guest worker programs do not necessarily prevent 
visa overstays or undocumented immigration outside of established 
quotas for temporary employment. Canada, which currently admits 
approximately 20,000 seasonal migrant labourers from Mexico and the 
Caribbean through its guest worker program, continues to have an 
estimated 400,000 undocumented migrants residing in the country. 
Thus, to address undocumented migration, both Canada and the U.S. 
would benefit from looking at what gains could be made through a more 
concerted effort to promote development in migrant sending 
communities. 
In the end neither border enforcement, nor workplace raids, 
nor guest worker programs can really address the crux of the problem. 
While U. S. demand for Mexican labour is a significant part of the 
equation, as long as millions of Mexicans face difficult economic 
circumstances in their own communities there will be massive pressure 
to seek better opportunities elsewhere. In short, the true limitation of 
U.S. immigration and border enforcement policy has been a failure to 
recognize the major causal factors driving migration from Mexico, and 
the urgent need to promote economic development to help benefit 
migrant sending communities. 
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PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO 
Few U.S. officials have seriously advocated addressing the problem of 
undocumented migration at its roots through concerted policy initiatives 
to promote sustainable, equitable economic development in Mexico. 
Yet, with projections of continued large scale unauthorized migration 
from Mexico to continue in full force - possibly more than doubling the 
undocumented population living in the U.S. over the next twenty-five 
years - consideration of longer term solutions to Mexico's larger 
development challenges is urgently needed. 
The "push" and "pull" factors underlying Mexican migration to 
the U .S. are relatively simple. While rare instances of political instability 
during the 20'" century have caused some migration from Mexico across 
the border (as was the case during the Mexican Revolution of the 
1910s), the primary "push" factor has been economic instability and lack 
of employment opportunities. As tough times have pushed Mexicans to 
migrate in search of jobs - and with significant U.S.-Mexico wage 
differentials (See Figure: Comparing U.S. and Mexican Manufacturing 
Wages) - the strong performance of the U.S. economy has "pulled" 
Mexican workers into the U.S. in search of better employment and 
earmngs. 
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Many U.S. citizens may wrongly assume that higher levels of 
poverty and lower levels of development in Mexico have maintained a 
steady stream of humanity across the border. Yet, historically, migration 
- along with Mexico's levels of poverty - has ebbed and flowed along 
with the significant booms and busts in the Mexican economy. 
Moreover, Mexico's economy grew quite strongly from the 1940s 
through the 1970s, with sustained annual growth rates of over 6% thanks 
to a state-led growth model which used protective tariffs and subsidies to 
privilege Mexican production over foreign imports (See Figure: GDP 
Per Capita in Mexico, 1900-2003). However, this so-called "import 
substitution industrialization" (ISI) model imploded in the 1980s, as 
inefficient domestic production contributed to a lack of competitiveness, 
and a series of fiscal and monetary crises led to major disruptions in the 
Mexican economy. Thus began the most recent wave of mass Mexican 
migration to the U.S. 
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, Mexico reluctantly 
shifted to an aggressive export-oriented growth model - formalized by 
the country's signing onto the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in the mid-1980s, its entry into NAFTA in 1994 and its 
negotiation of a myriad of other free-trade pacts with worldwide 
partners. NAFT A proponents vowed to reduce illegal immigration by 
bringing the Mexican economy up to "First World" standards, primarily 
by expanding the country's manufacturing base. "We want to export 
products, not people," said then-Mexican President Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari as negotiations were taking place in the early 1990s. Certainly, 
Mexico's macroeconomic shift brought some definite benefits and 
helped to sharpen the country's investment profile among developing 
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nations. Overall, trade between NAITA countries increased 
dramatically, and Mexicans made gains in middle wage earnings relative 
to the minimum wage from 1990-2000. 
Yet in the dozen years that have elapsed since N AFT A officially 
went into effect on January 1, 1994, Mexico's opening to global 
economic competition has been accompanied by significant challenges. 
During the 1990s, Mexico's economic restructuring brought job losses 
in uncompetitive industries (notably agriculture), and currency volatility 
- such as the nearly one-third devaluation of the peso in 1994 and 
ensuing economic crisis - seriously diminished the buying power of 
Mexican wages. Although middle-class incomes improved significantly 
in Mexico over the 1990s (especially in northern Mexico), by the end of 
the decade the buying power of Mexico's poor was less than one third of 
what it had been in 1980. Moreover, poverty rates of 60% and above 
continued to plague Mexico's rural areas and heavily indigenous south, 
and overall economic inequality remained high (with Mexico's Gini 
index of 54.6 ranked 109'" out of 123 countries in 2000). (See Map: 
Earnings in Mexico). Not surprisingly, throughout the NAFTA era, 
rates of unauthorized migration have steadily increased during this 
period. 
While N AFT A did promote growth in the northern industrial 
belt, it did so principally by intensifying the export activity of in-bond 
assembly plants or maquiladoras - not by creating a permanent 
manufacturing structure that made use of regional intermediary goods 
and raw materials. These maquiladoras attracted migrants from the 
Mexican interior to settle along the border, which became a convenient 
jumping off point for unauthorized entry into the U.S. Meanwhile, 
competition from China has weakened the maquiladora sector, raising 
concerns about the job growth along the border. Meanwhile, over the 
last two decades, these challenges have been aggravated by lower-tl1an-
expected GDP growth, ineffective governance, rule-of-law challenges, 
and educational deficits, factors that exacerbated the difficulties of 
millions of potential Mexican migrants . 
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Thus, when Mexico's long-time ruling party - the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) - lost the presidency in 2000 to former Coca-
Cola executive Vicente Fox, many hoped that his six-year term would 
bring much-needed change. In an attempt to promote economic 
development, President Fox experimented with a mix of public policy 
initiatives to improve governmental revenue (e.g., fiscal reform), 
infrastructure development (e.g., the Puebla-Pana.ma Plan), and micro-
economic solutions (e.g., micro-credit lending and the Oportunidades 
program). Moreover, his ambitious agenda for change sought to 
overhaul the Mexican justice system and improve education. However, 
Fox's domestic programs - hobbled by partisan divisions in Mexico's 
Congress, and attempted without full participation of Mexico's NAFT A 
partners -have met with only limited success. 
Today, with roughly 40% of Mexican households still living in 
poverty (defined in Mexico as households earning less than $5 USD per 
day), the supply of potential Mexican migrants seems enormous; 
certainly much greater than the 161,445 legal permanent resident 
immigrant visas granted by U.S. officials to Mexicans in 2005. Unless 
better employment opportunities and higher wages can be provided in 
Mexico, the overwhelming "push" factors that have driven recent 
migration will no doubt continue to influence prospective innovative 
approaches, and much cooperation by Mexico and the U.S. will be 
needed to address this issue. Indeed, according to the Mexican federal 
population agency (Consejo Nacional de Poblaci6n - CONAPO), as 
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many as 400,000 to 500,000 Mexicans are expected to emmigrate to the 
U.S. per year through about 2030, no doubt swelling the total number of 
unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the United States in the 
foreseeable future. Innovative approaches and many hands will be 
needed to address this issue. 
HOW TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO? 
Promoting economic development in Mexico will obviously require 
sustained and far-reaching reforms in Mexico's domestic economic 
policy, education and human development, management of public-
sector enterprises, and the provision of basic infrastructure (particularly 
in Mexico's underdeveloped South). Throughout his term, Fox strongly 
advocated similar reforms, but was hamstrung by a divided Congress 
that opposed his key initiatives. Like Fox, incoming Mexican President 
Felipe Calder6n advocates boosting private-sector investment, improving · 
Mexican education, building up infrastructure, and promoting fiscal 
reform in order to provide greater resources for government programs. 
Calder6n may actually accomplish more in this regard than Fox did. 
Despite an extremely close (and highly controversial) presidential 
election in July 2006, the centre-right National Action Party (PAN)- the 
party of both Fox and Calder6n- picked up seats in the lower house of 
Congress. Also, for the first time ever, the PAN became the dominant 
party in the Mexican Senate. 
Striking a new deal with Mexico's now debilitated former ruling 
party (PRI) - which may be induced to support PAN initiatives in order 
to strengthen its own bargaining position - could enable Calder6n to 
pass reforms that will help to bridge the gap between Mexico's haves 
and have nots. Indeed, if he hopes to have a mandate to govern, 
Calder6n must do so with the fierce urgency of now. Anger over the 
closeness and perceived irregularities of the July elections has 
contributed to smouldering popular indignation among supporters of 
leftist candidate Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador, who lost by only less 
than 1% of the vote. 
CONCLUSIONS: fiNDING CONSENSUS ON MIGRATION 
In the intensely polemical debate on undocumented immigration to the 
U.S., two indisputable facts emerge. The first is that current U.S. 
border security initiatives have failed to stop undocumented 
immigration. The second is that more needs to be done address to the 
deeper underlying economic factors that contribute to large-scale 
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migration from Mexico. Many anti-immigration activists adopt a finger-
wagging position, emphasizing the corruption and ineptitude of Mexican 
politicians. Yet, it is important to recognize that Mexico's troubles over 
the past two decades have to do in large measure with (the attendant 
disruptions brought on by) a macro-level shift in Mexico's economy and 
the emergence of a new globalised marketplace. 
NAFT A, at least as it was originally envisioned, was intended to 
help usher in that new global era by bringing Canada, Mexico, and the 
U.S. economically closer together, and even reduce undocumented 
immigration. Unfortunately for Mexico, the deal entailed free flows of 
goods and capital, but not labour (its one area of comparative 
advantage). Moreover, opening to international trade entailed a massive 
restructuring of its economy, volatile currency fluctuations, deteriorated 
wages, and lostjobs. 

The Impact of Neoliberal Reforms and 
Mexican Emigration on the North 
American Labour Market 
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ABSTRACT 
The labour market and labour movements of North America are being 
transformed by neoliberal reforms and free trade agreements that 
restrict labour rights and by the intensification of migration from Latin 
America that has resulted from these reforms. Precarious migration by 
Mexicans to North America and the shifting of production to Mexico 
are exerting a downward pressure on the labour market and on working 
conditions in all three countries. Emigration from Mexico has not been 
lessened by these plant relocations as they are part of a package of 
neoliberal reforms that destroy more jobs and sources of livelihood in 
Mexico than they create. Wages and working conditions will continue 
to deteriorate and labour organisations to weaken throughout North 
America unless and until the labour movement develops new ways of 
organisation and struggle that are inclusive of all sectors of the labouring 
populations, are transnational, and challenge the new "free trade" 
systems of labour regulation. 
I. MEXICO AS A POOL FOR THE RESERVE ARMY OF LABOUR 
In his classic text, "Structural Change in the New Economy," the 
legendary president of the Federal Reserve Board of the U.S., Alan 
Greenspan, celebrated the most prolonged expansion in the history of 
the U.S. as a consequence of the irresistible power of competition and 
the growth of the efficiency of corporations: "States with more flexible 
labour markets, skilled work forces, and a reputation for supporting 
15 
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innovation and entrepreneurship will be prime locations for firms at the 
cutting edge of technology." 1 
Alan Greenspan's comparison of the U.S. and Europe hails the 
unilateral control of labour market flexibility by corporations as the key 
to U.S. economic superiority. In elaborating the reasons for U .S. 
prosperity, he concluded: 
An intriguing aspect of the recent wave of productivity acceleration is that 
U.S. businesses and workers appear to have benefited more from the recent 
advances in information technology than their counterpa1ts in Europe or 
Japan. Those countries, of course, have also participated in tllis wave of 
invention and innovation, but they appear to have been slower to exploit it. 
The relatively int1exible and, hence, more costly labour markets of tl1ese 
economies appear to be a significant part of the explanation. The elevated 
rates of return offered by tl1e newer technologies in the United States are 
largely the result of a reduction in labour costs per unit of output. The rates 
of return on investment in the same new technologies are correspondingly 
less in Europe and Japan because businesses there face higher costs of 
displacing workers than we do. Here, labour displacement is more readily 
countenanced both by law and by culture. Parenthetically, because our costs 
of dismissing workers are lower, the potential costs of hiring and the risks 
associated with expanding employment are less. The result of tills 
sigilificantly higher capacity for job dismissal has been, counter-intuitively, a 
dramatic decline in the U.S. unemployment rate in recent years. ' 
In the months after the signing of NAFT A, Greens pan was 
obsessed with its possible effects on prices and labour costs 
(Woodward). However, productivity increased at the same time that 
unemployment surprisingly decreased without provoking a shift in the 
balance of forces in the U.S. labour market in favour of workers. The 
problem was not insignificant given that labour costs represent 70% of 
the operating costs of the U.S. economy. The explanation of this 
surprising outcome is found in the greater insecurity of workers and 
flexibility of management in hiring and firing, which Greenspan so 
praised. Furthermore labour insecurity was rooted in an unusual scissor 
effect: the simultaneous presence of an accelerated rate of technological 
change and the incorporation of a pool of new workers in conditions of 
extreme vulnerability, the millions of Mexican workers who entered the 
U.S. labour market in those years. The Mexican crisis of 1994, from 
this perspective, was not a minor or insignificant factor in maintaining 
the general rate of profit of the U.S. economy. The U.S. economy had 
begun to experience a sharp scarcity of unemployed. This tight labour 
market had the potential of undermining labour discipline and 
contributing to an upward movement of wages. The Mexican crisis 
alleviated this problem by expelling millions of workers who replenished 
1 Greenspan 2000. 
2 Greenspan 2000. 
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the reserve army of labour in the U.S. The Mexican crisis played an 
essential role for the growing U.S. economy. We will return to 
Greenspan and this issue in part IV. 
A certain amount of unemployment is good for Capital, though 
bad for both employed and unemployed workers. A surplus of workers 
gives Business flexibility and leverage to exert a downward pressure on 
wages and benefits. Firms, sectors, and the economy as a whole have an 
uneven rhythm of production. Workers are needed at times and not 
needed at other times as the cycle rises and falls. Individual firms want 
workers when they need them but do not want to pay wages and benefits 
to the workers when they do not. A reserve supply of labour helps 
capitalism solve this dilemma. They can be hired and paid when 
needed, and discarded when not needed. The costs of their survival, 
until needed again, are externalised. The costs are passed on to the 
state (social safety nets, such as welfare or unemployment insurance) or 
to family and friends. Aside from the need to have workers when you 
need them (or else miss profit opportunities), Capital wants cheap, 
productive and disciplined workers. As well as creating an upward 
pressure on wages, labour shortages contribute to a feeling of 
independence and possible insubordination on the part of workers. 
Thus, from the point of view of capital, a reserve army of labour is 
important not only for having labour when it is needed, but also having 
the kind of labour that is wanted . 
Capital can draw on domestic reserve armies of labour in 
certain periods, and women, especially victimised minorities, and 
regions with chronically high unemployment have often played this role. 
But these sources of surplus labour are not always available at the price 
and within the terms that Business is willing and/or able to pay, and, as 
citizens, they are entitled to a variety of rights. There are, therefore, 
special advantages to drawing on a labour reserve from abroad. The 
costs of producing this labour force - the raising and educating of 
children until attainment of working age - has been paid for by the 
other society. These immigrant workers are generally vulnerable due to 
economic needs, language barriers, and limitations on their legal rights 
within the host nation. They are more easily disposable when no longer 
needed. Those workers who toil in their home country for foreign or 
foreign-linked capital are also often denied citizenship rights because of 
the autl1oritarian structure of many of these regimes. 
There are two processes through which Capital draws on 
external reserve armies of labour throughout the world. One is 
immigration. The other - made much more possible by developments 
in technology and trade agreements - is the global reorganisation of 
production to incorporate low wage zones. In the case of the U.S., the 
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two processes come together in the massive in-migration of Mexicans 
and Central Americans and the burgeoning of maquiladoras and Export 
Processing Zones. Many of the Mexicans come as undocumented 
workers, which makes them both legally precarious and restricts their 
entitlements to health care or education for their children. Their legal 
vulnerability and economic dependency facilitates their exploitation 
which, in turn, exerts a downward pressure on the demands of longer-
term resident labour populations. The participation of Mexican 
nationals in the U.S. labour force and in the society at large has always 
been a source of great controversy. But the long, shared border with 
Mexico has provided a partial alternative to having foreign workers 
resident in the country. This alternative, the relocation of part or all of 
the production process to cheap labour areas, was not a totally new 
strategy. It did, and continues to take place within, as well as between, 
nations across the world.3 But the border of a first-world country with a 
third-world country created even steeper wage and other associated costs 
of production incentives that were even more dramatic. It also 
facilitated and facilitates wage and work discipline within the U.S. by 
serving as a vivid threat - shape up, give up previous gains, or lose out 
on jobs. 
These two processes, insecure immigration and plant 
relocation, are part of a broader package of neoliberal reforms aimed at 
increasing managerial power over labour. Other components of this 
package involve reducing the social net to put more pressure on people 
to work for less and making taxation levels more competitive with low 
tax regions and nations, which also means fewer funds for the social net. 
The privatisation of all things that can be turned into sources of profit, 
both public enterprises and public goods, such as water, are also part of 
these policies. 
The investment guarantees in the various "Free Trade" 
agreements are aimed, in significant part, at creating a legally secure area 
in which the search for cheap and flexible labour could be safely 
deepened, regionalised, and/or globalised. Business interests have been 
the driving force for the creation of these treaties in their constant efforts 
to maintain or increase profits. Business responded to the crisis of the 
1970s by developing more aggressive strategies towards labour. The 
neoliberal strategies are deliberate attempts to sharply increase the 
domination of capital over labour. They pre-date the trade agreements, 
which themselves seek to insulate these policies from tampering by 
governments or civil society in tl1e future. 
3 Cowie 1999. 
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11. NEOLIBERAL REFORMS, ECONOMIC CRISES, DEMOGRAPHIC 
CHANGE, AND LABOUR MIGRATION: THE PUSH 
An understanding of the radical demographic change in the Western 
hemisphere is necessary in order to grasp the basis for the torrential 
force of this great wave of human migration. Economic crisis and 
restructuring provide the push for the emigration towards the U .S. But 
the dimension and power of this migration has its underlying basis in the 
demographic transformation of the Western hemisphere. There has 
been an inversion of the population ratio between the U.S. and Latin 
America from the beginning of the last century to the beginning of this 
century. Early in the 20'" century, there were more people living in the 
U.S. than in all of Latin America. In 1914, the U.S. had a population of 
100 million, while all of Latin America only had 80 million, and most of 
these lived in rural areas. Eighty-six years later, the numbers were 
dramatically reversed. Latin America had a population approximately 
double that of the U.S.: 500 million in Latin America and about 260 
million in the U.S. 
The rapid growth of the Mexican labour force, the several 
economic crises, the restructuring of the economy in a manner in which 
formal sector jobs have diminished, and the common border, 
accelerated migration from Mexico to the U.S. in the 1980s, 1990s, and 
the first years of the 21" century. The northern trajectory of Mexican 
workers has been both to the maquila border zones and over the border 
to the U.S. The rapid growth of the Mexican labour force combined 
with Mexico's economic crises has greatly increased unemployment and 
underemployment. The dramatic drop in real wages has pushed more 
family members into the work force. As well, cutbacks in social services 
and in subsidies to tl1e agricultural sector are also pushing more and 
more Mexicans northward. 4 
As well, the promise of some employment, albeit at the bottom 
of the occupational ladder in the U.S., has continued to attract Mexican 
workers. This attraction has intensified as the wage differential between 
Mexico and the U.S. has grown with each peso devaluation and the 
ongoing fall of real wages in Mexico. There now also exists a self-
sustaining labour recruitment social infrastructure based on generations 
of previous migrants and tl1e physical contiguity of Mexico and the U .S. 
This self-sustaining system meshes with and is made possible by the 
4 As NAFTA opens Mexico up to more U.S. grain imports over the next decade, large numbers 
of Mexicans will be pushed ofT the land. Some writers expect the numbers to be in the millions 
in the first ten years of this new centmy. 
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embeddedness of this source of labour for sectors of U.S. industry.5 
As Kearney has aptly stated it: "Foreign labour is desired, but 
the person in whom it is embodied is not desired."6 This states well the 
divergence between the labour recruitment and regulation strategy of 
sections of Capital and the opposition of various sectors of society to the 
inclusion of the bearers of this labour power as fellow members of 
society. Conflicts over citizenship rights and the boundaries of society 
and nation become confounded with conflict over real or perceived 
economic interests.7 The state, therefore, is involved not only in 
mediating and managing interest conflicts but also ideological and status 
concerns over the boundaries and ethnic character of society. 
Ill. HISTORY OF MEXICO-U.S. LABOUR FLOW 
Mexican workers have long played a significant role in the U.S. 
c::conomy. During World War I, when the U.S. faced labour shortages, 
the government adopted the Temporary Admission Program to import 
cheap Mexican labour for U.S. industry and agriculture. In the early 
1920s and most dramatically, in the Depression of tl1e 1930s, there were 
massive deportations of Mexicans by the U.S. government. Again, with 
labour shortages during World War II and the Korean War, the 
"Bracero Program" was enacted, again, to import Mexican labour. And 
again, in the period of 1954-1 955, the U.S. government carried out its 
"Operation Wetback," in which approximately 3.7 million Mexicans 
were deported. 8 
5 The application of the concept of embeddedness as well as the notion of the self-sustaining 
migration process can be found in the work of Wayne Comelius, Roger Waldinger, and Robe1t 
Smith. See Cornelius 1998. 
6 Kearney, quoted injarnie Peck 1996:10. 
7 These issues are used as mobilizing issues in political struggles (e.g. Buchanan in the presidential 
prima~ies of 1996 and 2000, and also the anti-immigrant Bill 187 in California) building on the 
status, cultural, and economic anxieties of sections of the AmeiiCail population. 
8 When Attorney-General Herbe1t Brownell.l r. ordered "Operation Wetback" in .J une 1954, he 
"cited the possible illegal entrance of political subversives as a chief reason for his action ... " 
(Meier and Hibera 1993: 189). While "approximately 3,700,000 undocumenteds returned to 
Mexico between 1950 and 1955, only 63,500 were expelled as a result of fonnal deportation 
proceedings. Many left the country 'voluntarily'" (Meier and Hibera 190). The term "wetback" is 
a derogatory tenn used to label MexicailS by U.S. whites, especially in the Southwest. The term 
refers to an image of Mexicans crossing the Ri o Grande Hiver, the border between Texas and 
Mexico. As late as 1951, the President's Commission on MigratOiy Labour in Ame1ican 
Ag1iculture said in its Final Rep01t: "The wetback is a Mexican national who, figuratively, if not 
literally, wades or swims the Rio Grande. Whether he enters by wading or swimming, crawls 
through a hole in a fence, or just walks over a momenta~ily unguarded section of the long land 
border, he is a wetback. Since he enters by evading the immigration ollicers, he is, in any event, 
ail illegally entered alien. The term wetback is widely accepted a11d used without derision; hence 
for convenience, it is used here." Quoted by David M. Reimers 1992:58. The a~·gument that this 
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There was a diminished flow of immigration for the next ten 
years (1955-1965) but it picked up steam again in the second half of the 
1960s and even more so since the 1970s. The density of community 
and family links between Mexicans on one side of the border and 
Mexican-Americans and Mexicans on the other side create powerful 
networl}s for cross-border labour mobility. The deep crises of the 
Mexican economy since the 1970s as well as the devastating neoliberal 
restructuring have intensified the push out of Mexico. The insatiable 
desire of U .S. employers for cheap and vulnerable labour has produced 
powerful pressure groups for loopholes in policies intended to regulate 
or stop undocumented immigration. 9 The very programs meant, in 
part, to contain Mexicans in Mexico stimulate further migration. The 
maquila program, for example, attracts workers from other regions of 
Mexico to work in the frontier. Work in the maquilas enhances 
transferable skills, intensifies awareness of the great differences in wages 
on both sides of the border, familiarises people with the border region, 
as well as brings them to the edge of the "First World" (Sassen, 1996). 
The ongoing tension over immigration policy and job protection has led 
to a variety of measures and legislation, including the increasing 
militarisation of the border. 10 Nevertheless, the demographic pressure, 
the economic disparities within Mexico and between Mexico and the 
U.S., the desire of Capital for cheap labour, as well as the desire for a 
reserve army of labour to use as leverage for more general wage and 
work discipline, make the immigration flow uncontainable. 
The U.S.-Mexican labour market grew significantly in the post 
World War II years and even more sharply in the last thirty years. The 
maquila program did not deter it but, in fact, acted in a complementary 
manner. NAFT A was politically promoted in the U.S., in part, as a way 
pejorative tenn was used without derision shows the depth of racist attitudes in these 
cliscussions. 
9 The "T exas Proviso" provides a good example of the effectiveness of the agribusiness lobby. 
President Truman and the Ametican Federation of Labour sought to pass legislation in the early 
1950s to outlaw the employment of undocumented immigrants. But "Senator James Eastland of 
Mississippi, a staunch supporter of tl1e national origins quotas and limited inunigration and an 
opponent of refugee bills like tl1e Displaced Persons Act, was tolerant about admitting 
undocumented aliens. He insisted the Douglas amendment (to make tl1e employment of 
undocumented aliens illegal-EV/ RR) was 'unfair to the farmer or the Mexican involved." The 
law tl1at was finally passed "made it a felony instead of a misdemeanour to wilfully import, 
transport or harbour illegal aliens ... The law specifically said that employment of undocumented 
workers did not constitute 'harbouring'." "The exception, known as the Texas Proviso, 
inclicated a clear victory for the growers." In Reimers 5!-52. 
I 0 Andreas 1998; Dunn 1996. In 1982, the INS carried out "Operation jobs" (its label) which was 
aimed at removing undocumented workers from "high paying jobs" in order to make these jobs 
available to Americans. Raids were carried out in nine cities largely aimed at Hispanic citizens, 
mainly Mexicans. These were inefTective and challenged by civil rights ;md civil liberties groups, 
and, finally, suspended. (Meier and Ribera 191). 
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of stopping the undocumented immigrant flow. It does not allow for the 
free flow of labour. Nevertheless, it helps complete the integration of 
Mexican labour into the U.S. labour market. For while NAFTA makes 
all of Mexico a maquila zone, some production still must take place 
closer to consumers and less mobile capital in the U.S. needs to 
continually lower its labour costs to compete with goods now entering 
more and more freely from Mexico. A great volume of Latino workers 
have moved into fundamental sectors of the U.S. labour market to do 
this work that cannot be readily relocated. Latino workers are very 
important in specific sectors, both labour intensive and high tech.11 
IV. MIGRATION, POVERTY, AND THE DOWNWARD HARMONISATION OF 
THE U.S. LABOUR MARKET 
As the previous section has shown, the tremendous role of immigrant 
labour in the development of U.S. capitalism is not new. And Mexico 
has always been an important source. But the importance of Mexico 
specifically - and Latin America more generally - has mushroomed. 
Mexican labour on both sides of the border has become increasingly 
important to U.S. capitalism. It can be estimated that one of three 
employed Mexican nationals are employed in the U .S. 12 And one of 
four industrial workers in Mexico are employed in maquilas. Large-
scale immigration to the U.S. remains one of the highest migration flows 
in the world. 13 Of the 6.8 million legal immigrants who came to the 
U.S. from 1990-1995, roughly 38% were from Latin America. Of the 
vast number of non-legal immigrants in the U .S., a 1992 report indicates 
that two out of five were Mexican, and two out of three were Latin 
American. If we add seasonal workers to legal and non-legal Mexican 
11 The sunbelt boom and its expanded low-end manufacturing and se1vice job base were 
significant factors in the demand for Mexic;m labom. By 1990, 37% of young Mexican 
immigrant men and 59% of young Mexican immigrant women were employed in 
manufacturing, overwhelmingly in direct production tasks. (Vemez and Ronfeldt 1991). Other 
studies show that these workers were employed not only by labour-intensive u·aditional 
indusfl·ies (e.g., shoe and garment manufacture, consll'!lction) but also by high-technology li1ms 
with seemingly safe market positions (Cornelius 1989; Fernandez-Kelly 1983; Gonza!ez Baker 
et. al. 90). 
12 Velasco and Roman 49. 
13 The population of the U.S. grew from 248.1 million in 1990 to 261.1 million in 1995, an 
increase of 13.5 million people in five years (the U.S. increase in those live years was equal to 
about half of the total population of Canada in the same period). The rate of population growth 
"by natural increase" was 1.1% in rounded figures. Official statistics show that there were 6.8 
million legal immigrants in this period, which implies that 50% of the absolute population 
growth of the U.S. can be attributed to the flow of immigrants from other countries. (U.S. 
Statistical Absu·act, 1996, pp. 8-18). The volume of legal immigrants in 1994 was 804,000. Of 
this 804,000, 38% or 304,000 came from Latin America; 292,000 from Asia; 161,000 from 
Europe; 26,000 from Africa; and only 20,000 from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 
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residents of the U.S., we can say that approximately I 0 million Mexican 
nationals live in the U .S. for part or all of the year. 14 
The new waves of Mexican migrants are being incorporated into 
an economy that is being re-organised for cross-national production in a 
neoliberal framework. Production is being disaggregated and integrated 
continentally. This has profound implications for the incorporation of 
immigrants into the labour force. Earlier waves of European immigrants 
made economic gains through political and trade union struggle in the 
context of an expanding U.S. economy. These opportunities, however, 
were generally blocked for Latinos and Blacks through the practices of 
institutionalised racism, which ghettoized them in job sectors of lesser 
opportunity. However, while the job ghettoization of Latinos and 
Blacks persists, the character of the expansion of the economy is 
radically different: it is an expansion based on a systematic attack on 
wages, job security, and working conditions. The opportunity structure 
for advancement through immigration has shrunk as the labour market 
has been harmonised downward in the name of international 
competitiveness. This deterioration of the labour market is produced 
both by corporate and government policies (welfare reform, anti-union 
policies). The sectors in which immigrant labour is concentrated have 
been the most vulnerable to the threat and practice of job relocation, 
restructuring, and downsizing. 
This transformed job structure Gobs relocated to Mexico, 
downsizing, casualisation, etc.) is not only the entry point for the new 
waves of Mexican immigrants but also the location of the previous waves 
of immigrants and the Mexican-American population. They remain 
concentrated in the low end of the employment structure, in the jobs 
14 The importance of Mexican and Latin Ame1ican migration for the growth of the U.S. labour 
force becomes more sharply visible if we add non-legal immigration to the legal. The INS 
(Immigration and Naturalization Service of the U .S. govemment) estimated that there were 
between 3.4 and 4 million undocumented workers in the U.S. However, there are indications 
that the real number is much higher, perhaps around 6 million people, who live submerged in 
an underground social and labour world within the U .S. If we extrapolate from the study, 
Mig1<1tion Between Mexico and the United States, we would see that the number of 
undocumented immigrants of various nationalities is quite underestimated in the official figures. 
The 1992 study referred to above shows only 3.4 million undocumented immigrants, of whom 
1.3 million are of Mexican 01igin. But the study shows that the real numbers of undocumented 
workers, permanent and temporary, in the U.S. economy is actually much higher. In fact, it may 
have reached 6 million in the second half of the 1990s, e.g. 5% of the economically active 
population of the U.S. By ll1e end of ll1e century, these figures could increase to 8 million or 
6.3% of the economically active population of the U.S. vVhichever set of figures is more 
accurate, the growth of the Latino labour force in ll1e U.S., of which Mexicans are the majority, 
has been and will continue to be enormous. Latino workers have been predicted to have 
reached 27% of the U.S. labour force lllis ye;u·. And, by 2004, it has been predicted ll1at Lttina 
workers will outnumber female "Anglo"/wllite workers (Zaragoza V;u·gas 243). The above 
prqjections do not include the 3 million Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico. 
24 Richard Roman and Edur Velasco Arregui 
most vulnerable to relocation and therefore also to the effective use of 
the threat of relocation. Thus, the new entrants and the various layers of 
previous immigrants and Mexican-Americans are being compressed 
together at the bottom end of a job structure, which itself is being 
transformed in a downward direction. 
The presence of 11 million Latino/a workers in the U.S. labour 
market coincides with the destruction of the old social contract of the 
post-war period. As well, it takes place in a very different context than 
early 20"' century immigration. Immigrants then, as now, generally 
concentrated in certain niches . When the economy expanded, these 
immigrants and their children could move out into other areas or make 
gains in these expanding job niches. But now, the expansion of 
capitalism is not producing better opportunities but a worse and more 
casualised labour market. The job niches being carved out are shrinking 
because of downsizing and relocation to Mexico, among other places. 
Thus the recent immigrants, the 1.5-generation immigrants (those born 
abroad but raised in the U.S.), and the second-generation are finding 
their prospects very bleak. The combination of the persistently large 
immigration flow with the deteriorating job market bodes ill for the 
immigrants and their children. As one author has put it: "If the niche 
shrinks while the numbers entering it grow, conflict and downward 
mobility will result." 15 
The combination of a deteriorating labour market with the 
systematic assault on organised labour has made U.S. labour very 
weak. 16 This assault has been carried out both by companies and 
governments through legislation and practices that have made union 
15 Smith 151. 
16 It is more than coincidental that immigrants amass in cities of declining unionization. Jobs are 
still present in these cities - though these are old jobs that have been downgraded or new, low 
end jobs. Weak and declining unions find it difficult to organize new workers, immigrant or 
non-immigrant. The lack of organisation and clout undermines resistance to the replacement of 
union jobs with non-union jobs through restructuring, contracting out, etc. In this context, the 
mass of new workers can be used to beat down wages and working conditions and further 
weaken unionism. Job protection through exclusionary strategies is not viable in tllis new 
situation of tl1e continentalisation of the labour market and globalization of production. New 
York City had a unionization rate of 38% in 1983, but this declined to 25% in tl1e 1990s. 
Chicago declined from 25% to 18% in tllis period and Los Angeles from 22% to 15%. 
Unionized workers in cities witl1 large Latino populations are mainly composed of small groups 
of federal public employees who have unioni7,1tion rights by law, while tl1e rest of tl1e labour 
force lacks union organisation. The rate of unionization is 9% in Miami, 7.2% in El Paso, 7% in 
Houston, 6.8% in Dallas, 6.5% in Phoenix, 5.9% in San Antonio, and 3.6% in Austin, Texas. If 
we exclude the public sector and focus on tl1e 110 nlillion workers in tl1e private sector, the rate 
of unionization in the U.S. falls below 10%. This is a dramatic decline from tl1e 35% rate at the 
end of World War II . Thus, most U.S. workers lack the organisation to bargain collectively over 
their conditions of employment. But, in the case of La.tino workers, tl1e low rate of unionization, 
12%, has a devastating effect on salaries. The combination of falling salaries and tl1e slow but 
continuous rise in productivity has polarized income as never before in U.S. histOiy. 
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organisation, collective contracts, and strikes almost impossible in 
various parts of the U.S. As well, the weakness of U.S. labour is a result 
of the inability of traditional unionism to effectively confront these 
attacks. These conditions facilitate the use of mass immigration as a way 
of lowering the wage bill and disciplining the whole of the working class. 
It is not immigration per se that weakens unions and the position of 
workers in the labour market. 17 It is the inter-connected combination of 
these labour market changes and both the weakness and the strategies of 
U.S. unions that permit the demeaning treatment of undocumented 
workers and the general deterioration of conditions of work. 
Returning to Alan Greens pan's argument, we can see that one 
important result of the Mexican crisis of 1994 was that the tendencies in 
the Mexican and U.S. labour markets criss-crossed. Whereas the 
reserve army of labour of the U.S. decreased continuously in the 
following thirty-six months from 9.6 million to 6.2 million unemployed, 
the mass of unemployed in Mexico rose from 2.8 million to 4.6 
million. 18 40% of Mexicans and Central Americans continued to have 
incomes below the poverty line, another 17% had gross incomes that 
oscillated around the poverty line, and only 15% were involved in work 
that gained them incomes two times the poverty line. The 1994 
Mexican crisis, in one fell swoop, produced millions of newly 
unemployed workers. The incorporation of this surplus labour force 
into the U.S. labour market, without labour rights or union organisation, 
was fundamental for the prolongation of the profitability of U.S. 
corporations over the next four years. 
This absorption of a major part of Mexico's surplus labour 
force by the U.S. economy took place through two mechanisms. The 
17 As mentioned above, it: is not immigration per se that causes a deterioration of living and 
working conditions of wage earners. Earlie r waves of European immigrants were able to 
experience rising wages and living conditions in the generally expansive U.S. economy of the 20''' 
century. These objective conditions, along with the struggles of immigrant and non-immigrant 
workers tl1rough their unions led to tl1e wirming of 1ights as well as better wages and conditions. 
Management, in some sectors, found it necess:uy :u1d possible to live in f•iendly or hostile 
coexistence with collectively org:u1ized workers. The relative strength of unions in these 
conditions allowed for the sometimes successfu l collective defence of workers' rights. Thus, the 
impact o f immigration on tl1e workforce depends on tl1e structural changes going on in the 
economy (type of expansion or contraction) , the size and character of the immigration, the 
stTenglh of collective organisation of tl1e working class (unions), :u1d tl1e stance of unions toward 
tl1e acceptance or rejec!lon of immigrant workers. The key is tl1e m:umer in which immigrant 
workers are absorbed into the labour force :u1d working class culture :u1d institutions. The 
manner of absorption depends on several things: the slate of tl1e labour market 
(declininglexp:u1dinglchanging), the strength of unions , the st:u1ce of unions (fraternal-
welcoming, racist-excluding), labour legisla!lon and enforcement (anti-racist or facilitating racial 
segmentation, allowing sub-standard conditions, or enforcing minimal labour sl;md:u·ds -
tl1ereby reducing the opportunity and incentive lo use immigrant labour as a cheap labour force 
:u1d lever to drive down labour stand:u·ds in general). 
18 Anuario Estadistico de Ios EUM 2002:223. 
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first was the significant expansion of the maquila industry during the 
second half of the 1990s. The second was the massive migration of 
Mexican workers to the U .S. In both instances, the absence of the rights 
of association and collective bargaining were fundamental in preserving 
the low salaries of the recently arrived in the workshops and factories on 
both sides of the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo. The real and potential 
presence of Mexican workers in the continentally integrated 
manufacturing process of U.S. industry, without socio-political rights or 
unions, created the conditions for intimidating U.S. and Canadian 
workers with the threat of plant closures and relocation. 
The opening of the migratory floodgates in 1995 alleviated the 
labour shortage for the booming U.S. economy. For the migrants, it 
involved exchanging one kind of suffering for another. On one side of 
the border, the migrants had suffered the poverty of starvation, a 
palpable lack of food, and basic services for themselves and their 
families. On the other side of the border, their poverty rose to U.S. 
poverty levels but tl1ey had to endure the pitiless appropriation of their 
life energies and bodies in the machinery of U.S. production in order to 
keep themselves and their families from sinking below the poverty line. 
In the course of this exchange of suffering, they had also to endure the 
alienation of immigrants from their roots and the racism of their host 
country. 
Some of the consequences of this deterioration in the labour 
market have been partially overcome by having many members of the 
family participate in the labour force. The cultural capacity to constitute 
extended family units - and the sacrifice of more and more living labour 
for lower and lower wages - has been the only way that Latino families 
have been able to pay the very high rents of U.S. cities. It is only by 
combining five or six salaries within extended families living in 
overcrowded single-family housing that makes the payment of rents 
possible that would be impossible to cover with a single salary. Latinos 
constitute a significant portion of the population of nine of the ten major 
metropolises in the U.S. 
These developments have involved the deindustrialisation of 
the "Rust Belt" and the destruction of its unions as industry has been 
relocated to the Sunbelt of the U.S. south. The presence of 18 million 
Latino workers is coincident with the dismantling of the old, post-war 
social contract. Migration does not, in and of itself, produce a 
deterioration in the conditions of life and work of wage-earners. It did 
not do this in earlier periods of U .S. history. The effect of immigration 
depends on the general development of the labour market, the type of 
government regulation, and the strength of unions. Corporations have 
used immigration as part of a more general strategy to reduce salary 
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levels and increase flexibility. The corporate assault has combined the 
vvidespread use of immigrant labour with an attack on unions and 
workers rights and governmental regulation that obstructs unions and 
leaves undocumented workers without protection. 
The great importance of Latinos, especially Mexicans and 
Central Americans, in the reserve army of labour (which we are 
defining, roughly, as those below the poverly line) can be seen in 
changes that have taken place between 1980 and 2003. The Latino 
segment of the reserve army of labour grew from 11% of the total 
number of poor people in the U.S. to 24,% in this period, although they 
only made up 13.8% of the total population in 2003. Latinos have now 
slightly surpassed Afro-Americans within the reserve army of labour 
and, together, they have gone from being 41% of the reserve army of 
labour in 1980 to almost 48% in 2003. The immense majorily of these 
poor Latinos are of Mexican and Central American origins. In spite of 
the (U.S.) economic boom of the 1990s, the number of poor Mexicans 
witl1in the U.S. did not cease to grow, increasing from 3. 7 million in 
1990 to 5.4 million in 2000 and 6.2 million in 2003. Nevertheless, non-
Latino "whites" still make up a majority of the reserve army of labour. 
The last few years have seen a substantial growth in the number 
of both employed and unemployed Latinos, a seeming paradox that is 
explained by the magnitude of the migration to the U.S. This has been 
the case throughout the slow economic recuperation that began in 2002, 
during which the number of unemployed Latinos continuously grew to 
20% of the total of unemployed workers, in spite of, simultaneously, 
gaining ground in the over-all labour market, as we will see later. At the 
other extreme from poor workers [Latino migrants, poor whites, and 
(the long term marginalisation of) Blacks] is the nucleus of the dominant 
class of U.S. capitalism, that 5% of the population that receives 22% of 
the national income of the U.S., that is, five million famili es with an 
average annual income over $3 million USD. 
Latino workers have become the majority within workers of 
colour. In a period of lwenty years, their percentage of blue and white 
collar workers combined has gone from 7.8 % in 1983 to 20.1% (10.6 
million) of these workers in 2004 while the Afro-American percentages 
have remained relatively unchanged, increasing from 13.4% to 13.8% 
(6. 7 million) in the same period. Alongside Latino and Black workers, 
there is a growing portion of workers of Asian origins and the large 
majority of increasingly impoverished white workers. In line work and 
transportation, the percentage of Latinos of the whole labour force in 
that segment has gone from 8.3% to 19.2%, in construction from 6% to 
25%, in hotel services from 10.1 % to 38.2%, in building cleaners from 
8.9% to 26.8%. One of five workers in the U.S. today is Latino and they 
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continue to be the most dynamically growing sector of the working class 
of the world's leading capitalist power. 
CONCLUSION 
Neoliberal reforms in Mexico and in the U.S. have had a sharply 
negative effect on job opportunities, wages, benefits, and working 
conditions. They have been an important factor of the push of 
Mexicans to the U.S. And, in the U.S., these neoliberal reforms have 
meant that recent waves of Mexican immigrants are entering a labour 
market which is itself deteriorating. The combination of the increasing 
numbers of desperate migrants and a general downward push in the 
U.S. labour market creates conditions in which a scapegoating of the 
immigrants as the source of the deterioration is strongly possible. The 
alternative would be to see the neoliberal restructuring of the labour 
market as the source of the deterioration on both sides of the border 
· and labour organisation and action as necessary to slow or reverse these 
policies. But this requires major changes in the labour movements of 
both countries. Workers and unions must aim for a unionism that is 
inclusive, emphasises solidarity rather than competition, and seeks to 
reverse the neoliberal policies that have been so hard on workers on 
both sides of the border. 
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Canada-Mexico Relations 
Presentation Text 
Juan Bosco Martl Ascencio 
I am delighted to be here today. I truly appreciate the opportunity t6 
share with you some thoughts about North America and the relationship 
between Canada and Mexico. 
I am particularly grateful to Jessica Perkins, Publications and 
Communications Director of the Independent Study Committee on 
Mexico, for her kind invitation to participate in this symposium. Also, I 
would like to express my sincere recognition to Mr. Carlos Pujalte, 
Consul General of Mexico in Toronto, for his ongoing efforts in 
promoting these kinds of dialogues. 
Now, I would like to talk to you about some of the main results 
and challenges that we see NAFTA facing today and the achievements 
that we have been able to attain in the Canada-Mexico bilateral 
relationship. 
In the ten years of NAFT A, trade has essentially more than 
doubled in volume; financial flows over the last decade among the three 
countries have reached $1 trillion USD; and more importantly, 96% of 
all of our trade and investment relations flow smoothly. NAFT A has 
been fundamental to the creation of a prosperous Mexico. In a sense, 
the relationship among our countries has been transformed since its 
implementation. We have learned that if we work together and agree 
on our objectives for the region we can build a stronger relationship that 
will allow us to face the emerging challenges in the future. 
The NAFTA region is today the world's most dynamic with 
regard to trade exchanges. This agreement has served to increase trade 
volumes and subject them to rules that provide guarantees of legal 
certainty, even though we recognise we still have some problems. 
Today, more than ever, cooperation and exchange are the cornerstones 
of progress. Fair trade, governed by rules, is the basis for the growth of 
economies. Mexico regrets any unilateral decision that fails to abide by 
the decisions of the arbitration panels where trade differences are 
discussed and aired. 
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Mexico believes that, through the correct implementation of the 
agreement, our countries will create better trade opportunities for our 
businessmen. Further, Mexico believes that when international 
commitments are promptly honoured, we diminish uncertainly in the 
region and can maximise the benefits of the NAFTA. Institutions and 
procedures must be strengthened, not weakened. 
Nowadays, there is a growing scepticism about trade and 
liberalisation. I believe that our governments have the will to move 
forward in the process of making the North American region an 
economically strong one and therefore, we will have to improve our 
communication channels at all levels in order to take advantage of all of 
the benefits that NAFTA can bring to all of us. Together we should 
protect our jobs, improve quality of life for our people, and accelerate 
our capacity to expand our trade with other economic blocs. North 
America has greater potential for growth and creation of opportunities. 
We must move forward in keeping with reality and the challenges posed 
_by a more competitive and complex international setting. 
The future of North America must guarantee greater 
competitiveness, greater regional security, greater trade exchanges, and, 
naturally, greater well-being for all of its inhabitants. This is why we 
must join our capacities and develop our competitive advantages! 
Today, these discussions are taking place in the context where 
security - the security of nations - has certainly become one of our 
main shared concerns. We must think carefully about this issue. 
Mexico is undergoing a catharsis in its foreign policy and some 
of the major changes reflect its interior political transformation. There 
is also a catharsis in Mexico's relationship with North America. 
Nonetheless, this is an ongoing process, we will always be thinking about 
how to improve and take advantage of our geographical proximity. 
In the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs we submit that there 
are three essential objectives in order to fully exploit N AFT A: 
The first oqjective is to enhance the job-creating capacity of our 
free trade agreement. One of the main discussions about accepting what 
NAFT A does, whether there is a net increment in the number of jobs or 
not, is a complex international debate. There is no doubt that trade has 
helped transform our economies and prq_ject them into the 21 " century. 
I would like to suggest that, on the economic front essentially, any 
further development in North America should be enhancing the job-
creating capacity of this trade agreement. 
The second objective is to strike an appropriate balance 
between security and the facilitation of trade, the legitimate and secure 
flow of goods and people. Mexico, Canada, and tl1e United States 
cannot afford otherwise. Mexico has more than $720 million USD 
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worth of trade with the United States per day. Literally thousands of 
containers and almost a million people commute on a daily basis. This 
is an important factor for employment in the United States and Mexico. 
If we are going to think seriously about the challenges we face, especially 
from Asia and the European region, we must be sure to minimize any 
problems and to facilitate the legitimate How of people and trade across 
our borders. And yes, we do need to have modern and secure borders. 
I would argue that we have pre-NAITA infrastructures along 
our borders. The increase of trade has been exponential, and yet the 
investment of resources in the technology and infrastructure of our 
borders has not grown at that pace. So we need to think seriously about 
those issues. I emphasise that we should find the appropriate balance 
between security and the facilitation of trade and movement of people. 
National security is not about eliminating 100% of the risk. That is not 
possible. It is about pricing risk, calculating risk, and taking policy 
decisions upon these calculations. That is the important challenge we 
have in terms of security. 
Security cooperation over the last few years has probably 
become one of the most dynamic areas of cooperation in the bilateral 
relationship between Mexico and the United States, as is the case 
between Canada and the United States. Each day we are thinking more 
seriously about what aspects we can try to modernize in terms of 
security. 
The third objective of this process has to do with establishing 
mechanisms that will provide legal, orderly, secure migration between 
our countries; one that respects the human rights of the migrant people 
and their basic needs. We need to establish mechanisms regardless of 
how much migration we have. 
I truly believe that there are issues that should be tackled in the 
immediate future. First, our governments must strengthen their efforts 
to listen to the private sector and academia, to hear societies and to try 
to facilitate this process. There is a risk that our governments lag behind 
in this process. Second, what kind of process can we foresee? I would 
argue that we will not see a big-bang as we did in the nineties with 
NAIT A, but more of an incremental process with different steps and 
different phases. Third, our governments will have to find a way to get 
societies involved in a more active and intelligent way than we did 
previously; if not it is unlikely that we can move forward. The region's 
strength depends on the progress of three partners linked geographically 
through trade and friendship. 
34 juan Basca Mart( Ascencio 
CANADA-MEXICO BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
In this debate the three bilateral relationships among our countries play 
a key role; certainly being of great importance is the bilateral 
relationship between Canada and Mexico - a relationship that has been 
strengthened in the last couple of years from simple trade partners to 
strategic allies. 
Of course, we both try to privilege the relationship with our 
common neighbour, but I truly believe that we have finally realised and 
understood that if we work together we can achieve much more. 
If we needed to use some adjectives to describe Mexico's 
bilateral relationship with Canada, I would choose two: dynamic and 
flexible. There is a high level of dialogue and agreement in many fields; 
in periodic encounters between officials and businessmen of both 
countries, and in the vast spectrum of cooperation in areas such as 
competitiveness, energy, health, federalism, e-government, migration, 
and security. 
We have institutionalised our relationship to address every issue 
that might arise allowing us to advance in parallel on our increasingly 
broad bilateral cooperation agenda, which gives us the ability to attend to 
"sensitive topics" through dialogue and agreement. 
Since we entered our democratic process in Mexico there is 
greater coincidence and even a common vision with Canada in areas 
such as democracy, human rights, and free trade, which has allowed us 
to work together in multilateral forums. 
In this relationship the knowledge of our societies is of prime 
importance to the development of closer ties. The diversity of our rich 
cultures should be a source of enrichment that nourishes our societies. 
Tourism contributes to this aim and is a source of business, wealth, and 
jobs. At present, Mexico is one of the main tourist destinations for 
Canadians. Education and exchange programs are also vital to help us 
better understand each other. 
For more than thirty years the Mexico-Canada Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Program (SA WP) has been a successful example 
of legal, safe, and orderly migration between our countries, which has 
turned out to be of great benefit for our economies and our societies. 
This program has been contributing simultaneously to the enrichment 
of Mexico and Canada, and certainly has been an example to our 
common neighbours as to how temporary worker programs really do 
work. Thus, we should creatively look for the expansion of these types 
of programs. We should match supply with demand, and enhance our 
competitiveness and productivity. 
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In October 2004, the creation of the "Mexico-Canada 
Partnership" was agreed on as a strategic cooperation mechanism 
between the public and private sectors of our societies. Our strategic 
alliance enables us to position both countries in an increasingly 
demanding and competitive international environment. It also 
complements mechanisms such as N AFT A and the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership (SPP). It seeks to strengthen trade, improve our 
security, and raise our competitiveness. With this new partnership, both 
of our countries are pooling efforts to boost competitiveness, 
development of human capital, and sustainable development. It will 
also enable us to increase employment and improve labour standards, as 
well as to advance democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. We 
must strengthen cooperation and set priorities in bilateral trade and 
investment. We must reinforce business links and public-private 
partnerships. 
Collaboration as partners will also bring benefits in the 
education sector, good government practices, and institutional reforms. 
It will contribute significantly to raising the well-being of our peoples. 
With actions such as these, we are enriching dialogue, cooperation, and 
the achievements of our partnership. The efforts and dedication in 
connection with our alliance will continue to increase cooperation 
between Mexico and Canada. 
SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP FOR NORTH AMERICA 
Last March, NAFTA's three trading partners signed the SPP for North 
America. The SPP provides a framework that builds upon our long-
standing trade and economic relationships, complementing existing 
bilateral and trilateral efforts, and bringing momentum to other aspects 
of our relations in areas such as the protection of our environment, food 
supply, and public health. 
Through the SPP our three countries intend to benefit in three 
areas: (1) Better economic opportunities for our citizens - enhancing 
the competitive position of North American industries in the global 
marketplace. There are plenty of issues that are being discussed such 
as: standards and regulations to facilitate trade and reduce transaction 
costs, moving into common markets (on some specific economic 
sectors), and reviewing a common policy on e-trade and e-commerce, 
among others. (2) Improved quality of life by addressing disparities, 
promoting the full potential of our people, maintaining high standards of 
health and safety, and protecting the environment. (3) A safer and more 
secure North America by establishing a common strategy to streamline 
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the movement of legitimate travellers and cargo across our shared 
borders. 
We know that we still have a long way to go and many things to 
do but I am certain that the process that the SPP is initiating will help us 
achieve the goal of having a more secure and competitive North 
America. Now we are much more than an economic bloc, we are a 
dynamic region with hard-working people and democratic governments, 
with extended capacities and competitive advantages. 
MEXICO 
With a vision of shared responsibility we understand that in order to 
have a more competitive region Mexico has to do its part in closing the 
gaps between and amongst our societies. Over the past five years, under 
President Fox's administration, Mexico has worked to lay the 
foundations of a better future for Mexicans to transition towards a more 
democratic society with justice and opportunities for all. 
Citizen participation in government activities is now a basic rule 
in order to guarantee good government, compliance with the law, and 
transparency, accountability, and efficiency of public institutions. Today 
we have genuine competition among the various political parties, which 
reinforces transparency and reduces corruption. Thanks to the 
establishment of new accountability processes and the pre-eminence of 
the rule of law, today entrepreneurs, investors, and citizens in general 
enjoy unprecedented legal security in Mexico. 
We have been able to achieve economic stability through fiscal 
and budgetary discipline. The exchange market has remained stable, 
international reserves have grown to all-time highs, and we have 
significantly reduced foreign debt, thus making the country less 
vulnerable to external financial shocks. 
The strength of our economy and democracy are producing 
broad opportunities for investment in Mexico. Mexico is clear about 
doing what is needed to have a stronger North American region, thus 
bringing a better quality of life. 
CONCLUSION 
I believe that diplomacy finds in the 21" century its very essence in the 
need for nations to construct common visions about the challenges and 
opportunities that very rapidly change in the world. Certainly migration, 
trade, and security are the major challenges and opportunities facing the 
North American region, and we have created the right channels to adapt 
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transportation and trade in goods and services to this new and 
challenging situation. 
I truly believe that debates are helpful for understanding and 
constructing common visions. W e will need perseverance because this 
is going to be a long process. W e will also need a lot of creativity from 
the three societies, but mostly, we will need a lot of political compromise 
in order to push tl1is process forward. 
I cannot tell you enough how much I appreciate being here this 
morning, personally and institutionally. On behalf of the Mexican 
Government, I thank the Independent Study Committee for inviting me 
to speak here today. 

The Future of Canada-Mexico 
Relations 
Thinking Outside the Federal Box 
Duncan Wood 
The past four years have been a testing and difficult period for the 
North American partnership. The stresses and tensions brought on by 
the U.S. ' new security concerns and the war on terrorism have made it 
near impossible for a common agenda to emerge that is of mutual 
benefit to all three partners. The huge differences that have emerged in 
the worldviews of the NAFTA countries and the priorities they pursue 
have meant that significant progress on North American integration has 
been unattainable. This is not to say that no new agreements have been 
negotiated; on the contrary there have been advances, most notably in 
the area of borders and business integration. But it would be fair to say 
that the prospect of a new era of integration that satisfies all three 
countries is as distant today as it has ever been. 
The three governments face an array of challenges before they 
can realistically talk of a "NAFT A plus." First, they must await a 
"normalisation" in U.S. relations with the world in general and with its 
allies in particular, and a subsequent change in the U .S. foreign policy 
agenda. Second, public opinion in both Canada and Mexico must come 
to terms with a changed U.S. and be ready to get closer. Third, 
significant economic disparities among the three countries and among 
regions within the three countries must be addressed. Finally, and most 
importantly, a perception of mutual gain must emerge that would create 
the powerful lobby groups within the three states necessary to drive the 
process forward. This autlwr believes such an aligmnent of the 
"integration stars" to be highly improbable in the near future. 
However, at the same time as trilateralism in North America has 
been facing these challenges, the bilateral relationship between Canada 
and Mexico has been going from strength to strength. The signing of a 
Canada-Mexico partnership in 2005, the increasingly close cooperation 
between the two countries in the United Nations, and the Canadian 
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"courting" of Mexico in its 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS) are 
signs of the closeness discernible in bilateral affairs. The warmth and 
enthusiasm of the reception given to President Fox in Alberta in 
September 2005 was indicative of this, and stood in marked contrast to 
the disillusionment and disappointment felt towards him in his own 
country. 
Yet this new found intimate relationship is not to be taken for 
granted. A range of challenges must be overcome in the near future if 
the progress of the past couple of years is not to be lost. Elections in 
both countries in 2006, combined with the problems of structural 
reform in Mexico's economy, and the ever-present domination of the 
region by the U.S., require that the advances made by the two countries 
be institutionalised and a new framework for deeper and more long-
lasting cooperation created. 
This paper argues that the way to do this is to bring together 
stakehold ers in areas of mutual interest for the two countries. In a large 
number of diverse issues the two countries have mutual interests, though 
these are not necessarily obvious at the federal level. Instead, sub-
federal cooperation must be encouraged by empowering and 
encouraging actors at the provincial/ state, municipal, and community 
levels from both countries to come together to design collaborative 
projects for the long term. Subsidiarity is therefore a key concept for 
this paper, as is the idea of the existence of specialised communities 
whose interests and worldviews would be served by closer cooperation. 
THE PROBLEMS fACING NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION 
After eleven years it would be accurate to say that NAFTA has been a 
partial success. For although trade levels among the three countries 
have increased dramatically, and FDI has become a driving force for 
integration, a number of challenges still remain. First, integration is far 
from complete. While the Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico economic 
axes of the region are flourishing, the Canada-Mexico economic 
relationship remains relatively underdeveloped. At the same time as 
this national breach exists, regional differences are of crucial importance 
in evaluating the agreement. Whereas some regions of North America 
have become highly integrated (Ontario, California, and Nuevo Leon 
for example), others (such as Labrador, Arkansas, and Chiapas) remain 
isolated by weak infrastructure, education, or communications from the 
opportunities offered by NAFTA. Perhaps most significant from the 
point of view of the legitimacy of the integration process is that large 
sectors of society in all three countries have yet to benefit from NAFT A. 
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The owners of the factors in demand in the region (capital, skilled 
labour, technology, management, etc.) have all had the opportunity to 
benefit from higher levels of economic cooperation. However, the 
disadvantaged, uneducated, unskilled, poor, and marginalised have been 
excluded from the "NAFTA bonanza." 
At the same time, we must note that the visions of the three 
countries with regards to North American integration are still highly 
divergent. Canada's main priority in the NAFT A has always been to 
protect and expand its privileged economic relationship "'~th the U.S. 
The U.S., on the other hand, since 9/ 11 , has come to see the NAFTA 
through the lens of security, emphasising borders, intelligenc~ 
cooperation, and controlling flows of people. Mexico's priorities remain 
advancing the migration agenda with the U.S. while at the same time 
protecting Mexico from too much interference by its northern 
neighbour. 
The Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North 
America, negotiated in March of 2005, highlighted these divergent 
interests, and the relative importance of the three N AFT A partners 
(Council for Foreign Relations, 2005). For the SPP reflected the 
interests and vision of the U .S. and, to a lesser extent, Canada while 
neglecting the North American agenda of President Fox. Weakened at 
home through disillusionment with his Gobierno del Cambio 
(government of change) and his inability to deal with a hostile and 
uncooperative Congress, Fox was unable to secure any significant 
mention of migration in the March meeting. The SPP's focus on 
borders arid facilitating the business climate represented the agenda of 
powerful interests in the U.S., interests with which Canada was able to 
come to an understanding. Thus, despite the signing of a three-party 
agreement, Fox's sorry figure at the Waco meeting suggested a further 
weakening of trilateralism in the region. 
Another major obstacle to significant trilateral progress lies in 
the disparities in levels of economic development and competitiveness 
among the three countries. Whereas the U.S. and Canada are highly 
developed, competitive economies with a healthy mix of agricultural, 
raw materials, industrial and services production, Mexico faces 
enormous challenges in terms of structural economic reforms. Thus far 
unable to make the full transition from a maquiladora, resource and 
cheap labour based economy, Mexico's international competitiveness is 
under threat not only from China, but from other developing regional 
economies such as Brazil and Chile. The failure to move Mexico's 
economy forward to a new stage of development and competitiveness 
has made it a much less attractive and important focus for international 
investors. Although Mexico still receives significant foreign direct 
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investment (FDI), there is a feeling in Mexico and internationally that 
the country is losing ground against other potential destinations. The 
interest, therefore, in the business communities in the U.S. and Canada 
to promote deeper integration with Mexico is somewhat limited by the 
perception that other countries may in f~1ct ofler a bigger bang for their 
buck. 
A BILATERAL ALTERNATIVE: CANADA-MEXICO 
While it would be foolish to try to analyse Canada-Mexico relations 
without reference to the U.S., this paper suggests that there is ample 
room for a bilateral agenda for cooperation to emerge between the 
extreme north and south of NAFTA independently of the giant that 
divides tl1em. Canada and Mexico have made tremendous progress in 
recent years, in part because of the problematical nature of relations 
with the U. S. 
The immediate period following 9/ 11 was incredibly difficult for 
Canada-Mexico relations, with Canada preferring to negotiate bilaterally 
with the U.S. over new border arrangements ratl1er than risk 
"Mexicanizing" the U.S.-Canada border (Hristoulas, 2003). Other 
tensions arose between Mexico and Canada in early post-9/ 11 
discussions over the future of NAI<T A with the Fox government pushing 
for a "NAFT A plus" involving a migration accord, a social fund , and 
heavy investment in infrastructure, a.k.a. the "whole enchilada." The 
standard Canadian response to appeals from the Fox government for 
support was simply "what's in it for us ?" At the time, the Canadian 
government as well as the business community seemed to define North 
America in strictly Canada-U.S. terms, including Mexico only "when 
possible." 1 
These tensions, however, began to dissipate as problems grew 
betw·een the two countries on the one hand, and the U.S. on the other. 
The U. S. war on terror, and in particular the invasion of Iraq, pushed 
Canada and Mexico towards a rapprochement. As their foreign policy 
agendas began to coincide, especially in the United Nations, a greater 
mutual understanding also began to emerge. 
The creation of the Canada-Mexico Partnership (CMP) in 
October 2004 marked a significant step forward in bilateral affairs and 
was intended to develop the strategic relationship between the two 
countries. It brought togetl1er leading figures from business and 
government in both countries to discuss bilateral cooperation in a broad 
I Dobson 2002. 
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range of areas. Initially, three working groups were created in the areas 
of urban development and housing (looking at both sustainable cities 
and housing), human capital, and competitiveness.2 
Shortly afterwards, the Canadian government issued its 2005 
IPS, which pleased its Mexican counterpart enormously. First, the 
statement emphasised the importance of North America as a priority for 
Canada, with the region defined in trilateral terms. Unlike in earlier 
formulations of North America, Ottawa had apparently now come to 
see Mexico as a full partner in the region. Second, the IPS was replete 
with references to Mexico as an important country for Canada, not only 
in the region but also internationally as a partner in international 
institutions. 
In September of 2005 in another bilateral meeting between 
President Fox and Prime Minister Paul Martin, the two mandatories 
celebrated the high level of cooperation between the two countries, 
giving particular emphasis to the temporary workers agreement that has 
seen around 13,000 Mexican agricultural workers come north to Canada 
for seasonal employment. Although only a small program, discussions 
have begun to consider expanding the program to include workers from 
other sectors. 
Given this impressive progressive in the past couple of years, it 
would be tempting for advocates of the bilateral relationship to sit back 
and rest on their laurels. However, it is clear that the current state of 
affairs is an unstable one, vulnerable to changes in the national 
governments of the two countries concerned, and to changes in the U.S. 
It must be remembered that 2006 brings federal elections in both 
countries. A conservative victory in Canada could easily mean a swing 
back towards the U.S. to the detriment of Mexico, and a left-wing PRD 
victory in Mexico could mean a declining interest in North America in 
general. Unlike the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico axes of North 
America, the Canada-Mexico economic relationship lacks the same 
intense interdependence and is far from expendable in considerations of 
the national interest. Whereas the first priority of Canadian foreign 
policy may be "keep the U.S. border open" to maintain the flow of 
goods south, it is difficult to imagine Canadians attaching the same 
importance to the flow of tourists to Cancun or Acapulco! Mexico is 
therefore not yet an "assumption" in Canadian politics in the same way 
that the U.S. is for both Canadians and Mexicans. 
Nor have Mexico and Canada reached a level of cultural and 
societal understanding that facilitates stable long-term cooperation. 
Whereas Canada and the U.S. have reached an at times uneasy cultural 
2 PMO 2005. 
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accommodation over the last two centuries, and the U.S. and Mexico 
are experiencing a new level of cultural and social integration through 
the presence of tens of millions of Mexican and Latino migrants in the 
U.S., Canada and Mexico remain distant neighbours. One idea that has 
been floated to bridge this cultural divide is to encourage more Mexican 
migration to Canada. This rather seems like putting the cart before the 
horse, however. Surely we need to decide if and why Mexicans are 
needed in Canada for economic purposes rather than just importing 
Mexican populations to encourage greater understanding! 
PLOTTING A SUB-FEDERAL FUTURE FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS 
Given these uncertainties and the current healthy nature of the 
relationship, the time is right, therefore, to take steps to institutionalise 
the progress of the past couple of years and to lay the foundations for 
continued cooperation in the future. This paper argues that the best 
way to do this is not through the traditional means of federal 
government - federal government cooperation, but rather through sub-
federal and societal networks that are not suqject to the same shifts in 
political winds that can jeopardise close cooperation. 
Who will lead the process forward in such a way? Interestingly 
enough, from the Canadian perspective the key political actor will 
probably not be the federal government. Instead this paper argues that 
the process should be driven from the bottom up. In particular, 
provincial governments will explore the opportunities in the region to 
see what they can best take advantage of in a wide range of areas, from 
business, to culture, to education, to sports. The growing interaction 
between provincial premiers and the governors of states in Mexico is 
testament to the will of this level of government to engage in non-
traditional forms of diplomacy. Municipalities may also play a growing 
role, although that is not so well advanced as of the time of writing. 
This is not, of course, a novel approach to international 
cooperation. There is a long tradition in international relations of 
looking for sub-national drivers of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
In the 1950s and 1960s the neo-functionalist approach suggested that 
interested communities within society would push governments towards 
the creation of supranational arrangements. Putnam's two level games 
approach put forward the idea not only that domestic politics mattered 
in international cooperation and vice-versa, but more appropriately for 
the present study that transnational alliances of domestic level actors 
could be formed to secure international agreements. 
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What's more, the idea of sub-national governments in moving 
forward with piecemeal cooperation suggests a notion reminiscent of the 
European model of integration. Subsidiarity, the idea that policy and 
government functions should be transferred to the lowest level of 
government capable of effectively carrying them out, has yet to be 
explored in North America but holds enormous potential for opening 
up relations between different areas within the region. The economic 
concept of growth nodes and the potential for synergy between the 
factors of raw materials, labour, and technology, are so abundant 
throughout the region but widely dispersed, areas that provincial and 
state levels of government are likely best able to explore. 
Complementarity in education, health care, and even employment 
needs are other areas that would benefit from a less macro, more area 
specific approach. Although I would not suggest that subsidiarity in 
North America acquire the de jure status it holds in the European 
Union, a de facto approach to the concept holds great potential. 
But public authorities at the sub-federal level are not the only 
actors considered here. In addition, key communities holding 
specialised knowledge and sharing similar worldviews present a useful 
counterpart in, and support to, the integration process. The epistemic 
community approach, focused on the issues of learning in international 
politics and knowledge-based networks of professionals achieved a 
respectable following in the early 1990s and may hold some wisdom for 
the future of bilateral relations. It is possible to identify groups in the 
two countries that approximate the established definition of an epistemic 
community, that is, a network of individuals with: 
• A shared set of normative and principled beliefs; 
• Shared causal beliefs; 
• Shared notions of validity; and, 
• A common policy enterprise. 3 
For many years North American integration has depended on the 
three national business communities for its impetus. Future cooperative 
efforts between Canada and Mexico, however, will benefit enormously 
from the participation and leadership of interested groups, or 
stakeholders. I argue that in the areas outlined below there exist both 
communities, and an interest on the part of their members in both 
countries to move forward with bilateral cooperation. 
3 Haas 1992. 
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Education 
The CMP has already identified human capital as a key component in 
the drive for international competitiveness and as an area in which 
Canada and Mexico can work together. The collaboration of the 
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) and 
Asociaci6n Nacional de lnstituciones de Enseiianza en Relaciones 
Internacionales (ANIERI), along with government agencies, has shown 
that space exists for the operation of a transnational epistemic 
community. Yet the steps taken thus far are but a small portion of what 
could be achieved, given the right circumstances. 
Given the provincial domain over education, it would make 
sense for Canadian provinces to join these parties and directly engage 
the Mexican authorities to identify key areas of collaboration. Reducing 
the differences in the levels of public education from pre-primary 
through to university would clearly be in the interest of Mexico, but 
labour markets in Canada (and North America in general) would benefit 
from improved standards and the possibility of harmonised vocational 
standards. 
A harmonisation of educational standards may seem like an 
awfully ambitious goal given the enormous disparities between the two 
countries. But initial steps could be taken that focus on the university 
level. Canadian expertise in a state-run university system can be 
matched with the experience of Mexican experiments in private tertiary 
education, an experiment that has had mixed results to date, with certain 
examples of excellence. The highly entrepreneurial nature of Mexican 
university education, however, offers much to its Canadian counterpart, 
as do its links to Latin America and the challenging experience of 
working in a developing country. 
Health and Social Security 
Although Canadians are by now used to the idea of an imminent crisis 
in their systems of public healthcare and social security, they recognise 
that they are amongst the best-protected citizens in the world in this 
regard. Mexicans, on the other hand, have come to accept that the state 
cannot provide the necessary protection at a satisfactory level, and have 
embraced a mixed system. Although the public healthcare system in 
Mexico cannot satisfy the needs of its clients, and desperately needs new 
investment, there is no shortage of well-trained professionals. These 
professionals need money and the opportunity to practice. 
One simple and seemingly straightforward mode of cooperation 
would involve the creation of training programs in Canada to bring 
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Mexican healthcare providers (both doctors and nurses) with the 
necessary knowledge to allow them to practice in the Canadian context. 
Northern populations in Canada already suffer from a lack of healthcare 
providers; if we can bring in seasonally workers for agriculture, why not 
consider expanding the program to the area of health sciences? Given 
the fact that health comes under their mandate, the provinces would be 
key actors in this regard, but also universities, doctors, and professional 
associations in both countries. The exchange of medical know-how and 
expertise would presumably benefit both scientific communities as well 
as healthcare recipients. 
A more radical idea would be a cooperative agreement to build 
healthcare facilities in Mexico (likely in the vicinity of large ex-pat 
communities there, such as Lake Chapala), where Canadians could go 
to receive medical attention. If snowbirds already receive medical 
attention in Florida, why not promote the idea of lower-cost alternatives 
in Mexico? Private insurance companies are already experimenting with 
the idea of encouraging American and British clients to seek healthcare 
in India, at a fraction of the cost. Senior citizen care could easily be 
included in such an agreement, with the creation of long-term care 
facilities. 
Such healthcare could easily be covered by the state at a 
reduced cost than that already paid for similar services within Canada. 
Alternatively, a public-private collaboration between the public health 
service in Canada and private insurance companies could provide 
another option. 
Infrastructure and Transportation 
Mexico is in desperate need of heavy investment in its economic and 
transportation infrastructure. In 2006, a victory in the Mexican federal 
election by Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador (AMLO) will likely bring a 
renewed interest in infrastructure spending, both in terms of long-
distance communications (such as highways and railways) and in urban 
infrastructure. Given his record as mayor of Mexico City, he is willing 
to spend impressively in this regard. It would surely be in the interest of 
Canadian companies such as Bombardier to encourage a healthy 
dialogue with the Mexican government at such a time; however, an 
earlier, pre-election approach by groups of experts in infrastructure 
planning from Canada would ease the way for such a business 
opportunity to arise. 
Canadian provinces and municipalities would be important 
partners if a dialogue on urban infrastructure was to emerge, and the 
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discussions would fit in neatly with the sustainable cities program. The 
success of urban transportation systems in cities such as Toronto, 
Ottawa, and Montreal provide examples that Mexican cities may wish to 
imitate, or at least from which they may learn valuable lessons. 
Investment in long distance transportation systems has been a crucial 
element of the Canadian national story, from railways to the trans-
Canada highway. The engineering, planning, and financing expertise 
contained in government, as well as in private firms, would be of 
enormous benefit to Mexican planners. 
Energy 
Mexico is currently facing an imminent energy crisis. High prices for 
electricity and gas are compromising the competitiveness of Mexican 
business, consumers are facing blackouts and an uncertain future in 
energy supply and, most shockingly for the Mexican psyche, at current 
levels of exploitation and investment in exploration, Mexico will become 
a net oil importer at some time between 2008 and 2016. What's more, 
there is a lack of well-trained engineers and geologists in the country 
(particularly in the area of oil exploration), which further compromises 
the possibility of a homegrown solution to the problem. Unfortunately 
the debate over energy reform in Mexico remains dominated by oil and 
mired in outdated conceptions of sovereignty and protecting the national 
treasure. 
Already a number of Canadian firms are working with the 
Mexican government to deal with some of the myriad problems facing 
the electricity and natural gas sectors. This cooperation is by necessity 
limited due to the strict public control over electricity generation. In the 
oil sector, PEMEX's experimentation with multiple service contracts 
(MSCs) has allowed limited collaboration with Canadian firms, but a 
full-scale opening-up of the Mexican energy sector is a long-way off. 
Canadian provinces (in particular Alberta, Ontario, and 
Quebec) would be important partners in any discussion on energy 
reforms in Mexico. Alberta's hugely successful natural gas exploitation 
holds important lessons for Mexico, and Ontario and Quebec's 
experience with hydroelectric generation could help certain areas of 
Mexico to come up with alternative energy sources. While Canada does 
not hold any significant expertise in offshore deepwater oil drilling 
(where significant new oil reserves may be found in the Gulf of Mexico), 
the key benefit from the creation of an energy dialogue between the two 
countries would be the transfer of knowledge and expertise to help 
Mexico fully exploit its energy potential. In this sense provinces, 
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univers11:J.es (to offer training facilities), and indust:J.-y associations would 
be important collaborators. 
Indigenous Affairs 
While Canada has had a far from perfect record in its dealings with its 
indigenous populations (or First Nations), it would be fair to say that the 
current standard of living of the majority of Canadian First Nations 
citizens is far above that of their Mexican counterparts. Of course the 
histories of the two countries in their dealings with indigenous 
populations could hardly be more different: in Canada, a history of land 
treaties, separation, confrontation, and eventual cohabitation with the 
prospect of political and economic development; in Mexico, the culture 
of mes/J.zaje, marginalisation, and ultimately rebellion in 1994. 
Significant sections of Canada's First Nations today have 
achieved greater political and economic autonomy and have begun to 
look outside of Canada for contact with other indigenous peoples. 
Recent years have seen a flurry of activity in this regard, with high-
ranking indigenous individuals visiting Mexico. Cultural exchanges, 
discussions over economic cooperation, and importantly, the visit of 
Paul Okalik, premier of Nunavut, in November of 2004, have heralded 
this new era of "indigenous diplomacy." 
Indigenous affairs will be of great importance to the next 
President of Mexico as levels of protest among the pueblos indigenas of 
southern Mexico are again rising. With the chaotic southern border 
already facing the challenge of rising levels of violence and disorder due 
to the maras (or gangs originating in cent:J.·al America), a constructive 
dialogue that leads to significant improvements in the standard of living 
of the indigenous population is desperately needed. It is here that the 
Canadian federal and provincial governments, but more importantly 
First Nations, may be able to play an "honest broker" role. The 
indigenous communities in both Canada and Mexico hold many of the 
qualities normally attributed to epistemic communities, particularly in 
tl1e areas of shared normative and principled beliefs, shared causal 
beliefs, and shared notions of validity. 
What do Canadian indigenous groups stand to gain from this 
cooperation? A sense of prestige, international recognition, and perhaps 
most importantly, a heightened sense of community and brotherhood in 
the hemisphere would be key achievements. The Mexican government 
stands to benefit as a process of dialogue replaces conhontation, as well 
as the potential for economic t:J.·ansfers from wealthier Canadian First 
Nations to marginalised populations in the southern states. 
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Federal Government Cooperation 
This paper has focused its attention on sub-federal cooperation. 
However it would be foolish and shortsighted to ignore the numerous 
areas of interest and potential cooperation to both federal governments. 
Of course the two federal governments need to lay the foundations and 
prepare a framework within which such sub-federal cooperation could 
take place. But we must also consider the interest that exists in federal 
collaboration in areas such as foreign policy, in particular international 
institutions, fiscal reforms, and regional development (the abortive 
experience of the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) contains many valuable 
lessons for both governments). A final area that may hold potential is 
that of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Although constitutional 
constraints limit the potential at the present time for military-military 
collaboration, the federal electoral institute (IFE) has already been active 
internationally in Afghanistan and Iraq in promoting free and fair 
elections. What's more, the space exists for the transfer of 
peacekeeping expertise from, for example, the Pearson Centre, to those 
agenc1es of the Mexican military (such as the navy) that are ready to 
listen. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that significant potential exists for future 
cooperation and collaboration between Canada and Mexico at the sub-
federal level if an adequate framework can be created to promote a 
vibrant dialogue that includes relevant communities, both political and 
knowledge-based in both countries. Although such far-reaching 
collaboration may seem improbable at the time of writing, the example 
of the CMP holds the potential for broader and deeper cooperation that 
can be continued by political authorities in the future at multiple levels. 
The Future of Canada-Mexico Relations: Thinking Outside the Federal Box 51 
REFERENCES 
Council for Foreign Relations. Building a North Ame1ican Community : Report of an Independent 
Task Force. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005. 
Dobson, Wendy K. "Shaping the Future of the North Ame1ican Economic Space: A Framework 
for Action." C. D. Howe Institute Commentary: The Border Papers 162 (April 2002). 
Available at <http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_ l 62.pdf>. 
1-Iaas, Peter M. "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination." 
lntemational Organization 45. 1 (\.Yinter 1992): 1-35. 
H1istoulas, Alhanasios. "Trading Places: Canada, Mexico and Continental Security." The 
Rebordering of North America. Eels . Peter Andreas and Thomas Biersteker. New 
York, Roulledge Press, 2003. 
P1ivy Council Office. Canada-Mexico Partnership: Backgrounder. Ottawa: Privy Counci l Office, 
2005. Available at <http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language- E&Page- archivemartin&Sub- newscommuniques&Doc 
- news_release_20050930 _598_c.ht:m>. 

The Puebla-Panama Plan 
A Strategy for Regional Development? 
Alejandro Alvarez Bejar 
Note: This paper is part of a research project funded by DGAPA-
UNAM/IN 307102-3 
ABSTRACT 
The Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP) appeared in the first year of Vicente 
Fox's administration as a program of regional development for the 
southeastern states of Mexico and its links with Central America. It is 
based on two suppositions: that the region lags behind the rest of the 
country, especially in regard to infrastTucture, poverty, and 
marginalisation; and that since Mexico has seen great inequality in the 
implementation of public policies it is necessary to "insert" the region 
into the stream of globalisation. 
World Bank estimates indicate that Mexico will need an 
investment of $20 billion USD per year for the coming ten years in 
order to close the gap in that line. But the nature, amount, scope, and 
political impact of those investments have been rejected by many 
indigenous communities, social organisations, and political forces, 
locally as well as nationally. 
The official basic diagnostic of the region's troubles remains the 
same as many years ago: the region's agricull11ral zones are poorly 
structured, its industrial space is concentrated in only one area, 
communications are deficient, and its predominantly youthful 
demographic pattern contrasts witl1 the distribution of its population. 
But the general formula for solving the problems remains quite 
conflictive (to open up, privatise, and deregulate) and the priorities and 
amount of public expenditure benefit the few. 
This paper will identify, critically, the most important economic, 
political, and social challenges related to the PPP, and will answer to 
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what extent the region is not only already inserted into the stream of 
globalisation through regionalisation with North America, but has also 
suffered its worst effects, looking at the content and direction of exports 
and imports, the nature of agricultural activities (coffee, corn, beans, 
sugar, rice), and the ecological damage to biodiversity due to the 
exploitation of natural resources, oil, petTochemicals, electricity, as well 
as activities such as tourism. 
Finally, it will criticise the linear relationship established in the 
PPP between communications and development, arguing that the 
connection remains unclear, and concluding that without explicit public 
policies, built by consensus with the local communities in all of the 
aforementioned areas, it is impossible to speak of a "strategy of regional 
development." 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper has been organised into four main sections. The first one 
gives some historical background to understand the specificity of 
regional development in the Mexican experience, going back from the 
model of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) to the most recent 
Export Oriented Industrialisation Model (EOI). It recovers recent data 
from regional changes to show increased polarisation instead of regional 
convergence and the worst welfare indicators concentrated in the 
southern region. 
The second section recovers the basics of the PPP as a regional 
development plan for the southeast region, calling attention to the 
different stages that the prqject has gone through, until finally "greening" 
its projects and widening the institutional scope as to leave it practically 
in the hands of the Inter-American Development Bank (ID B). It is also 
related to other transnational projects now at work directly or indirectly 
in the big region of Central America and Mexico, such as the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA), the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC), 
and with the deepening of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). 
In the tl1ird section, we take a look at the geo-economic 
potential of the South-Southeast (S-SE) region of Mexico, its natural 
resources, pool of cheap labour, biodiversity, and strategic geographical 
situation for international trade, but also to the problems of poverty and 
vulnerability to natural disasters. 
In the final section, we examine the federal expenditure 
priorities in order to show the real level of resources committed to the 
project and the consistency of the same. This is to say that only the 
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development of highways and electricity interconnections are revealed as 
real priorities. Furthermore, going through the lack of coordination in 
agriculture to the environmental crisis of the region, inconsistencies are 
shown. We conclude with some ideas for the construction of ecological 
alternatives, building a new consensus with the indigenous communities 
and people of the region. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Until the 1980s, regional development policies in Mexico were in reality 
sectoral development policies, with projects carried out in the U. S. as 
their model (such as the T e1messee Valley Authority program in the 
1930s). For example: the development of hydraulic works to expand 
the frontiers of agriculture in the north; the promotion of industrial 
parks and cities in the central regions to stimulate the emergence of new 
industries; the encouragement of economic development in the arid and 
semi-arid zones which constitute the largest portion of Mexican territory; 
and the development of programs for taking advantage of water 
catchments (such as those on the Balsas, Papaloapan, or Gr~jalva rivers 
in the states of Guerrero, Veracruz, and Chiapas respectively). 
Between the decades of the 1940s and the 1970s, under the ISI 
model, the state functioned as the engine, prot.:1gonist, coordinator, and 
executive of public policies devised in order to create a commercial class 
which would generate employment for salaried workers. 1 Under this 
industrialisation scheme, the design of sectoral policies always had 
regional implications, though this geographical dimension tended to 
depend on the weight that regional power groups had within the federal 
government. One notable feature of Mexico is its strong regional 
disparities. This, among other reasons, has led some to speak of a 
northern Mexico and a southern Mexico since the mid-1990s. 
In the fifteen years since 1990, the strict logic of North 
American integration and the emergence of information technologies 
has held sway, and it is evidently since this date that the notion of 
'locking-in' the structural reforms imposed in the 1980s, which were 
oriented towards implanting the new EOI model, has come into force. 2 
See Francisco Garcia Moclezuma, El ordenamicnlo tenilan·al y la planeaci6n del Dcsan-ollo en 
Mexico, la Macro-region mexicana del Phw Puebla Panam;i, Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of 
Economics, UNAM, Mexico, 2005, chapter 2. 
2 I have examined the global logic of this process in Aleiand ro Alvarez, "Mexico: relocating the 
State within a new global regime", in Stephen Clarkson and Marj01ie Gri flin Cohen, eds., States 
Under Siege: se1mpenpheml countJies under Globalism (London, U.K.: Zed Books, 2004) . 
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For this same reason, since the end of the 1980s regional policy 
was in good measure linked to the needs of social policy, which explains 
why programs for alleviating poverty were concentrated in the S-SE 
region, such as the National Solidarity Plan initiated by Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari, which played a key role in the Mixteca zones in the state of 
Oaxaca, the Selva Lacandona in Chiapas, and the Huasteca zone of 
Veracruz. At the end of the 1990s, the so-called "Priority Region 
Attention Program" emerged with President Ernesto Zedillo, which 
covered the Canada norte, Selva Norte, the Sierra, and the coastal areas 
of Chiapas; the Mayan areas of Campeche and Quintana Roo; the 
eastern and coastal areas of Yucatan; the Sierra, Montana and Costa 
Chica areas of Guerrero; the lsthmus-Papaloapan, Sierra de Juarez and 
Mixteca zones of Oaxaca; the Sierra Norte and Mixteca areas of Puebla; 
and in Veracruz the Sierra de Soteapan, the Valle de Uxpanapa, and the 
Sierra Negra de Zongolica.3 
Since then, there have been very significant changes to the five 
major regions of Mexico (being the North, the Pacific, the Centre-
North, the Centre and the South-Southeast), beginning with the 
increasing transnationalisation of economic interests which now operate 
with near-complete freedom in the country. These are significant 
changes as much for their effect on the behaviour of the Gross 
Domestic Product (generated by state and by per capita GDP) as for that 
on the standard of living of broad swathes of the population affected by 
the logic of structural changes, something which can be seen clearly 
reflected in indicators of well-being and of human development, as well 
as poverty indexes. 
One of my colleagues at the faculty has demonstrated the 
existence of important changes using the most recent and detailed 
statistics, from both the Mexican National Census System run by the 
INEGI (National Institute for Statistics, Geography, and Information) 
and the Human Development Index (HDI) by state of the UN's 
"UND P Report on Mexico" (the first set showing information at 
municipal or Basic Geostatistic Area levels, and the second taking into 
consideration over 30 socio-economic variables from income levels and 
employment, to living conditions (existence of piped water, electricity, 
and drainage), and health, to educational levels, among other 
indicators). 4 
3 See Pedro Ponce Javana, El PPP y las comunidades indigenas, Ph.D. T hesis, Universidad 
Aut6noma de Chapingo, Mexico, 2005, still without ex;m1ination date. 
4 See Gabriel Mendoza Pichardo, "Evoluci6n econ6mica y social de !as regiones de Mexico, 
1990-2005", Paper lo the Seminar De las Integraciones Region;des a Ios G unbios Loc;1les, 
Faculty or Economics, UNAM, 2005; see also Gennan Sanchez Daza y M<u·fa Eugenia Marlfnez 
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These changes consist of various significant trends in regional 
development in Mexico fi·om 1980 on: firstly, the increasing polarisation 
of the northern and southern states (all the northern states gained in 
relative share of the total GDP and of GDP per capita, while the states 
in the Pacific, Centre and S-SE regions lost out); secondly, between the 
1980s and the year 2000 the tendency towards convergence of GDP and 
per capita GDP among the states that existed from 1950 to 1980 can be 
said to have decelerated; thirdly, that if we order the population 
according to strata of well-being, the northern states possess tl1e best 
indicators both on the upper and the lower strata (indicating that a 
higher percentage of their population belong to the highest level of well-
being indicators and a lower percentage is located on the lowest level}, 
while tl1e worst-off region is that of the S-SE, tl1e states standing out for 
having the worst indicators being Chiapas, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. It has 
been said, quite rightly, that poverty is not just another variable but ilie 
key factor explaining almost everything that goes on in the S-SE. The 
other crucial factor is the existence of abundant energy resources. 
THE PPP AS REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN SOUTH-
SOUTHEAST 
As is well known, the PPP appeared in the first year of Vicente Fox's 
administration as a key part of its National Development Plan, focused 
on the links between Mexico's S-SE region (which includes nine states: 
Puebla, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Veracruz, Tabasco, Chiapas, Campeche, 
Yucat{m, and Quintana Roo) and seven Central American countries 
(Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
Panama). It is based on two assumptions: that the region lags behind 
the rest of the country, especially with regard to infrastructure, poverty, 
and marginalisation; and that since Mexico has seen great inequality in 
the implementation of public policies it is necessary to "insert" the 
region into the stream of globalisation.5 
The truth is that from its launch to the present the PPP has 
passed through a number of stages: firstly a propaganda-led launch 
(2000-2001), then a crisis due to popular resistance (2002-2003) , then a 
decline and practical disappearance from public political life (2003-
de l t;t, "El patron de reproclucci6n global: la integraci6n de Ios estaclos del Sureste mexicano", 
El Cotirfjano 129 (2005), UAM-A, Mexico, 75·83. 
5 See Alejandro Alvarez, "The Puebla-P;mama Plan: ~Desan·o llo Regional o de un Enclave 
Trasnacional?", ObsenraLOiio Social de Ame1ica Latina, CLACSO, Argentina, .Tune 2001; see 
also 1-Iepzibah Mui\oz Martinez, "State, Capital and 'Second Nature': Re-territmialization in the 
Plan Puebla Pmmna," Capitalism Nature Socialism, 15.1 (March 2004), Routledge, 67 ·81. 
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2004), to finally move in silence (2005) by means of the projection of a 
new image, the promotion of sustainable development, and a new 
instilutional apparatus, that of the IDB, promoting new local 
participation schemes and alliances with some indigenous communities. 6 
The PPP includes eight initiatives with projects focused on 
sustainable development, human development, natural disaster 
prevention, sustainable tourism, cmrunercial streamlining, 
telecommunications, road networks, and electricity interconnection. 
Later on we will see that these last two, highway infrastructure and 
electricity link-up, are its real budgetary priorities. We can add right 
now that there is clear evidence that the PPP is a link in the chain to 
expand the reach of NAFTA while the hemisphere progresses towards 
the FTAA.7 
It is important to remember that the PPP is not the only plan of 
multinational scope at play in the region, since in 2005 the U.S. signed 
the CAFT A with the Central American countries, an agreement which 
covers the most important Central American states and which will have a 
profound impact on the production, commerce, and economy of these 
countries and of the S-SE states of Mexico. It will generate a significant 
expulsion of labour, above all from agricultural activities, from a part of 
the population which tends to look north to emigrate, which partly 
explains the current obsession of the Republicans witl1 the fronti er 
security agenda in the U.S. and tl1eir plan to stem this flow by raising a 
wall along the border with Mexico while establishing a partial agreement 
on temporary guest workers, while at the same time refusing an amnesty 
for those who are already working in the U.S. undocumented.8 
Also in operation in the region for a number of years is the 
MBC,9 financed by the World Bank, which is formally aimed at 
preserving the biodiversity of four states of the S-SE of Mexico (Chiapas, 
6 This idea is clearly developed by Neil Harvey, in "El capitalismo ecol6gico y el PPP: la 
transfonnaci6n de Ios recursos naturales de Mesoametica," Comercio Ext.e1ior 54.4 (April 
2004), Mexico, 319-327; Laura Carlsen makes a detailed examination of the two basic models 
now at play in the PPP region , the Corporate consetvationist Model and the Indigenous· 
peasant stewardship Model, in "Conservation or privatization!' Biodiversity, the global market 
and the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor," chapter 4 in Gerardo Otero Eel., !Jfexico in 
Transition (Neoliberal Globalism, tile St;1te ;md Civil Society) (London-New York: Zed Books, 
2004) . 
7 These ;u·guments were widely developed in Alejandro A.lvarez and Gabriel Mendoza Pichardo, 
"La InfraestTuctura prioritatia en el PPP y Ios indicadores de bienestar social en el sur-sures te 
de Mexico," Imaginales I (Jan.,July 2005), UNISON, 11-38. 
8 See Laura Carlsen, "From NAFTA to CAFTA to FTAA", available at <http://americas.irc-
online.org/arn/655>; for the analysis on itrunigration bill H.R. 44.37 in U.S. Congress see David 
Bacon, "The Border is a Common Ground Between Us", Fiatlux Redux (19 Dec. 2005), 
available at <hup://wwv.•.fiatlux.info/december2005/bordetisacommongrouncl.html>. 
9 See World Bank, Proyeclo del Con-edor Biol6gico Mesoamen'cano-Mexico, 211 36-ME (6 Dec. 
2000), Washington, D.C. 
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Campeche, Quintana Roo, and Yucatan) and the seven Central 
American states, although in these same states there are numerous 
accusations that the project is really concerned with developing what in 
practice is better known as bio-piracy. 10 
The basic diagnosis of the region's troubles remains the one 
originally formulated by a group of economists lead by Santiago Levy, in 
a technically sophisticated study carried out at the request of the Ernesto 
Zedillo administration after the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas. 11 
According to that study, in the S-SE the agricultural space is poorly 
structured, its industrial space is concentrated in only one part (the state 
of Puebla, though recently assembly plants have been established in 
Puebla, Yucatan, and Chiapas), communications are deficient, and its 
predominantly youthful demographic pattern contrasts with the mostly 
rural distribution of its population (60% dispersed over a huge rural 
area, that is to say nearly 11.5 million people living in settlements of less 
than 2,500 people and 5.3 million in settlements of less than 15,000 
people), with 11 million people concentrated in 156 urban areas below 
the size of the national average. 12 
BASIC FEATURES OF THE CURRENT STATE AND THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL 
OF THE S-SE REGION 
The S-SE of Mexico covers 25% of the territory of the country (around 
half a million square kilometres) and around 18% of the population in 
the 2000 census, which generates 11.6% of the country's GDP. Of this 
population, over 4 million are indigenous peoples, (out of a total of 6 
million in the country as a whole), so that in the region the languages 
most widely-spoken after Spanish are Nahuatl, Maya, Zapoteco, and 
Mixteco, though in each state a further eight to fifteen languages are in 
use, which together with geographical isolation explains the 
precariousness of basic education levels.13 T his also explains the 
reference to a region of huge cultural and linguistic diversity. 
To top it all, the poverty indicators and tl1e geographical 
situation have become a nightmare since the majority of the states in the 
region are located in a zone which due to its geographical conditions is 
I 0 Another delailed and ctilical review of that Projecl e<m be found in Gian Carlo Oelgado, 
Biodiversidad, Desan ollo sustenlable y M1litaJizaci6n, Plaza .lanes-CIII-1. UNAM, Mexico, 
2004, p<11ticularly chapter 2. 
11 See S;mliago Levy, "El Sur t<11nbien ex isle: un ensayo sob re el desaJTollo regional de Mexico", 
Agenda Estadistica del JNEGI (lnslitulo Naciona.l de Estadislica e Informalica) , Mexico, 2000. 
12 See Fr<111cisco Garcia Moclezuma, chaper I , 152. 
13 See Pedro Ponce .)av;ma, chapter 4.. 
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highly vulnerable to natural disasters, given the incidence of hurricanes, 
earthquakes, and volcanic activity. 
As we have pointed out, the region comprises nine states and is 
very rich in natural resources: it concentrates almost 80% of the oil 
reserves in Mexico (in Tabasco, Campeche, and Veracruz), while the 
petrochemical complexes in the state of V eracruz generate 90% of the 
oil products consumed in the country. The four Mexican states which 
border on Guatemala and Belize (Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and 
Quintana Roo) possess the run-off of one third of the water in Mexico 
and the abundance of water has brought hydroelectric development as a 
consequence, such that four dams in the S-SE provide 40% of the 
country's hydroelectric energy. If we also take into account that 70% of 
the country's energy is provided by thermo-electric plants, the fuel for 
which is extracted from Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Veracruz, 
this adds up to a key region for Mexico's energy. 
In the Mexican states of the S-SE and the Central American 
states as a whole, 10% of the planet's biodiversity is concentrated, so it 
should not be surprising that the World Bank launched the MBC 
project in the region. However, today agricultural activity is important to 
the population, from subsistence cultivation of corn, rice, and beans, to 
commercial cultivation of soya, African palm, coffee, bananas, mangos, 
and pineapples. Generally speaiUng, the worst threat comes from the 
menace of the introduction of genetically modified seeds (GMOs), a 
problem that can very rapidly accelerate destruction of life in many 
communities. A significant statistic released by the Federal Office for 
Agriculture in 2001 states that in the S-SE social property predominates 
(essentially cooperative property) in 70.8% of the total area, while private 
property covers 26.2%. Federal lands and agricultural colonies 
represent 3%. 
In October 2003 the same Federal Office for Agriculture 
identified three groups of states with the greatest levels of poverty and 
the lowest standards of living: in Group 1, Chiapas, Guerrero, and 
Oaxaca with a total of 10.5 million inhabitants; in Group 2, Campeche, 
Tabasco, Veracruz, Hidalgo, Puebla, and San Luis Potosi with a total of 
20 million inhabitants; and in Group 3 the states of Guanajuato, 
Michoacan, and Zacatecas with a population of 10.5 million. Altogether 
we are talking about over 40 million inhabitants in thirteen states, just 
four more than the number maiUng up the S-SE region. 14 
Since it contains impressive natural beauties and pre-Hispanic 
and colonial archaeology and architecture, tourism is a key factor, 
consisting of several 'corridors' of huge importance for Mexico. These 
14 See Pedro Ponce .Javana, chapter 4. 
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are both on the Pacific (the so-called 'Sun Triangle' in Guerrero 
including Taxco, Acapulco, and Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo, and in Oaxaca, 
covering the state capital, Huatulco and Puerto Escondido) as well as on 
the well-known Gulf-Caribbean route in Yucatin (the Cancun-Tulum 
corridor and the routes of the 'Mayan World') while in Chiapas there is 
the Jungle-Sierra tourist corridor including Palenque, Agua Azul, 
Montebello, and San Crist6bal de las Casas. 
Another feature of decided importance and worthy of attention 
is that the S-SE region has not only become an important region for the 
expulsion of labour towards the North - due above all to the agricultural 
crisis resulting from Mexico joining the NAFTA15 - but is also a transit 
zone for Central American migrants whose destination is the same. In 
2002, the regional police force in Chiapas made nearly 50% of total 
arrests of foreign migrants without papers, which together with the 
arrests made in Tabasco add up to 56% of those made in the whole 
country. If we include Veracruz and Oaxaca, we can see that 
international migration affects the whole southern frontier of Mexico. 
The majority of migrants from other countries enter via the Soconusco 
zone and use the coastal strip of Chiapas as a corridor, where the border 
posts made 54% of the arrests carried out in 2002. Arrest figures from 
the National Institute for Immigration indicate that the majority come 
from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, representing 56.4%, 
25.1 %, and 14.6% respectively in 2002. 16 
The growing militarisation of the southern frontier on the 
pretext of combating drug trafficking, the reinforcement of border 
control posts, and the proliferation of Central American gangs even 
within Mexico (such as the Mara Salvatrucha or maras) together raise 
the spectacle of an intensification of a series of violations of the human 
rights of Central American migrants, many of them still minors. This is 
a matter which should receive more attention from the bodies in charge 
of protecting human rights. 
Finally, though by no means of lesser importance, the S-SE 
region and some Central American countries are located geographically 
on the crossroads of the commercial routes between Europe, Asia, and 
North America. On the basis of the historical experience of the Panama 
Canal, which was constructed to reduce transport costs between the east 
and west coasts of the U.S., and the present saturation of the trading 
routes through the Panama Canal and to the port of Long Beach, 
15 See Aida H ernandez Castillo, "Las migraciones hacia el Norte en Zona Mam. Nuevas 
identidades y Nuevos Cruces de Fronteras," paper to the Seminar on New Identities, 
Universidad de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas, 2004. 
16 See Angeles Cruz, Hugo, "Las migraciones intemacionales en el Soconusco, Chiapas: un 
fen6meno cada vez mas complejo," Comercio Exteiior54.4 (April2004), Mexico, 312-318. 
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California, several alternatives have been proposed for multi-modal 
communication and even 'dry canals' to improve the communication 
networks and lower the costs of transport to and from North America. 
The project for a railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in 
Mexico was launched many years ago (in fact the idea was first put out in 
the last third of the 19'" century), 17 but dry canals and railroads are 
options now also being contemplated in Guatemala, Hondmas, and 
Nicaragua. This implies a cluster of massive investments in physical 
infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports, airports, telecommunications 
networks, electricity networks, etc.) which at one point the World Bank 
estimated at a cost of $20 billion USD every year for the next ten years. 
Such investments have subtle territorial implications for 
sovereignty, security, and administration, as can be seen in the case of 
Panama, such that it is perhaps one of the most politically delicate points 
in transnational relations, as much between Mexico and Central 
America as between the latter and the rest of North America. The PRD 
(Party of the Democratic Hevolution) candidate for the presidency, 
Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador, has made explicit his intention to go 
ahead with the project for the Isthmus railroad. 
However within the region, as much as these communication 
and transport networks facilitate rapid and cheap access to zones 
cmrently isolated but rich in resources (forests, fuel, biodiversity), they 
also raise delicate political problems with the local communities, 
particularly the indigenous groups, that tend to see such projects with 
great suspicion since they always imply a direct loss of territory, 
resources, and means of living, when they already live in a precarious 
situation. 
According to estimates by Sanchez Daza y Martinez de Ita in 
2000, 76% of the employed population in Chiapas lives on one 
minimum wage or less, or simply earn no income, the same income 
level as that of 72% of the employed population in Oaxaca, 67.6% in 
Yucatan, 64% in Campeche, 63.9% in Puebla, 62.3% in Tabasco, and 
40.4% in Quintana Roo. 18 The states with the highest indigenous 
population that earn less than one minimum wage are Yucatan, Chiapas, 
and Oaxaca; those with the highest indigenous population that receive 
no salary are Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Veracruz. 
17 An impressive recount of the long history of d1is Project can be found in Hip6lito Rodriguez, 
"El Istmo de Tehuantepec y sus Lecturas," Comercio ExteJior54.4 (April 2004), Mexico, 296-
311. 
18 See German Sanchez Daza and Maria Eugenia Mart:inez de Ita, "El patron de reproducci6n 
global: la integraci6n de Ios estados del Sureste mexicano," El Cotidiano 129 (2005), UAM-A, 
Mexico, Table 7, 83. 
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In this respect it is important to mention a key example, given 
that experts speak of the future of the Usumacinta river basin [which 
runs along the border between Chiapas, Tabasco, and Guatemala and 
which is part of the settlement of the Zapatista Army for National 
Liberation (EZLN)), regarding the use of water to generate electricity, 
tl1e exploitation of oil reserves, ecotourism, the exploitation of the jungle 
for genetic material, agricultural cultivation, and water-based activities. 
It is not surprising therefore that the indigenous population in 
the region objects to some of the projects for developing the hydraulic 
infrastructure, given tl1at for example, in the area of the Usumacinta 
basin alone, it is estimated that hydroelectric dams will affect 8,700 km' 
of Tabasco lands, and in Chiapas the Quetzalli dam will cover 570 km', 
tile Huixtan I dam 90 km', tl1e Jattza dam 29 km', and the Nance dam 
14 km'.19 
To sum up, we can highlight several significant features from the 
point of view of sectoral specialisation: these states are highly specialised 
in sectors related to natural resource exploitation, such as oil in 
Tabasco, Campeche, and Chiapas, petrochemicals in tl1e state of 
Veracruz, and hydroelectricity in Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and 
Quintana Roo; meanwhile tourism is important in Yucatan, Oaxaca, 
Guerrero, and Chiapas; Puebla has the highest manufacturing GDP and 
the highest sectoral diversification in tile region, but almost 70% of the 
manufacturing GDP is concentrated in just two branches: machinery 
and equipment (automobiles), and food and drinks.20 These features 
have important consequences for the deployment of any regional 
development plan. 
IS THE 'ONE SIZE FITS ALL' ECONOMIC POLICY MODEL SUITABLE FOR A 
BACKWARD REGION? 
From tile original diagnosis to the most recent version of the PPP it has 
been understood that "insertion into the stream of globalisation" consists 
in opening, privatising, and deregulating, which are the fundamentals of 
neoliberalism. But in our view, this is exactly what has been keeping the 
region backward. An enclave-type outward oriented development and 
its very resource-intensive nature is precisely the model that has been 
applied historically in the S-SE region, from the oil boom in the second 
half of the 1970s through to the present day. 
19 See Antonino Garda Garda, Las cuencas hidrogr;i/jcas comp;u·lidas Mexico-Gualemala-Belice: 
una opci6n de desarrollo reg1'onal, paper to the Congress of Guatemala Economists, 
Quetzaltenango, 2004. 
20 See German Sanchez Daza y Marfa Eugenia Martfnez de Ita, Table 4, 8 1. 
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To further open, privatise, and deregulate the energy sector, the 
most strategic of the PPP's initiatives, would imply touching on a very 
sensitive part of the country's makeup, identity, and long term survival. 
Furthermore, the PPP's reconfiguration in action goes far beyond 
regional levels instead focusing on federal levels (the Congress of the 
Union), and implies radical changes in articles of the National 
Constitution. This requires a two-thirds majority of Congress votes, 
which now can only be found between the PRI and the PAN, today at 
odds in the area of energy reform, even though only the PAN was 
offering constitutional changes during the most recent electoral 
campwgns. 
The PPP has been presented as a regional development plan 
that "must be based on planning and coordination." But in the list of 
priorities there has been no mention of planning anything resembling a 
policy on agriculture (a very important sector for the indigenous 
communities in the region), nothing for an environmental policy (unless 
one includes the effective military occupation of wildlife reserves) 
despite the area being deeply affected by the insensitive exploitation of 
its oil (a problem which is taking on the dimensions of a large-scale 
ecological crisis) . 
This is not scw-emongering: "between 1997 and 2001 alone 
1,470 environmental disasters of all scales occurred in Mexico; PEMEX 
was responsible for 89% of these with the most affected states being 
V eracruz with 34% of the total, Campeche with 28%, and Tabasco with 
27% of all the disasters, which are part both of the principal oil-
producing zones and of the S-SE of Mexico (together they account for 
58% of all disasters). As if this were not enough, PEMEX was 
responsible for 57% of the environmental emergencies owing to 
hazw-dous substances on a national level. "21 
The indigenous reform approved by the Congress eliminates 
any legal recognition of the rights of indigenous communities over the 
natural resources surrounding their communities, so the PPP does not 
offer anything like a coordination with affected communities. Strictly 
speaking, the only federal plans made explicit up to now have been 
plans for construction of road infrastructure and energy interconnection. 
Information on the purpose and amounts of expenditures 
shows that of the almost $4.225 billion USD destined by both public 
(which in the documents include multilateral organisations such as the 
International Development Bank) and private sources of financing to 
21 See Nora Lina Montes, J\1exico: la reforma energetica y su impacto regional, unpublished 
mrumsc1ipt, paper to the Seminar de !as lntegraciones Regionales a Ios Cambios Locales, 
Economic Faculty, UNAM, ]une 2005. 
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projects defined before .June 2002, only two of the PPP projects seem to 
have benefited from significant financial support: the "International 
Network of Mesoamerican Highways" ('RICAM' in Spanish, agreed to 
in an 'understanding' signed in July 2002) and the "Mexico-Guatemala 
Electricity lnterconnection."22 
The first involves almost 9,000 km of a highway network 
including a 3,159 km Pacific corridor and a 1,745 km Atlantic corridor, 
plus branches and regional connections adding up to the total figure, 
noting that not all of these are new constructions but in many cases a 
question of money for maintenance and improvement work. The cost 
is $3.6 billion USD. 
A number of important points may be added: in the case of 
Mexico, the whole Pacific corridor will be financed by the federal 
government, while in the case of Central America the IDB, the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration, the World Bank, and 
governments such as the Swedish government would all play a part. For 
the Atlantic corridor, the Mexican section would be paid for by the 
fed eral government while again in Central America the IDB, the World 
Bank, and the Kuwaiti government would pay. There are, however, 
doubts about the congruency of the figures, since the 'Chiapas bridge' 
alone, which since December 2003 connects Tuxtla Gutierrez with the 
petrochemical corridor of Cosoleacaque and with Mexico City, has been 
confirmed to have cost $200 million USD, while the Mexican 
Department of Transport and Communications admitted that its entire 
budget for 2002 was $625 million USD.23 
The electricity link-up, meanwhile, supposedly had a budget of 
$320 million USD, $250 million USD of which were conb·ibuted by the 
IDB and $70 million USD by the Spanish govermnent (the project has 
an estimated value of $320 million USD). Undoubtedly it is a more 
transparent project from a financial point of view. As tl1e IDB 
document about the progress of the Mexico-Guatemala interconnection 
project dated August 1, 2003 informs us, an investment of $60 million 
USD leads to the construction of 80 km of power lines. The resources 
for the rest of the project are on a much smaller scale. 
Up to this point, Vicente Fox's government maintains that it has 
invested thousands of millions of pesos in establishing a different 
relationship with the Central American countries. But the PPP has not 
only been removed from public view in terms of propaganda, but 
22 lnf01mation has been taken from Alejandro Alvarez and Gab1iel Mendoza Pichardo, "La 
Infraestructura priorita1ia en el PPP y Ios indicadores de bienesta.r social en el sur-sureste de 
Mexico," Imaginales I (2005), UNISON, Mexico, 28-36. 
23 See Vicente Fox Quesada, Tercer Infonne de Gobiemo, Mexico, September 2002. 
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moreover there is a lack of transparency about the amounts and 
destinations of governmental actions. This is a very delicate matter if we 
take into account the number of complaints in Chiapas, Veracruz, 
Yucatan, and Quintana Roo in the last hurricane season about the lack 
of support for the devastated communities, the prioritising of 
economically advantaged sectors, the hiding of goods which had been 
collected by community organisations in solidarity with the victims, and 
worst of all, the delays in the delivery of assistance to condition it to 
electoral ends. In this respect we can see similarities with the altitude of 
George W. Bush's government towards the victims of the hurricane in 
New Orleans. 
This explains why social resistance against several of the projects 
associated with the PPP in these and other areas has intensified, such as 
the recent agricultural workers' protests against La Parota dam in 
Guerrero. More than 350 social organisations from Central American 
countries and S-SE Mexican states have openly declared themselves 
against the PPP and are still actively working throughout the region. 
Finally, when it comes to talk of "inserting the region into the 
stream of globalisation," because imports and exports are overly 
concentrated in the state of Puebla, a number of questions arise. The S-
SE's dominant agricultural products are crops which depend very highly 
on international markets, such as corn, beans, sugar, rice, bananas, and 
above all, coffee; while changing perspective and looking at the richness 
of biodiversity, at least two large national industrial groups -Pulsar and 
Bimbo - are already exploiting those resources, not to mention the 
multinationals Nestle and Coca-Cola which are to be found in every 
corner of the region. In this sense the region does not need to 
incorporate itself into globalisation, as this has already happened. 
In tl1e case of the region's industries - oil, petrochemicals, 
electricity, and textiles - these also have strong dependencies on 
international markets and commodity value chains going back many 
years . Although in the case of the energy sector, activities are presently 
dominated by public sector companies, there is a marked concentration 
of infrastructure in just a few municipalities and urban centers . As we 
have seen, this has led to accentuated disparities within the region, the 
pillaging of natural resources, and upsets in the ecological balance not 
only in urban areas, but even more in coastal zones, ports, and rivers in 
a region with a very delicate ecology: the humid tropical lands. 
Tourism too is highly subject to international currents, precisely 
because of the region's great nat11ral attractions. Here it is evident that 
large national and multinational corporations have had more success in 
marketing the region's archaeological, natural, and architectural 
attractions than have local or regional companies or communities. 
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Furthermore, the linear relationship established in the PPP 
between communications and development remains problematic. A 
recent study conducted by a student of the Economics Faculty at 
UNAM has found that from a total of 333,840 km of the Mexican 
highway system, 31.4% belongs to the S-SE region, paradoxically in 
Chiapas, the state with the longest road system within the region. 
Furthermore, highway density for the region is above the national 
average, with Tabasco and Yucatan twice that size. Correlating railroad 
infrastructure and HDI, the same study finds that Chiapas is third in 
road system development while last in HDI. The point then is that the 
government is investing in the S-SE because these states do not have 
high specifications as required by an export oriented economy, this is to 
say, highways with four or more lanes. 24 
We also must consider that there are already privately-run 
freeways linking several parts of the country, but their benefits have not 
been reflected regionally. Worse, they represent notable financial 
catastrophes with grave repercussions in public finances up until the 
present. In sum, the region's insertion into the stream of globalisation is 
common currency and its devastating effects are clear to anyone who 
cares to see them. 
To conclude, without explicit public policies, built under 
consensus with the local communities in all of the above-mentioned 
areas, it is very difficult to speak of a "strategy of regional development." 
Emphasis on sustainable development is the only long term 
solution to conservation needs in the region, but in such a process it is 
crucial to accept that only with local populations regaining a central role 
in resource management will we assure the patrimony and the future of 
the next generations. 
Furthermore, where communities of indigenous groups are 
expelled by force to change land-use, the result will deepen economic 
genocide and natural resource depletion, already accelerated with 
neoliberal economic policies. In mainstream economic theory, "well 
being" is always measured by increased levels of global production and 
consumption, ignoring the impact on conservation. As Laura Carlsen 
said, market based mechanisms promoted by the World Bank to 
guarantee sustainable development are "essentially a strategy that leaves 
the wolf to guard the sheep."25 
24 See Karla Parma Pardinez, Politicas regionales, lnkaestructura Can etera y Desan ollo Regional: 
Eswdio e Impacto en el Sur-Sureste, B.A. Thesis, Faculty of Economics, UNAM, Mexico, June 
2006. 
25 See Laura Carlsen, 52. 
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The time has come to challenge that view, supporting the 
peasant economy in organic production schemes, promoting the value 
of production for local consumption, the respect of traditional 
knowledge as well as natural resources such as land, forests, water, and 
biodiversity as collective goods not subject to privatisation. This is not to 
call for an isolationism nor a "pure and idyllic conservationism" that 
denies linkages with global markets, but a call to redefine the model for 
sustainable development under the free trade schemes. 26 
Of course, international coordination should be another 
important factor, exempting agriculture from "free trade" schemes and 
WTO regulations, rejecting monoculture agriculture and promoting 
organic alternatives, stopping the accelerated exploitation of energy 
resources, enforcing control of eo, emissions, strictly regulating 
bioprospecting, and promoting changes in mega-project expenditure 
priorities as in the PPP. 
26 See Graham Dunkley, Free trade, Myth, Reality and Alternatives (London-New York: Zed 
Books, 2004), particularly chapters 7 and 8. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Mexican territory is extremely rich in biological and cultural 
diversily and thus provides an important and interesting case for 
examining the relationship between indigenous and other rural 
communities and environmental conservation initiatives. After briefly 
reviewing historical and legal factors that shape the relationship between 
rural communities, land, and resources in Mexico, I will examine the 
particular case of the Calakmul region in southeastern Campeche. 
Drawing from the anthropological research I have done on a Canadian 
"sustainable development" project there, I will discuss the ways in which 
this project sometimes reproduced and sometimes challenged 
historically entrenched hierarchical relations between state 
representatives and ejido communities, and belween men and women, 
and left many environmental concerns still to be addressed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mexico is a country with tremendous biological and cultural diversity. 
From coasts to mountains, and from the arid north to the rainy south, 
an extraordinary range of physical environments is found. In terms of 
species of plants and animals, Mexico has very high degree of 
biodiversily. Agriculture has been practiced in Mexico for at least 
10,000 years, contributing further to the biological and ecological 
diversity of the region. The cultural diversity of indigenous groups and 
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the variety of subsistence and livelihood strategies they have devised 
through time are equally remarkable. 
There are therefore both tremendous incentives and 
considerable potential for environmentally sustainable development in 
rural areas. But because many rural Mexicans depend for their 
livelihoods on soil, water, forests, and other biological resources, and 
often compete with agriculture, forestry, and mining industries for access 
to resources, the challenges are daunting. Mexico is therefore an 
important and interesting case for exam1mng enviromnental 
conservation initiatives and conflicts. Much is at stake in terms of the 
biological and cultural diversity, and so much can be learned from both 
successful and problematic initiatives. The Mexican case also makes 
clear that enviromnental concerns are also ecological, social, cultural, 
political, and economic concerns, and must be understood in historical 
context. 
This paper therefore begins by explaining what anthropological 
perspectives contribute to understanding enviromnental concerns and 
conflicts in rural areas. It then outlines historical and legal factors that 
have shaped relationships between rural communities, land, and 
biological resources in Mexico. The central focus of the paper is the 
Calakmul Model Forest, a Canadian-funded sustainable development 
project in the state of Campeche (see figure 1), that I studied from 1996-
1998 for the dissertation upon which this paper is based. 1 
CHIAPAS 
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Figure I. Yucatan Peninsula showing location of CaJakmul 
Model Forest, CaJakmul Biosphere Rese1ve, and other nearby Biosphere 
Rese1ves (from Murphy 2003a). 
I Murphy 2003a. 
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11. ANTHROPOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT 
Environmental concerns are often considered to be technical questions 
that fall into the realm of the natural sciences, or the applied branch -
environmental management - or to be the result of flawed political or 
economic systems, and therefore best understood by political scientists 
or economists. If cultural factors are invoked in discussions of 
environmental concerns, it is usually with reference to indigenous 
peoples or because certain cultural ideas are considered backward or 
obstacles to progress. Anthropological studies, however, that explore 
people's material relations to their environment - how livelihoods are 
made in fields, forests, and waters - as well as the cultural values, 
historical experiences, and political relationships that shape these 
livelihoods and life-ways - can contribute to a much fuller 
understanding of the origins of environmental concerns and possible 
means of addressing them. 
Ethnographic research on sustainable development, based on 
participant observation, interviews, and related research methods, 
describes how development initiatives unfold in complex social and 
political contexts. It does not prescribe how they should unfold, or 
evaluate their success or failure in reaching development goals. My 
work in Calakmul drew on recent anthropological research that 
considers "development" not as a universal project in human 
advancement, but as the exercise of particular forms of power in specific 
historical and cultural contexts. Escobar (1995) and Ferguson (1994) 
interpret the institutions, practices, and discourses of development as 
ones in which both the agents and subjects of development are actors 
informed by cultural assumptions and enmeshed in relations of power. 
Earlier anthropological studies of development focused on the impacts 
of development projects on so-called local populations, or aimed to 
make development interventions more culturally sensitive. The newer 
perspective has been called the anthropology of development. 2 
My study focused on three groups of people differently 
positioned in relation to the Calakmul Model Forest. These were: the 
staff of the Calakmul Model Forest; the directors of the Regional 
Council of X-Pujil (the campesino organisation with which the Model 
Forest worked very closely); and tl1e men and women who were 
members of ejidos3 involved in Model Forest prqjects. 
2 Grillo and StitTat 1997:vii. 
3 The ejido is a complex institution unique to Mexico. According to Whetten (1948: 182) , "The 
tenn ejido ... refe rs to an agra1ian community which has received and continues to ho ld land in 
accordance with the agr;uian laws growing out of tl1e Revolution of 1910. The lands may have 
been received as an outright grant from the government or as restitution of lands tllat were 
74 julia E. Murphy 
But Ferguson's and Escobar's approach to development 
involves more than a wider definition of what kinds of people should be 
the focus of ethnographic studies. Working from a Foucauldian 
perspective, these authors are concerned with the relationship between 
power and knowledge in the field of development, in the construction of 
the field and subjects of development. For example, Ferguson notes 
how, "'Development,' insistently formulated as a benign and universal 
human project, has been the point of insertion for a bureaucratic power 
that has been neither benign nor universal in its application,"4 and 
Escobar notes that, "Witl1 the exception of applied practitioners, 
anthropologists have shown little interest in the discourses and practices 
of development, despite the fact that these discourses and practices 
greatly shape the individuals and communities which constitute tl1e 
subject of their inquiry."5 
My study therefore examined how the institutions, practices, 
and discourses of "sustainable development" came to play in the 
complex political and cultural field of Calakmul in 1996-1998. In 
particular, the influx of funds for sustainable development projects in 
the region, following the creation of the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve, 
resulted in a regional sustainable development effort that made 
Calakmul an ideal area in which to investigate how global environmental 
and feminist concerns had altered notions and practices of rural 
"development" in one part of Mexico. 
One of the contributions that ethnographic approaches to 
development can make is to "identify struggles and spaces in which 
important changes can be and are made."6 In my work I explored the 
ways in which involvement in sustainable development projects and 
activities created opportunities for women to promote their interests 
and/or challenge dominant local gender ideologies, as well as the ways in 
which this involvement reproduced unequal gender relations.? 
An important part of the study involved examining the history 
of state-peasant relations, forest exploitation, and land use in Calakmul, 
from the early 20'" century to the present. Since the beginning of the 20'" 
century the Mexican state has sought to control land tenure and forest 
use in Calakmul through various means and for various purposes. The 
forests had served first as a source of exportable forest products. During 
previously possessed by the community and adjudged by the govenunent to have been illegally 
appropriated by other individuals o r groups; or the community may merely have received 
confirmation by the govemment of titles to land long in its possession." 
4 Ferguson 1994:267. 
5 Escobar 1991b:6 19. 
6 Watts 2001:286. 
7 See Murphy 2003b. 
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the first half of the century forest concessions were granted to foreign 
and then national interests. Beginning in the 1960s lands were granted 
to campesinos grouped as ejidos in a program of ejidal colonisation. 
Relationships between government officials, development workers, and 
ejidatarios in the mid-1990s reflected this history. The historical 
experiences of people involved in the commercial exploitation of the 
region's forests and in ejidal colonisation shaped their reaction to, and 
engagement with, sustainable development. For example, one 
important observation of my study was that, whatever notions the 
Canadians might have had about how the Model Forest stalf would 
work, these had little influence on the relationships of project stalf with 
the ejidatarios/as of Calakmul, and more to do with past practices Of 
rural development in Carnpeche and in Mexico. And in the case of 
women in the ejidos, although the Model Forest devised projects to 
involve them, these prqjects did not address the fact that, historically, 
women have been for the most part excluded from the e]idal assemblies 
that have the legal authority to direct the activities of ejidos. 
Ill. AGRARIAN HISTORY AND "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT" 
The Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) profoundly altered the political 
and economic trajectory of the nation. The 1917 Constitution 
established agrarian reform as a keystone of relations between the state 
and its citizens. Article 27 gave groups of landless people the right to 
petition for land to which they had no prior claim and which was 
granted in the communal form called the ejido. It also gave established 
communities that could demonstrate previous, long-standing, communal 
use of land and water the means to petition for their rights to be 
formalised as comundidades. Agrarian reform progressed in fits and 
starts during ensuing decades, altering structures of land ownership to 
greater and lesser degrees in regions across the country. By the mid-
1990s slightly less than 40% of the Mexican territory was held in ejidos 
and comumdades. 28,000 e1idos had been established, where roughly 3 
million eJidatarios and their families worked, 8 and well over 50% of 
Mexico's forested lands were communally held.9 
There has been ongoing, often ideological debate about 
communal forms of land tenure and the political structures instituted 
under agrarian law to govern them, and whether these perpetuate 
poverly or are a necessary foundation for viable rural communities. 
What is certain is that agrarian law means ejidos, comunidades, and 
8 Ranclall 1996:328. 
9 Bray et al. 2003:673. 
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their members have complex, evolving relationships with the Mexican 
state and its bureaucratic branches, mediated by a range of campesino 
organisations. The revolutionary underpinnings of the agrarian law 
continue to bear considerable political weight in rural Mexico. The 
discourse campesino/as use to make claims to resources and to assert 
rights clearly reflect Mexico's post-revolutionary history. 
It has also been debated whether communal forms of land 
tenure create communities motivated to address environmental 
concerns collectively, or lead inevitably to the so-called tragedy of the 
commons. Regardless, given the large proportion of Mexican lands held 
in communal forms and the complexity of the relationship between 
members of ejidos and comum"dades and the agrarian reform 
bureaucracy, agrarian politics shape environmental conflicts in rural 
Mexico. In other words, environmental programs proposed for rural 
areas dominated by communal forms of land tenure, such as Calakmul, 
often raise historically charged questions about rights to land and 
resources, and responsibilities to regulate their use. Agrarian history 
gives land, as well as forests, water, and other resources, particular and 
powerful meanings. These differ from the meanings and values 
associated with them in sustainable development discourse. 
"Sustainable development" is the field of development that 
attempts to reconcile the apparently contradictory goals of development 
and environmental protection. This field developed as a result of the 
encounter between western environmentalists and the institutions of 
development beginning in the mid-1980s. 10 After it was championed by 
the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, Our Common Future, sustainable development became 
the predominant mode through which concerns about global ecology 
and Third World environments are expressed. The concept of 
"sustainable development" has guided development projects around the 
world and in some of its remotest corners, including the Model Forest 
concept in ten Model Forests in Canada and tl1e Calakmul Model 
Forest in 1993.ll It has also been applied to a series of other rural 
development projects undertaken in Calakmul in the 1990s, to Model 
Forests elsewhere in Mexico, and in ten other countries. 
The disjuncture between agrarian history and sustainable 
development, as hiVO ways of understanding relations between rural 
people, the state, and natural resources, is critical to understanding how 
sustainable development initiatives, such as the Calakmul Model Forest, 
unfold in rural Mexico. This is not to say, however, that "global" 
10 Adams 1995. 
11 Beyers 200 l. 
Anthropological Perspectives on Environmental Concerns in Rural Mexico 77 
environmental perspectives have no resonance in rural Mexico, or that 
environmental concern is necessarily and always in opposition to 
agrarian rights. The concept ecologfa productiva that guided the 
planning of the Model Forest is an example of an effort to bring the two 
perspectives together, 12 and social action based on environmental 
concern has taken different forms in different parts of Mexico. 13 
Nevertheless, the disjuncture has not always been recognised by 
international and internationally-funded environmental actors that have 
attempted to implement programs based on concepts of sustainable 
development originating from other political contexts. This was 
certainly the case in Calakmul, 14 where the influence of "global" 
environmental funds and perspectives can be traced through time. 
IV. NEOLIBERAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REFORMS 
National and international attention came to focus on Calakmul's 
extensive tropical forests as Mexico entered the negotiations that led to 
the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1993. In the context of those negotiations, Mexico sought to 
demonstrate its commitment to addressing both deteriorating 
environmental conditions and security concerns about · its southern 
border. The creation of the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve in 1989 was a 
central element of President Salinas de Gortari's effort to improve 
Mexico's environmental reputation in the international arena. 15 With 
an area of 723,185 hectares, the Reserve is one of the largest protected 
natural areas, and the largest area of protected tropical forest, in Mexico. 
During the same period, and for similar reasons, Mexico was 
implementing a set of neoliberal reforms that included liberalising 
markets, the sale of nationally-owned enterprises, the privatisation of 
government services, the end of agrarian reform, and the reduction of 
state-provided services in rural areas. 16 Changes to Article 27 of the 
Constitution through the 1992 Agrarian Law of Mexico not only ended 
the distribution of land but also gave ejidatarios the legal right to sell, 
rent, sharecrop, or mortgage their land, as well as to enter into joint 
ventures with private entrepreneursY The PROCEDE program18 
12 See Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1994a. 
13 See Simonian 1995. 
14 See also Haenn 2005. 
15 Dauzier 1999. 
16 Dresser 1991. 
17 DeWalt, Rees, and Murphy 1994. 
18 Prog1ama de CertiHcaci6n de Derechos Ejidales y Titulaci6n de Solares Urbanos/ Program for 
the Certification ofEjida!Land Rights and the Tilling of Urban House Plots. 
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divided all or part of many ejidos into parcels to which ejidatarios were 
given individual title. These changes were intended to foster investment 
of capital and technology in the ejidal sector and revitalise rural 
economies. 
The environmental measures introduced by Salinas de Gortari 
included programs to improve air quality in Mexico City19, a national 
reforestation campaign, a ban on the commercial hunting and uses of 
marine turtles, the creation of protected natural areas, including the 
Calakmul Biosphere Reserve,20 and two major revisions of the 
environmental law (Ley General de Equilibrio Ecol6gica y Protecci6n al 
Ambiente).21 Critics have argued that these measures, although 
responding to concerns expressed in Mexico, were primarily a response 
to international pressure and not a definite commitment of the state to 
addressing environmental degradation through transforming the 
dominant development model. 22 
Noting the apparent contradiction between environmental and 
neoliberal reforms, Vasquez-Leon described how they were linked in 
efforts towards "gaining acceptance as a fully integrated partner in the 
global economic order."23 Together they became central elements in 
the process of economic and political "modernisation" Mexico has 
undergone since the late 1980s. In rural areas changes to agrarian, 
forestry, and water laws were central. Bray noted that, "The reforms to 
the land tenure regime were not first and foremost an environmental 
measure, although the supporting legislation, notably the new forest and 
water laws, take on a more explicitly environmental tone."24 Proponents 
of the new agrarian laws had argued that changes to eji"dal tenure, 
through fostering greater investment in, and increased productivity of, 
ejidal lands, would create greater incentives to address environmental 
degradation. In other words market incentives, restrained by the ·new 
forestry and water laws, were expected to encourage resource 
conservation and attention to environmental concerns. 
Reforms undertaken at the federal level often play out in quite 
varied and unusual ways in peripheral regions like Calakmul. There, 
effects of environmental reforms were felt primarily in relation to the 
19 Air quality in Mexico City is such an important focus of environmental concem in Mexico, and 
that city has such a hold on the country's media, that air quality sometimes seem to define 
environmental concem for the whole country. On several occasions residents of Calakmul 
described environmental benefits of the Biosphere Reserve to me in terms of improvements to 
local air quality, even though air contamination is very low, except locally, at the end of the dry 
season, when farmers bnm their fields in preparation for sowing corn. 
20 Simonian 1995. 
21 Mumme 1992. 
22 Mumme 1992. 
23 Vasquez-l.e6n 1999:233-34. 
24 Bray 1996:215. 
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creation of the Biosphere Reserve, and those of neoliberal reforms most 
directly in changes in the delivery of government services. The 
Solidaridad programs associated with the Salinas de Gortari 
presidency, 25 most of which required local labour and social 
organisation, were ubiquitous, and the subsidy to corn farmers, 
PROCAMPO, seemed a mere pittance to many. Because almost all 
ejidallands in Calakmul are designated as lands best suited for forests 
and forestry activities, few eji"dos there were eligible to be divided into 
individual plots and lands must continue to be held in common. As a 
result some changes to the Agrarian Law had almost no impact. 
Although it is difficult to separate effects of the various reforms in a 
single location, I would argue that in the case of Calakmul, it was the 
presence of internationally-funded "integrated conservation and 
development" projects through the 1990s that had the greatest impact. 
Not only was southeastern Campeche symbolically transformed from a 
forested frontier to an area of global environmental significance, but new 
forms of organisation and new activities were introduced in many of the 
region's eJidos. 
V. "INTEGRATED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT" IN CALAKMUL 
In the first half of the 20"' century southeastern Campeche had been a 
sparsely populated border area, important as a source of chide (a tree 
resin used to make chewing gum), mahogany, and other forest products. 
Beginning in the 1960s, the federal government promoted agricultural 
colonisation in the region by granting ejidos to landless campesinos from 
across the country. Poor and in some cases desperate, they accepted 
grants in southeastern Campeche. Although the lands are relatively 
unproductive and poorly supplied with water, the relatively large size of 
the land grants compensated to some extent for their quality. By the 
mid-1990s the region had a culturally heterogeneous population 
estimated between 15,000 and 20,000 people, from the states of 
Campeche, Yucatan, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Chiapas, 
living off of small-scale agriculture and animal husbandry, beekeeping, 
forestry activities, small businesses, and government make-work 
programs. 
Mter the creation of the Biosphere Reserve, approximately 
seventy-two ejidos located around the edges of the reserve became the 
focus of a set of initiatives intended to make Calakmul a national and 
international showcase of sustainable development. Most projects 
25 Dresser 1991. 
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reflected current thinking that protection of natural environments 
should not be undertaken at the expense of local communities, but 
instead should enlist their support by demonstrating the economic and 
other benefits of conservation. 
As mentioned at the outset, indigenous people in Mexico have 
historically been both vulnerable to pressures on natural resources and 
resourceful in adapting to change. It is estimated that one quarter of the 
population of Calakmul is indigenous. The largest groups are Yucatec 
Maya speakers from the peninsula and Chol and Tzeltal speakers from 
Chiapas. Many people unfamiliar with the area believe it is 
predominantly Yucatec Maya. Indeed Calakmul is part of the Selva 
Maya, a conservation initiative involving biosphere reserves and forests 
in the adjoining areas of Mexico, Belize, and Guatemala (see figure 1). 
Innumerable Maya archaeological sites, including the ancient city whose 
name is used for the whole region, also contribute to Calakmul's aura of 
"Mayaness," and are used to promote luxury and eco-tourism. This 
simplification belies the cultural diversity of the region's population, 
regional identities (including Tabasquefio/a, Veracruzan/os, 
Campechano/a, and Chiapaneco/a), the importance of interethnic 
relations in the local political dynamic, and, indeed, the broad range of 
cultural traditions that influence social relations within and among 
ejidos, patterns of natural resource use, and forms of political 
participation. 
"Una Reserva Socialmente Ocupada" 
When the creation of the reserve was announced concerns were 
immediately raised in the national press about how local residents would 
be affected. An article in La ]ornada pointed out that Calakmul was a 
"socially-occupied reserve" (una reserva socialmente ocupada) and 
asserted the need for full recognition of the agrarian rights of the people 
whose ejidallands lay near, and in some cases inside, the reserve. In 
fact, the decree creating the reserve did not address the fact that eJi"dal 
lands make up 50% of its area. According to one source, there were 
thirty-one settlements within the reserve when it was created. 26 As a 
result, several eji"dos protested against the reserve. Several groups of 
people who were living in the centre of the reserve agreed to be 
relocated, with the promise of better services in a new site. The forestry 
extension of the ejido of Dzibalchen was purchased by the state. Two 
ejidos whose lands fall pardy inside the reserve boundaries refused to be 
relocated and mounted a legal challenge. In 1993 the case was resolved 
26 Bufete]uridico "TieJTa y Libertad" A.C. 1997. 
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in their favour. Even those whose rights were not so directly threatened 
feared that government authorities would impose stricter regulation of 
forest uses, especially hunting. 
Despite these legal conflicts and uncertainties, once established 
the reserve began to attract Mexican and international funding for rural 
development projects with an environmental focus. These projects used 
a variety of terms to describe their particular approaches. Mexican 
funders used the terms "productive ecology" (ecologfa productiva), while 
World Bank-funded groups used "integrated conservation and 
development," and "community-based natural resource management." 
These approaches were also influenced by reforms to federal 
environmental laws that promoted citizen participation in environmental 
decision-making and linked development and environmental goals. 27 
The federal Environmental Protection Law of 1988, for example, states 
that where there are protected natural areas, the Ministry of the 
Environment, Natural Resources, and Fisheries (SEMAHNAP) has the 
responsibility to: 
1 ... 1 promote the participation of the inhabitants and land-holders, local 
govemments, indigenous peoples, and other public and private social 
organizations, with the goal of fosteting community development and 
asswing the protection and preservation of ecosystems and their 
biodiversily. 28 
The arrival of environmental NGOs and the establishment of a 
regional campesino organisation, the Regional Council of X-Pujil 
( Consejo Regional Agrosilvopecuaiio y de Servicios de X-Pujil), did 
increase possibilities of political participation for some people. 
Calakmul has a reputation as a Mexican conservation success 
story, recognised for the serious commitment made to working with 
local residents towards the goal of sustainable resource use (rather than 
strict "conservation"); new opportunities for, and new kinds of, political 
participation; and the relatively high degree of local acceptance of the 
reserve. The reality is of course more complex than this assessment 
would suggest. Later in this paper I will present some of the results of 
my observations of relations between project staff and campesinos and 
of the efforts of women to "participate" in this new context. 
The Calakmul project was ambitious and well-funded, but 
certainly not the most radical, or even innovative, regional 
environmental proposal in Mexico. Critics have noted tl1e 
contradictions and superficiality of some of the forms of participation 
promoted. Salinas de Gortari's presidency was, of course, marked by 
27 Mumme 1992:135. 
28 Bulete .luridico 'Tien·a y Liberlad" A.C. 1997:12. 
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the challenge to continental economic integration of the Zapatista 
uprising that began in 1994. The EZLN called for political, cultural, 
and territorial autonomy, the recognition of indigenous cultural and 
political rights, and the end to the poverty and marginalisation in which 
so many Mexicans live. The proposals for Calakmul clearly posed 
much less of a challenge to state authorities and institutions. 
For the Chimalapas region of northern Oaxaca, bordering the 
state of Chiapas and Veracruz, Umlas (1998) describes considerable 
opposition in the early 1990s to the idea of establishing a biosphere 
reserve. ProNatura- an NCO also active in Calak.mul- promoted the 
reserve, but a network of indigenous and environmental groups called 
instead for immediate resolution of agrarian conflicts, changing the route 
of the federal highway proposed to pass through the area, and the 
cancellation of logging permits given to two large companies. Ranchers 
supported the biosphere reserve idea; the governor of Chiapas called for 
an ecological reserve, and the network for a campesino ecological 
reserve. Each of these proposals represented a distinct way of 
configuring relationships between ejidatmios, other landholders, private 
interests, and branches of the government, lands, and resources. 
In fact, models proposed by NGOs to state authorities and the 
Regional Council met little resistance in Calakmul. When I started my 
work in Calakmul in 1996, the following agencies and organisations were 
funding conservation and development projects there: the Calakmul 
Biosphere Reserve; Instituto Nacional Indigenista (1Nl); Secretaria de 
Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL); Secretaria de Media Ambiente, 
Recursos Naturales y Pesca (SEMARNAP); ProNatura Peninsula de 
Yucalcin (PPY), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Mexico; the 
World Bank's Global Environment Facility (GEF); U.S. Agency for 
International Development (US-AID)'s Biodiversity Support Program, 
and Environment Canada. Support was also provided by a number of 
research institutions, including the University of Campeche's ProgTmna 
ECOMA T, Comisi6n Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la 
Biodiversidad (CONABIO), Stanford University's Centre for 
Conservation Biology, and the International Centre for Research on 
Agroforestry. $2 million USD annually is a conservative estimate of the 
amount of money destined for Calakmul during the period 1992-1996. 
The two largest projects were ProNatura's and the Calakmul Model 
Forest. 
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The Calakmul Model Forest 
This organisation, a joint 1mtiative of Environment Canada and the 
Mexican Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, was 
intended to create "a model of sustainable development... [and] set an 
example for other tropical areas."29 
The Model Forest concept was developed in Canada in the 
early 1990s as part of Environment Canada's Green Plan, a response to 
public concern about the environment and to the 1987 report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common 
Future. Ten Model Forests were established in Canada, instituted as, 
"independent, legally incorporated non-profit organisations directed by .a 
representative group of multi-stakeholders of the forest resource,"30 and 
each comprising: 
[ ... 1 both a geographic area and a specific partnership-based approach to 
sustainable forest management... A model forest is also a voluntary 
partnership whose members fully represent environmental, social and 
economic forces at play within the land base. The partnership works to 
define a shared, locally relevant vision of sustainable forest management, and 
then works to translate that vision into concrete terms for the benefit of all 
stakeholders (http:/ /www.idrc.ca). 
The Model Forest program was presented by the Canadian 
delegation to the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Then Canadian Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney announced that Canada had successfully 
established the Model Forest program as a means of promoting 
sustainable forestry, and was willing to assist other nations in adopting it. 
Mexico, Russia, and Malaysia were the first to become involved.31 The 
Calakmul Model Forest was one of the first Model Forests established 
outside Canada, in 1993, and the first of three in Mexico. The 
Chihuahua Model Forest followed later the same year, and the Monarch 
Butterfly Model Forest, in the states of Michoacin and Mexico, in 1997. 
By 2001 there were Model Forests in ten countries, including Canada, 
coordinated through the International Model Forest Network 
Secretariat in Ottawa. 32 In September 2002, in his address to the World 
29 Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1994a. 
30 Patry 1997:5. 
31 Patry 1997:5. 
32 The stated objectives of the Intemational Model Forest Network are: "[11 to foster international 
cooperation and the exchange of ideas relating to the concept of sustainable forest management, 
[21 to support international cooperation in critical aspects of forest science that underlie the 
search for new models of forest management; and [31 to support ongoing international 
discussions on the criteria and principles of sustainable development." Minister of Supply and 
Services Canada 1994b:2. 
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Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa, then Prime 
Minister Jean Chretien renewed Canada's commitment to the 
International Model Forest Network and announced continued funding 
for the Network as one of Canada's contributions to global 
environmental efforts. In June 2006, forty-one Model Forests in 
eighteen countries were listed by the Network as members.33 
The political motivations that led to the establishment of the 
Calakmul Model Forest are clearly very similar to those that led to the 
creation of the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve. With Canada's forest 
industries under national and international scrutiny, and rates of 
deforestation that had led it to be called "the Brazil of the North," 
Canada, like Mexico, wanted to demonstrate its commitment to 
addressing both domestic and global environmental concerns. 
VI. ANTHROPOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT IN CALAKMUL: 
ORGANISATIONS, LABOUR, AND GENDER 
This section describes three important dimensions of sustainable 
development: the organisations involved, use of campesino labour m 
development projects, and women's "participation." 
Two Organisations: Model Forest and Regional Council 
Sustainable development in Calakmul was implemented through a 
number of organisations set up and funded for this purpose, including 
the Calakmul Model Forest and the Regional Council of X-Pujil. The 
proposal for the Calakmul Model Forest was chosen over others in part 
because the Regional Council was the kind of local organisation 
representing interests in the forest, or stakeholders, that is central to the 
"multistakeholder planning" principles of the Model Forest model 
(Beyers 2001). The Regional Council brought together and represented 
ejidatarios and campesino/as living in the Calakmul region. (How well 
and how democratically it did this is an important question, but it was 
definitely, at the time, the largest and best-organised campesino 
organisation in the region). The Council grew in importance as it took 
on implementation of sustainable development prqjects in its member 
33 In Mexico, however, transformations of the federal govemment's forestry programs following 
the election of Vicente Fox Quesada in 2000 shifted priorities in Mexico's Model Forest 
program. Presently neither tl1e Calakmul nor the Chihuahua Model Forests is receiving funding, 
while the Monarch Butterfly Model Forest is, and a new one, the Sierra La Quila Model Forest, 
is being developed in the state of .J alisco. Despite these activities, Mexico is not currently 
participating in eitl1er the Intemational Model Forest Network or the Regional Model Forest 
Network for Latin American and the Caribbean. 
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ejidos. Among the organisations in Calakmul with which it worked, its 
most enduring relationship, however fragile, was with the Model Forest. 
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the two organisations and their 
relationship to each other and to the ejidos that were the official objects 
of their concerns. 
CALAKMUL MODEL 
FOREST 
- based in Zoh-Laguna 
-A development 
project with paid staff 
Coordinator 
l 
4 sub-program coordinators 
Forestry Productive Scientific 
projects research 
Communication, 
training, and env. ed. 
ingenieros y tecnicos 
REGIONAL COUNCIL 
OF X-PUJIL 
- based in Zoh-Laguna 
-A campesino 
organisation works 
with members fees 
and project funds 
from gov't and NGOs 
-ASSEMBLY OF 
DELEGATES: 2 men 
from each ejido, 2 
women from each 
UAIM orSSS 
- 6 Directors elected 
by and from 
assembly: 5 men and 
1 woman 
/ 
"/as comunidades" 
"the communities" 
actually ejidos and a few SS 
-Approximately 50 of the 72 ejidos in the 
Model Forest area 
- Including the ejido 20 de Noviembre 
Figure 2. Organizational Structures of the Calakmul Model Forest and the Regional 
Council ofX-Pujil (from Murphy 2003a). 
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The Model Forest had a bureaucratic vtswn of relations 
between campesinos and development project staff. There was a work 
plan; funds were intended to be disbursed according to an approved 
budget; and staff members were expected to perform specific tasks 
outlined in job descriptions for salaries, in cooperation with the 
beneficiaries of the project and their democratically elected political 
leaders. It would seem that the Canadians who set up the project were 
naive about how difficult it would be to work in this way in Mexico. 
Local political and economic practices proved resistant to adopting this 
bureaucratic logic and the kinds of accountability it implied. 
Tension in the day-to-day operations of the Model Forest and 
Regional Council reflected divergent understandings of the relationship 
between ejidatarios, tecnicos, and forests. An important advisor to the 
Regional Council told the tecnicos that the ejidatarios should be 
understood to be, and treated as, the dueiios (owners) of the forest 
resources on their e)idal lands, owners who were seeking technical 
advice on forest management from the foresters. He discouraged the 
tecnicos from seeing themselves as representatives of government 
authority responsible for directing or regulating the cutting and selling of 
timber. It was clear to both tecnicos and e)i"datarios, however, that tl1is 
vision was a challenge to prevailing practice and could not always be 
fulfilled. The Model Forest argued for a similar relationship between 
foresters and ejidatarios, but in different terms. It promoted the notion 
that the people whose livelihood depended on a sustained supply of 
harvestable timber and other forest resources are those who will, given 
the right circumstances, be most interested in the protection of those 
same resources. In this case, the foresters' role was to convince the 
campesinos of the wisdom of the approach. Both these visions were 
idealistic, as illustrated by the following etlmographic vignette. 
Negotiating Community "Participation" in Forestry Activities 
For an e]i"datario, control over one's own labour can be more important 
than the promised benefits of sustainable development. Thus, when an 
asamblea e)idal meets to discuss carrying out a sustainable development 
project, ingenieros and eJidatmios may have very different sets of 
concerns . F,;i"datarios' responses to '.'sustainable development" projects 
may reflect the way in which it is proposed that their labour be used in 
its implementation, rather than their views of more abstract notions of 
participation and sustainability. 
The Model Forest foresters regularly attended eJidal assemblies 
to discuss forestry activities on eJi"dal lands and reach agreements with 
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the ejidatarios as to how these were to be carried out. According to the 
Agrarian Law, the ejidal assembly is the forum where ejidatarios make 
collective decisions.34 The foresters may attend either special 
assemblies called to discuss a particular event or issue, or the regular 
assembly held on the last Sunday of every month, the asamblea del fin 
de mes. The ejidal assembly comprises all the ejidatarios, in their roles 
as male heads of household, and any women ejidatarias the ejido may 
have. (In Calakmul these are usually widows of ejidatarios) . 
On the afternoon I attended a special assembly in the ejido Dos 
Lagunas N orte, the e)i"datarios had gathered to organise work teams to 
assist the foresters with a forest survey on their lands. The discussion 
focused on how many e]idatarios were needed and for how long; only 
one question was asked about the nature or purpose of the work 
involved. On this occasion the ejidataJioi principal concern was not 
forest use and management practices on their ejido, or even eventual 
profits from timber cutting, but the use of their labour. Their reaction 
suggested that they were willing to comply with the request of the 
foresters, as long as it was reasonable, but that they viewed this as 
something of an imposition rather than part of a process they were fully 
involved in. 
I observed similar discussions in other assemblies. The 
concern with the use of ejido labour can be partly explained by the 
historical experience of older campesinos working as peones35 on 
henequen (sisal) haciendas in the northeastern part of the peninsula, or 
under exploitive conditions in the chide industry in Campeche, or on 
coffee plantations in Chiapas. 
Another possible explanation is the tendency of so many 
government programs in eji'dos - not just tl1ose related to sustainable 
development - to be invariably framed in terms of benefits to the 
community, to insist on community "participation" regardless of how 
ejidataJios perceive the benefits. As a result, they are reluctant to agree 
to the use of their labour when other components of the project may or 
may not materialise, in response to factors beyond their control. But 
they are also reluctant not to be involved in the projects because of the 
importance of maintaining patron-client relationships with individual 
tecnicos and ingenieros, and with the agencies and organisations they 
represent. Through these processes, forest deterioration and other 
34 The ideal of the ejidal assembly as a democratic community forum, however, is belied by the 
networks of power that exist in all ejidos, and by the inequalities between members , based on 
hierarchies of wealth, age, ethnicity, and, in particular, gender. 
35 The tenn peones (peons in English) is sometimes used in tJ1e present to refer to manual 
labourers; for example, men who are hired to clear the brush on tJ1e sides of roads and highways 
wiili machetes. 
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environmental concerns are sidelined in the complex interplay between 
development workers, organisations, and beneficiaries. 
Women's "Participation" 
Sustainable development in Calakmul was very clearly a gendered 
phenomenon, one in which men and women played very different roles. 
Despite the important conclusions of the many studies that have been 
made of "women and development" around the world, the importance 
of gender as a dimension of social relations continues to be neglected in 
many studies of rural Mexico. Agarwal has argued that despite all the 
accumulated evidence that gender is such a significant dimension of 
development, "gender continues to be viewed as an issue of 'special 
interest,' whose incorporation into development analysis and program 
interventions has been piecemeal at best.."36 
A conlluence of global, national, regional, and local factors both 
created and constrained opportunities for women in Calakmul. In the 
case of the Calakmul Model Forest, the involvement of women in the 
activities of the Model Forest and Regional Council was an unintended 
consequence of sustainable development. Most Western development 
assistance agencies now require attention to gender from the very first 
steps of project design and such policies have influenced the way most 
internationally funded projects, and some Mexican projects, have been 
implemented in Calakmul. But because funding for the Canadian 
Model Forest program originally came from Environment Canada, not 
CIDA, the Calakmul Model Forest was not required to follow CIDA's, 
or any other body's gender policy. 
From a historical experience of marginalisation from rural and 
agrarian politics, women challenged the Model Forest and Regional 
Council's projects and practices and drew attention to the material 
difficulties of the lives of their families. But even though the political 
spaces for women created in the context of the regional sustainable 
development program were used by women to promote their interests, 
they also sometimes served as spaces in which dominant gender 
ideologies and unequal gender relations were reproduced. 
A critical point, related to the earlier discussion of the 
disjuncture between agrarian history and sustainable development, is the 
place of women in ejidos. Until 1971 holders of ejidal rights 
(ejidatmios) could only be male heads of household, their sons of 
marriageable age, or the widow of an eJidatmio. After 1971 a woman 
raising children on her own for any reason could also become an 
36 Agarwal 1997:1 373. 
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ejidataria, but in Calakmul few such women have claimed ejidataria 
status. Thus the presumption is that male heads-of-household can, and 
do, democratically represent the interests of all members of their 
families persists. 37 Stephen notes how: 
]t]he histmical gendered dynamics of c;jido law and organization in Mexico 
are consistent with a cultural ideolO!,'Y that subordinates women's decision-
making to men and sees women as having their interests represented by 
male family members.38 
In other words, she concludes, the Agrarian Law enshrined 
post-revolutionary patriarchal family structures and values. This fact has 
been critical in shaping the ways women in rural areas dominated by 
ejidal land tenure, such as Calakmul, have organised politically and 
participated in sustainable development projects. I often heard it said in 
Calakmul, by both Mexicans and foreigners, that women's 
marginalisation from formal ejido-level decision-making reflected 
campesino or indigenous cultural values. But women's legal position 
within the ejido has as much to do with laws made in Mexico City in the 
early 20'" century as it has to do with cultural patterns of kinship and 
inheritance, which in fact vary and have varied considerably across 
Mexico and through time. 
When I interviewed women political leaders about their 
experiences of participation in sustainable development related 
initiatives, they often used the terms of sustainable development 
discourse to describe their needs, and they justified their needs in terms 
of their family roles as mothers. 
Doiia Edelmira Jimenez, originally from the state of Tabasco, 
was one of the first women to participate in the Regional Council as an 
official delegate of her t<Ji'do and the first woman to become a director of 
the Regional Council. After leaving that position she continued to be 
outspoken in the Council's assemblies. During our interview, I asked 
Doiia Edelmira what women had achieved through their participation in 
the Regional Council. She described the obstacles the women had 
faced, including the opposition of their husbands, sometimes expressed 
through physical violence, but said that there had been benefits. Some 
women had been able to improve their economic situations; they had a 
bit more money to improve their children's diet and health and to 
provide them with clothing and the other things that they needed to 
continue attending school. 
37 Stephen 1997. 
38 Stephen 1997: 171. 
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When I asked her if the women's perceptions of themselves had 
changed, if they had more self-confidence, or if they had different ideas 
about what kinds of work they could and could not do, "Oh yes, 
definitely," she replied, "some women now have eight or nine cows." 
Women in San Antonio Soda had not owned cattle before, and any 
woman who owns a herd of cattle, however small, would likely be more 
self-confident, as well as wealthier. 
Edelmira told me that despite the difficult conditions in which 
they live it is possible for women to improve their situation. She 
described witJ1 great enthusiasm the difficulties she had faced in getting 
to meetings with women in other ejidos: "It didn't matter to us if it 
rained. If the trucks got stuck in the mud, we walked into the villages, 
tJ1rough the forest and through the rain, and didn't care one bit, even if 
we didn't get home until the middle of the night." 
The biggest obstacle to women trying to meet their needs, 
Edelmira said, was their lack of liberty (Jibertad). Not all women had 
the same degree of liberty tJ1at she had, although achieving it had come 
at a cost, sometimes black eyes, but me vale, I don't care, she said. 
What motivates us are our needs. I have seen that when I have had a little 
bit of work and make a few cents, I can buy tl1ings for my children, crackers, 
bread in tl1e evening and tile next day tl1ey don't have to eat just beans and 
rice, they can have egg or something else with it. Tllis is why we need work, 
to be able to defend ourselves a little bit, tllis is why we need to be suppmted 
witl1 training in handicrafts. 
I was struck by her complaint about women's lack of liberty and 
her call for the kinds of projects the women had already been offered. 
The handicrafts projects did not challenge the cultural restrictions on 
women's movements and had generated relatively little income for 
them. 
In a similar vein, Doiia Carmen Salgado, originally from the 
state of Veracruz, explained to me that when women organise 
themselves into groups they are able to obtain more cosas (things), 
apoyos (financial and material support) and proyectos (projects). Both 
these women leaders articulated women's interests using the terms of 
development discourse, drawing attention to their needs for the kinds of 
opportunities they had previously been offered by development 
institutions. 
So why, I asked Edelmira, are men so opposed to the women 
doing these kinds of things: 
It's not that tl1ey are opposed to us, it's tllat they don't give the women libe1ty 
to work outside, to leave the village. They are not opposed to the women 
working, but it has to be here in the village. [Otherwise] the children get left 
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alone in the house, our belongings are unwatched. The husband too is left 
on his own. So that's why they don't want their wives to be gone all the 
blessed day, two days, three days. They've seen that when we have been 
working here in the village, well, even they benefit. But at first it was hard for 
us, because they didn't agree. They said we were crazy, that we weren't going 
to get anything, that no one was going to listen to us... The first few women 
that tried, well, the other husbands saw that we had obtained results and then 
they gave permission for their wives to participate with us, and now we've 
gone to conquer the compa.iieiaS in the other e}i"dos, who were living in 
peace before. [l..1ughsj. 
Edelmira and other women leaders told me about the 
difficulties they also faced in their work as directors of the Regional 
Council, difficulties posed by the necessity of working together with their 
male counterparts, and created by these men, their own husbands, and 
other women. It is a very delicate task for a woman to manage her 
personal reputation while involved in political work. 
Doiia Carmen explained to me that it is just not the same for 
women in rural areas as in the cily. In Calakmul, she said: 
If a woman goes out, if a woman is going around with the compa.Iieros 
(men), hijole, all the world is criticizing you, they don't believe that you are 
going around working. They gossip. A woman has to have a good dialogue, 
good communication with her husband to be able to travel where we have to 
travel, and we have all been through big conflicts because of this. 
In Calakmul, as in other parts of rural Mexico, there is a 
strongly gendered division of space. Transgressions leave women open 
to criticism from both men and women, as Doiia Carmen pointed out. 
Edelmira, Carmen, and other women leaders were engaged in 
local politics with clear goals and the desire to fight for them. Our 
conversations showed how they engaged with the Regional Council, the 
Model Forest, and other institutions in terms of claiming rights as 
women and mothers to supports, projects, and training, while managing 
their reputations. 
The involvement of women in the assemblies of the Regional 
Council of X-Pujil represented a significant departure from rural 
development practice that had previously excluded women from 
campesino organisations. Given the opportunity to participate in the 
assemblies and on the board of directors, several women were extremely 
vocal in advocating for women and occasionally criticised their male 
counterparts openly. In these ways and others women can be seen to 
have actively occupied, and sometimes tried to expand, the political 
spaces opened for them in the regional sustainable development project 
in Calakmul. Such efforts, however, were made in the face of a 
persistently male-dominated political culture and unequal gender 
relations within their own families and homes. The Model Forest's 
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projects for women did not directly challenge dominant local gender 
ideologies, the gendered division of labour, or the marginalisation of 
women from ejido level decision-making. The implementation of the 
women's projects, in many cases, followed the populist logic 
characteristic of rural development in Mexico. The combination, 
however, of women's involvement in the Regional Council and of 
projects for women in the ejidos did expand their possibilities. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the early 1990s a new era began in Calakmul, one in which the 
importance of the region's forest was redefined in global, ecological 
terms, and campesino/as' relations to forests on their ejidallands were 
recast in the terms of sustainable development. And yet, during the 
electoral campaign for state governor in 1997, while I was finishing my 
research, political discourse about Calakmul began to shift. The 
outgoing PRI governor had described Calakmul in terms of its potential 
for sustainable development and biodiversity conservation and the 
economic benefits these would bring. But the party's gubernatorial 
candidate, the eventual governor, described the region in his campaign 
speeches as impoverished and in dire need of government services and 
infrastructure, never mentioning the potential environmental impacts of 
infrastructure projeCts. In describing the problems of Calakmul in this 
way, he offered yet another vision of the relationship between the state, 
campesino/as, and the region's forests, and a shift away from the politics 
of sustainable development. 
Although Mexico has sometimes been portrayed as particularly 
impervious to foreign cultural influences, my work suggests how "global" 
environmentalism and feminism did, to a certain degree, transform rural 
development practices in Calakmul. The Calakmul Model Forest 
introduced a model of sustainable development centred on 
multistakeholder planning. This model was neither successfully 
adopted nor entirely rejected in Calakmul, but like other related 
development institutions, practices, and discourses, it was reworked and 
transformed into a particularly Mexican model. Multistakeholder 
planning became the Regional Council and Model Forest staff working 
together to implement sustainable development projects in the ejidos of 
Calakmul, sometimes following a formal work plan and sometimes not. 
This arrangement of relations between campesino/as and development 
project staff resembled those of previous rural development projects in 
Mexico more than they resembled the Model Forest concept developed 
in Canada. It also reproduced the kinds of social relations that have 
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historically characterised rural development initiatives in Mexico. In 
another kind of analysis, the work practices of development project staff 
might have been considered incompetent, or not-yet modern, or simply 
corrupt. In other words, the legacy of hierarchical, clientelistic relations 
between representatives of government agencies and ejidatarios- as well 
as among representatives, ejidatarios, and their female counterparts -
could not be shaken off by re-imagining them as stakeholders who 
would work together to build consensus on the best ways to use the 
region's forests. The problematic results of the Model Forest's attempts 
to do this points to the cultural specificity of the social relations of 
development and the resilience of local understanding of 
"development," derived from accumulated experience. 
One of the most surprising observations of this study is how the 
image of the Calakmul Model Forest projected from Ottawa and 
Mexico City avoided any mention of the problems that it encountered. 
The structure of knowledge on which public portrayals of this 
development project rested was remarkably impervious to challenges by 
the ejidatario/as of Calakmul (to say nothing of my anthropological 
analyses). The Model Forest is described in positive terms as a 
successful, ongoing project on the website of the International Model 
Forest Network. This is one of the implications of the political and 
economic structure of development assistance and knowledge. There is 
some coverage in the newspapers in Campeche of political events in 
Calakmul and misuse of funds does not pass unnoticed by a broader 
Mexican public. But where are other visions of future possibilities for 
Calakmul? Such firm control of representation of sustainable 
development does not serve the interests of its so-called beneficiaries, 
because it too reproduces the hierarchical relationships that have 
historically characterised government interventions in the ejidal sector. 
It also prevents better understanding and more productive discussions of 
the relationship of forests and "the environment" to improving the lives 
of men and women in rural Mexico. 
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Indigenous Movements in Mexico 
Impasse or Forward Motion? 
John Gledhill 
My first ethnographic study in Mexico was of the people who worked on 
a gigantic landed estate or hacienda before the revolutionary land 
reform: they saw themselves as mestizos and often used the disparaging 
diminutive "inditos" to refer to people from the neighbouring 
P'urhepecha indigenous communities of the highlands. Ironically, many 
of these ex-peones descended from the numerous Africans and mulattos 
brought into the region to work on the sugar haciendas. But they could 
not recognise this element in their historical identity, since as migrants to 
the U.S. they had become antagonistic to Afro-Americans. This is one, 
less attractive, side of transnational relations. But it is symptomatic of 
other political effects of globalisation that the new millennium witnessed 
the birth of black identity politics in some Afro-descendent communities 
on the coast of Guerrero state. As in the case of Colombia, where black 
movements have become far more extensive, we could see these new 
developments as a reflection of the impact that indigenous movements 
have had over the last couple of decades and in particular of the 
recognition that indigenous demands have received from national 
governments and multilateral agencies such as the International Labour 
Organization and the World Bank. They also reflect the increasingly 
significant role that NGOs are now playing as mediators between 
grassroots movements and national and supranational institutions of 
governance. Indigenous rights movements do, however, also seem to 
reflect a historically rooted sense of identity. One of the most important 
questions we need to ask about Mexican history is how and why some 
Mexicans and not others preserve that identity. 
LOCATING INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN SOCIETY 
The vast majority of Mexicans today do not, of course, see themselves as 
indigenous. Three quarters of them now live in urban not rural places, 
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and a substantial minority gain their livelihoods by crossing international 
frontiers as migrants. Migrant remissions are now Mexico's largest 
source of foreign earnings. If we do not start with those basic facts, we 
will not reach an adequate diagnosis of the significance of, and 
challenges facing, Mexico's indigenous movements today. Indeed, we 
will fail even to understand the contemporary situation of indigenous 
people themselves, since millions of them now live and work in major 
cities and migration of various kinds is extensive. 
Some indigenous people work in agribusiness in Mexico. Much 
of this movement is from South to North. Indigenous workers replace 
local mestizo labourers who have moved on to focus exclusively on work 
in the U.S. One of the best-known examples of the domestic migration 
of indigenous people is the use of workers from Oaxaca state by the 
agribusiness of Baja California, which has attracted considerable media 
attention, initially because racial stereotyping underpinned abysmal 
living and working conditions and flagrant violations of Mexico's labour 
protection laws, but more recently because tl1ese Mixtec workers have 
mounted strikes and protests. 1 There is, however, a vast amount of 
movement that remains invisible to the public, and to human rights 
activists, elsewhere along the Pacific Coast, as I discovered when I was 
working in the area between Lazaro Cirdenas city, on the border 
between Michoacan and Guerrero, and tl1e agribusiness zone that 
stretches from the northern border of Michoacan through Colima to the 
port of Manzanillo. Here we even see migrants from Oaxaca replacing 
local indigenous workers as the latter have found new livelihoods as 
international migrants or in some of the most inaccessible communities, 
sowing marijuana or opium poppies. This tells us sometl1ing about the 
continuing impacts of sustained rural crisis and uneven development, 
but if we go to Mexico's own southern frontier, we find ample evidence 
that, from the point of view of indigenous people, Mexico is often to 
Central Americans what the U.S. is to Mexicans: a step up in a larger 
regional race to the bottom for labour, which is fraught with very real 
personal hazards. Working illegally in Mexico not only involves dealing 
with the immigration authorities but also with the maras, the gangs that 
now operate throughout Central America and prey upon vulnerable 
migrants as they try to get a footl1old across the border. 
The maras are another face of transnationalism. These gangs 
were born in Los Angeles, not El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, or 
Guatemala. They are the legacy of regional problems of intervention, 
displacement, and social polarisation in which the U.S. also plays a 
central role. 
I Martinez Novo 2004. 
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That brings me back to the fundamental issue of migration 
across Mexico's northern border and its effects. Both seasonal and 
more permanent migrations to the U.S. have a long history which I 
cannot recapitulate here. But the point I need to stress is that 
indigenous people are being incorporated into this human exodus today 
on a far greater scale than in the past, and at a moment at which U .S. 
policies are making it increasingly difficult for poorer people who make 
it alive across the border to return home again. Some indigenous 
communities in Mexico do have long traditions of international 
migration: this would include the P'urhepecha zone of Michoacan, the 
state which has now returned to first place in the international migration 
league table in a way that affects the lives of all social classes and ethnic; 
groups very profoundly. But international migration even from Chiapas 
has increased dramatically in recent decades and, with narcocorridos2 
blaring out of every radio, is increasingly becoming the dream of many 
young people even in some of the communities where there is still 
strong support for the Zapatistas. In fact, one of the unintended effects 
of NGO intervention in Chiapas has been to foster the idea that 
escaping the country could be the best route to further social mobility 
on the part of some community activists, but relatively austere lives in 
economic terms clearly always encourage some people to "vote with 
their feet" and experiment with some kind of migration. 
Nevertheless, international migration is not necessarily about 
disappearing over the horizon and does not even necessarily imply 
cutting ties even when people stay away for long periods of time. 
Although there are still more stay-at-homes than migrants in a state such 
as Oaxaca, international transmigration has had social, cultural, and 
political impacts on Oaxaca that are disproportionate to its scale. Many 
of the Mixtecs who found work in Baja went on to try their luck across 
the border.3 Today anthropologists habitually refer to a new 
transnational region termed Oaxacalifornia as the space within which 
Mixtec culture, society, and politics evolves, a space that not only 
includes the Mixtec communities located in California and Oaxaca, but 
large colonies in Northern Mexican cities such as Tijuana.4 The point is 
that this space remains socially and politically connected. Those who 
remain in Oaxaca struggle to keep the migrants active members of their 
2 NaTcoconidos are the latest incarnation, usually backed by an accordion-based polka rhythm, of a 
long-established mestizo song genre, the conido. Conidos have always celebrated the lives of 
bandits and illegal immigrants as well as the struggle with life and love of poor people in general, 
but their extension to drug traffickers by northern Mexican bands such as the Sinaloan group Los 
Tigrcs del N01te have made them contmversia.l for mainstream media ;md hugely popular with 
ordinary people throughout the counlty. 
3 Keamey 1986. 
4 Besserer 2002 . 
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communities by insisting that they continue to participate in sponsoring 
fiestas and holding community offices or face loss of their rights of 
"membership." Sometimes the migrants themselves take the initiative in 
fostering projects for community ecological rehabilitation, public works, 
and local political battles: some of these are against local community 
bosses or caciques, others to strengthen the community's independence 
against non-indigenous neighbours and powerful regional economic and 
political actors. 
Oaxaca itself is a tremendously fragmented place, both because 
of its ethnic diversity and because its municipalities are very small.5 In 
contrast to many other regions in which indigenous people live, the 
boundaries of the municipality and local indigenous community often 
coincide, whereas elsewhere a variety of indigenous communities that 
are sometimes in conflict with each other over land boundaries or 
timber exploitation are subordinated to municipal centres controlled by 
mestizos. This has made it easier to implement a specific style of 
indigenous autonomy legislation at state level in Oaxaca, the usos y 
costumbres system in which election of political representatives can 
optionally be done either by conventional secret ballot or through the 
consensus obtained in a communal assembly. In some Oaxacan 
communities, candidates are not allowed to run as members of national 
political parties, and Oaxacans are not alone in arguing that political 
party competition disrupts community life by promoting factionalism 
and subordinating community interests to outside agendas. The 
potential pitfall of this approach is that it may simply disguise the way 
that groups within the community may remain closely tied to particular 
political parties and more importantly, the way their leaders maintain 
links with wider networks of power and influence that will affect the way 
they discharge their responsibilities and the kinds of policies they 
advocate and implement. The other limitation of the Oaxacan 
indigenous laws is that they do not address indigenous demands that 
concern control over resources and tl1e social rights that are so central to 
addressing the problems of poverty and marginalisation which diminish 
the lives of so many of Mexico's indigenous citizens . 
WHY INDIGENOUS RIGHTS MATTER 
That brings me to one final point of qualification before I say more 
about Chiapas and then try to assess the significance of indigenous social 
movements in Mexico as a whole. On aggregate, Mexico's rural 
5 Stephen 1997. 
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indigenous citizens remain its most disadvantaged citizens, not only in 
economic terms and in terms of access to public services, but in terms of 
civil and human rights. Indigenous people are less likely to receive due 
process of law than anyone else in a country in which judicial reform 
remains a priority even for citizens living more comfortable lives. 
Despite the efforts of domestic and foreign NGO workers and peace 
campers, the counter-insurgency campaign in Chiapas revealed the 
structural racism still endemic to much of Mexican society, and not only 
in the routine humiliation of indigenous men through the symbolic 
feminisation to which they were routinely subject by the Mexican army. 6 
False criminal charges have often been laid against Zapatist'l 
sympathisers unable to defend themselves effectively due to language 
barriers. But at least Chiapas has seen efforts to improve this situation, 
not only through the work of the human rights NGOs, but also through 
the training of bilingual indigenous defenders able to navigate the 
labyrinth of the official justice system and press for more acceptable 
standards of evidence and due process. 
Things remain very different in the region in which I last did 
fieldwork in Mexico, the coastal sierras of Michoacan state, inhabited by 
Nahuatl-speakers who have, unusually, managed to defend control of 
much of the communal land they were guaranteed by the colonial state 
through to the present despite some vigorous attempts to dispossess 
them at the end of the 19'" and beginning of the 20'" century. Currently 
plagued by the drug wars relating to control of the cocaine and heroin 
trades between the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels, this kind of region has no 
human rights observers nor NGO presence to offer protection from 
abuse by the military or judicial police that so often affects indigenous 
communities caught up in problems in which they play no part 
whatsoever. One of the problems that indigenous people often face is 
that the so-called "war against drugs" becomes a pretext for interventions 
that serve more political ends, as has frequently been the case in 
Chiapas and Guerrero as well as many regions of Michoacan, but 
beyond that there remains an embedded problem of institutional racism 
<md mundane, everyday discrimination that must be recognised as one 
of the principal justifications of tl1e whole indigenous rights movement. 
This is not to say, however, that all indigenous people in Mexico 
are poor, marginalised and victimised . Some indigenous communities 
are quite prosperous and many indigenous communities are socially 
differentiated. There have always been indigenous elites of some kind, 
and the political and economic power of those elites has often been a 
major cause of local conflict historically. Indigenous communities have 
6 Stephen 2000. 
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displayed considerable political activism in the past, even if they were 
often defeated, and some have become quite aggressive in recent years. 
Chiapas is often portrayed, misleadingly, as a place that missed out on 
the revolutionary land reform. Yet the land reform of the 1930s under 
President Cardenas was the foundation of the political bossism for 
which some of the communities of Highland Chiapas became famous in 
the later 20'" century, and the fincas or landed estates in the Tojolabal 
zone in the south of Chiapas had already all but disappeared by the time 
of the EZLN rebellion in 1994.7 Throughout the state, the 1960s and 
1970s saw an increasing assertiveness on the part of indigenous 
commumtres . This led to a whole range of new experiments in 
indigenous politics and organisation and also provoked the exit of 
mestizo families that had been living inside indigenous settlements. 
These processes were paralleled in many other parts of the country; so 
let me now try to explain why. 
HOW INDIGENOUS MEXICANS BECAME AN "ETHNIC MINORITY" 
Indigenous people constitute just over 12% of Mexico's population. 
Despite tl1e impacts of migration and urbanisation on their 
contemporary patterns of settlement, they remain geographically 
concentrated in states towards the south of the country. This means that 
elsewhere, indigenous people are a tiny minority: for example, they are 
only 3.2% of the total population in Michoacan despite the fact that the 
state has a militant indigenous rights movement. Because of Mexico's 
size, it still has the largest national indigenous population in Latin 
America, more than 13 million, but the question I want to pose with 
tl1ese figures is what they really tell us. 
Let us assume that what makes people "indigenous" today is 
that they claim to belong to one of Mexico's indigenous etl1nic groups, 
i.e. that is tl1e way they define themselves. This is not, of course, a 
totally valid assumption, since there are several ways in which the state is 
the arbiter of claims to indigenous identity, especially in matters of rights 
to communal land and various kinds of targeted social development 
programs. But it opens up the fundamental historical question. In 
1600, most of the inhabitants of Mexican territory saw themselves and 
were seen by others as indigenous naturales. Mter the chaos of the early 
decades following the Conquest, the Spanish Crown had set about 
"protecting" them in order to have tribute-payers and a colonial labour 
force, once the initial demographic catastrophe induced by European 
7 Van der H a;u· 2004. 
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diseases had passed. Enslavement of indigenous people was prohibited 
and the Crown abolished the encomienda system that had also 
contributed to the decimation of the native population of some regions 
because the Spaniards to whom the natives were "entrusted" grossly 
over-exploited them. This protection was achieved by creating judicially 
recognised "indigenous communities" with communal lands and a 
degree of autonomy in managing their own internal affairs. These 
colonial units of administration and exploitation became the principal 
point of reference for indigenous identities. People identified with their 
local community rather than more extensive ethnic groups. 
But Mexico is geographically complex and each of its regions 
has its own history, which colonial systems of exploitation complicated 
even more as export markets came and went. Populations were moved 
and resettled by the Spanish, sometimes with catastrophic demographic 
consequences in the longer term. Indigenous people themselves 
sometimes abandoned their communities and migrated spontaneously, 
in search of a better life elsewhere, often in places previously only lightly 
occupied by mobile bands of hunter-gatherers who were displaced by 
the incomers. All that, coupled with the fact that most of the immigrants 
to New Spain were men, produced mestizos, people who abandoned an 
identity rooted in membership of an indigenous community. Becoming 
mestizo was principally a cultural process: anyone who spoke Spanish 
and dressed appropriately could cast off the status of natural and its 
tribute obligations once they left an official indigenous community. 
Given that, we have to understand why people decided to retain 
indigenous identities and why they might have chosen to abandon them. 
The answers to that question are again a matter of particular local 
contexts, opportunities and costs, but one answer was that there was 
often a lot to be said for staying put, defending what had been saved 
from the Conquest, particularly land and resources, and living a life that 
allowed a certain autonomy in political and religious life at the 
community level, although this does not mean that indigenous 
communities were paradises of socio-economic equality or free from 
coercive and sometimes rigidly hierarchic forms of authority that some 
of their members, especially women, might find oppressive and stifling 
at times. What they offered was a kind of security and defence, but as 
historian Juan Pedro Viqueira is showing in his path-breaking 
demographic studies of Chiapas, both internal conflicts and the 
subordination of indigenous communities to non-indigenous landlords, 
including the monastic orders, could lead some families to opt for 
migratory strategies that fed the process of mestizaje.8 We cannot 
8 Viqueira 2002. 
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assume that people who opted to abandon indigenous identities did so 
because they lacked the moral fibre to "resist colonial domination," 
which is how the survival of the indigenous community is sometimes 
painted. Nevertheless, as the colonial era drew on, indigenous 
communities did have quite a lot to resist if they wanted to survive, in 
particular attempts by neighbouring landed estates or growing non-
indigenous communities to dispossess them of their lands and water. 
Again, the threats to the indigenous community varied immensely by 
region and micro-region, but national independence eventually brought 
a general challenge, as liberal reformers set about dismantling the legacy 
of the colonial order and embarked on the privatisation of communal 
lands. Some communities rose up in arms, rather more tried in vain to 
use the law to defend their rights, but by the end of the 19'" century 
Mexico had become a largely mestizo country because most of the 
former communities had been dispossessed of their arable lands, waters, 
and forests, and the bulk of their inhabitants were turned into rural 
proletarians. This is tl1e process that has generated the present 
geographical distribution of indigenous communities, and it was not 
reversed significantly by the Revolution and subsequent land reform. 
Although some former indigenous communities recovered their 
lands or received grants of new lands, the post-revolutionary state did 
not want to conserve indigenous cultures and identities but to forge a 
new mestizo nation by promoting cultural assimilation. The liberal 
reform had abolished the legal personality of indigenous communities 
and even when the Agrarian Codes were finally modified, from 1940 
onwards, to allow for the official recognition of communal land rights 
again, members of tl1e surviving indigenous communities held tl1eir 
rights to a share of communal lands and the right to speak as community 
members in assemblies as individuals whose names were entered on the 
rolls held by the state land reform ministries. Under these conditions, 
even more communities slowly abandoned their sense of indigenous 
identity. 
But some communities hung in there tenaciously throughout 
this history and others reconstituted themselves, even on the basis of the 
state's new land reform regime. This is true, for example, of the 
Tojolabal communities of Chiapas, which are entirely a product of the 
land reform in tl1e sense tl1at the entire population had worked as 
landless peones on the fincas beforehand. The Tojolabales adapted the 
new state model of communal assemblies to their own purposes, 
running their internal affairs in an idiosyncratic manner by official 
standards because official standards were not rigorously enforced.9 This 
9 Van der Haar 2004. 
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is something that indigenous people had been doing since the arrival of 
the Spanish: institutions that were based on European models and 
imposed on native peoples, such as the religious confraternities, were 
appropriated and "indigenized" in ways that made them new forms with 
new purposes. 10 The Tojolabal case is also instructive in another way. 
Despite the fact that the population had been totally enclosed by the 
!incas, or more accurately perhaps because of that fact, there were 
region-wide links between Tojolabal groups, mediated by pilgrimages 
and other aspects of ceremonial life. 11 Unsurprisingly, then, the 
Tojolabales were the first to try an experiment in regional autonomous 
government, a decade before the Zapatista rebellion. "Where local 
community organisation had been stronger historically, as in the Central 
Highlands of Chiapas, community boundaries tended to be stronger 
too, and identities were at their most localised. 
"What we can infer from this is that distinctive cultural practices 
are central to the reproduction of indigenous identities, but subject to 
two important qualifications. Firstly, indigenous culture has evolved and 
changed historically, through a process of interaction with European 
culture that is best described as a two-way process of transculturation. 12 
So although cultural politics often gravitates around a defence of 
"tradition" and customs of supposedly great antiquity, in reality, many of 
these traditions are quite modern. That point certainly extends to some 
of the institutions that are central to debates about usos y costumbres in 
community government, even if consensual modes of reaching decisions 
are long established in a more abstract sense. It also extends to 
institutions that anthropologists working in regions of Chiapas have 
traditionally painted as diagnostic of indigenous community 
organisation, in particular the fiesta-cargo systems in which individuals 
ascend a hierarchy of ranked offices by sponsoring increasingly 
expensive types of ceremonial activity. 13 It is now clear that these 
replaced collective confraternity systems as a result of economic changes 
brought about by liberal reforms and the growth of migrant labour 
systems linked to the development of capitalist agro-export systems 
under conditions of growing pressure on remaining village landholdings. 
Secondly, the defence of culture and the right to be "different" today, as 
in the past, is about defending and if possible improving one's place in 
society under conditions of accelerating social and economic change. 
That means that indigenous cultural politics involve increasing internal 
debate, including debate over religion, since Pentecostal churches are 
10 Gmzinski 1990. 
1 1 Mattiace 2003. 
12 Gledhill 2004. 
13 Viqueira 2002. 
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growing fast in some regions. But we need to understand these debates 
from the inside. For example, women in indigenous communities are 
less likely to accept exclusion from public decision-making but may 
adopt postures that seem odd to Northern feminists. One "tradition" 
many women are anxious to end is their husbands having affairs and 
neglecting their families, which can lead them to demand stern forms of 
moral regulation that young unmarried people in turn find oppressive, 
especially when they are surrounded by young foreign NGO workers or 
tourists who seem to be having a lot more fun. So what counts as "good 
culture" to be preserved is constantly being challenged, but we can see 
that the rise of indigenous rights politics has already produced some 
important shifts. For example, where once people encouraged their 
children to speak Spanish and abandon their native tongue because this 
seemed the best way to escape being stigmatised as an ignorant natural, 
there is now a growing emphasis on preserving and modernising la 
Jengua. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS 
Where do modern indigenous rights politics in Mexico come from? 
Part of the answer is clearly global and transnational, as I suggested at 
the beginning. But there is also a Mexican dimension, an unintended 
consequence of the assimilationist policies of the post-revolutionary 
state. That state trained bilingual schoolteachers to help foster its 
policies of "Mexicanizing the Indian" by fostering use of Spanish, 
encouraging hygiene, and inculcating other dimensions of 
"modernisation" in skills and attitudes. But this created a new kind of 
community elite that often violently displaced traditional autl1ority 
figures in regions such as Chiapas.14 At first the teachers were state-
loyalists and aligned with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), and it is important to see iliat much of the history of indigenous 
activism in Mexico has been one of working through official institutional 
channels. But where the ambitions of these newly empowered 
indigenous political leaders were blocked by the domination of the 
regional scene by mestizos, they not surprisingly began to try to change 
this situation. Where they could not achieve this through militancy in 
the PRI and other official organisations, they turned to alternative 
organisations. Defections and conflicts accelerated in Chiapas through 
the 1980s because leaders who remained with the PRI had often 
converted iliemselves into local bosses who used their connections "'~th 
14 Nash 200 I. 
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tl1e government not only to line fueir own pockets but to acquire a 
stranglehold over fue remaining profitable sectors of a local economy 
under stress as fue plantation system declined, agricultural crisis 
deepened, and no new sources of employment emerged. 15 The Chiapas 
elite proved too inflexible to bring fuese developments under control by 
making selective concessions to rival indigenous organisations and 
leaderships. 
But alfuough fuis set dle stage for an irruption of indigenous 
mobilisation, dle EZLN rebellion of 1994 was dle product of very 
specific micro-regional conditions.16 The epi-centre of dle rebellion in 
dle Selva Lacandona was a region of peasant colonisation, which mixe~ 
people from different edlnic groups and communities togedler and 
dlese were mostly people who had previously been landless workers on 
finca.s. They did not come to fue Selva bringing widl dlem fue cultural 
baggage of fiesta-cargo systems and rafuer closed political organisation of 
dle Central Highlands, but created dleir own institutions by once again 
appropriating forms of peasant organisation dlat dle national 
government had, ironically, designed to reduce peasant mobilisation. 
By democratising fue official model of dle union of ejidos or agrarian 
communities, fue people who became dle base of dle EZLN created a 
region-wide organisation dlat was drawn into a collision course widl dle 
state for a variety of reasons. These included a lack of lands for dle next 
generation following fue government's creation of a vast bioreserve 
designed principally to foster external exploitation of dle region's 
resources, and a combination of exclusion from some of dle state's 
social programs widl inclusion in some development programs dlat were 
peculiarly unsuited to dle area's social and ecological characteristics, in 
particular extensive cattle breeding schemes which left large numbers of 
people in irretrievable debt after fue neoliberal reforms of dle second 
half of dle 1980s and early 1990s. 
There were two external influences in fue development of fue 
EZLN. One was fue role of dle Cafuolic dioceses under Bishop Ruiz, 
wifu its orientation to Liberation Theology and Indigenous 
empowerment: a new generation of indigenous catechists became a new 
generation of radical peasant leaders. The odler is subcomandante 
Marcos and his group of urban guerrillas. But I fuink we should believe 
Marcos when he says dlat it was dle indigenous movement dlat changed 
fue outlooks of dle outsiders and not fue oilier way around. 
15 Rus and Collier 2003. 
16 Leyva and Ascencio 1996. 
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THE EZLN: AN ATYPICAL MODEL RESHAPES THE NATIONAL (AND 
GLOBAL) AGENDA 
To conclude, I want to discuss what the EZLN has and has not achieved 
over the past twelve years. One thing it has clearly achieved is a central 
symbolic place in the international anti-globalisation movement and the 
affection and active support of large numbers of foreign activists and 
NGOs. Very few of those supporters understand the complexities of 
Chiapas or know a great deal about the many other indigenous and 
peasant organisations that have played roles in its recent political history. 
But the external support has not only allowed the Zapatista movement 
to survive repression, it has supplied the resources that have 
underpinned its experiments in autonomous development. The EZLN 
has been able to decide which NGOs will operate in its territory and 
preserve a reasonable degree of control over the inner heartland of the 
rebellion. It has, however, lost much of what it gained after 1994. Even 
within the Selva itself many communities that initially supported the 
rebellion have either left the movement entirely or divided into rival 
factions, usually divided between the EZLN and groups identifying with 
tl1e PRI or tl1e centre-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). 
This situation reflects the way that the government has persuaded many 
families to take the benefits offered by its social development programs 
despite the EZLN's instructions to its supporters to reject all relations 
with "bad government." It also reflects the EZLN's consistent refusal to 
countenance an alliance with the PRD, which it continues to depict as 
another manifestation of a corrupt political system. 
In these respects, the EZLN does seem to be locked in an 
impasse in Chiapas, and it is perhaps an impasse that characterises 
much of the rest of the indigenous movement. What kind of 
sustainable livelihoods can be created in the fragile ecological 
environment of the Selva, and are these kinds of livelihoods likely to be 
attractive to people who also have options of migration? Does it make a 
great deal of sense to build the utopia of indigenous autonomy on rural 
territories within a context of the slow decay of maize farming and a 
Mexican rural economy which continues to be fettered by its 
subordination within the global food system dominated by transnational 
corporations and reinforced by U.S. trade policies? But there are other 
perspectives. While the overall economy of Chiapas may be stagnating 
and even de-industrialising, 17 the zone contested by the Zapatistas is of 
enormous interest to a variety of transnational corporate interests: the 
Selva itself has oil and minerals, biodiversity and eco-tourist assets, and 
17 Villafuerte 200 I. 
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the southern frontier has become a site of potentially significant 
developments in the greenhouse cultivation of transgenic tomatoes and 
other kinds of high value produce, industries already supported by 
commercial forestry projects designed to produce wood for packaging. 
The new commercial agricultural investments have masses of cheap 
female labour to draw upon, and that is also potentially an asset that 
could be extended to new kinds of assembly and manufacturing 
production. The major problem is that there is still cheaper labour 
available south of the border. 
In other words, the EZLN, like many other indigenous 
movements, is involved in a struggle over the shape and terms of 
development in Chiapas. Are we going to have an extractive economy, 
possibly combined with a sweatshop economy, that will suck profits out 
of the country, or is the population going to share more fully in the 
wealth generated in the region? From this perspective, the demand for 
territorial autonomy as control over resources that the Mexican 
government has never wished to concede takes on a quite different 
meaning: if extractive activities are to be allowed, can they be managed 
in an environmentally acceptable way and will the profits generated be 
shared by indigenous communities? What kinds of choices will people 
be allowed over their own futures? 
This is an aspect of the EZLN program that resonates with 
many other indigenous movements that do not share other aspects of 
their philosophy, and it is also echoed in efforts to defend "patrimony" 
against forms of development that threaten to totally transform local 
social life. We know from experience that indigenous people north of 
the Rio Grande may think hosting casinos or nuclear waste dumps is an 
acceptable way of improving local living standards and creating jobs, but 
indigenous autonomy is about rights to manage as well as profit from 
"development," and indigenous communities in Mexico have now 
accumulated a lot of bitter experience of what "development" may do 
from, for example, the repeated failure of PEMEX to prevent 
devastating ecological harm. The economic and social stakes in 
indigenous autonomy demands are therefore substantial. 
But what of the political stakes? The EZLN's international 
profile also reflects its model for grassroots direct democracy and 
implementation of the principle of "governing by obeying" (mandar 
obedeciendo). 18 Its most recent innovation, the "Good Government 
Councils," is an attempt to break the mould of local government in 
Mexico: the juntas de Buen Gobiemo are made up of representatives 
not only from local communities but also from different autonomous 
18 H arvey 1998. 
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municipal governments, who are rotated in office very fi-equently to 
avoid corruption and the pursuit of personal ambitions. This extension 
of the principles of direct democracy to create a higher level of regional 
administration threatens to undermine the traditional bases of political 
control from above and traditions of boss rule. It offers access to "good 
government" that listens to what local people say to everyone who lives 
in a region, indigenous or not, pro-Zapatista or not. In embarking, on 
the 12'" anniversary of the uprising in January 2006, on anotl1er national 
tour christened "The Otl1er Campaign," subcomandante Marcos was 
striving to advance his organisation's longsta.nding critique of the 
established political party system by inviting a new national debate on 
what democracy could mean in Mexico. 
There are perhaps two ways to look at La Otra Campaiia and 
the Sixth La.cand6n Declaration on which it is based, the foundations for 
activities that have continued beyond the 2006 Presidential election 
campaign. One is that it is a new attempt to bring the indigenous 
movements into alliance with other kinds of social movements and forge 
a new national Left, something that the EZLN has tried in the past but 
failed to bring off for a variety of reasons, including the difficulties that 
urban working class Mexicans face in identifying with indigenous people 
from Chiapas. As Matthew Gutmann (2002) has pointed out, the fact 
that people who see themselves as "different," see their problems as 
"different," and advocate different strategies for solving them, does not 
mean that they cannot have debates about politics and social justice that 
slowly transform attitudes and in subtle ways might reshape Mexican 
political culture. In a sense, the utterly pluralistic, "let us respect 
difference," posture of La Otra Campaiia clearly seeks to tap the rich 
vein of what Gutmann calls the "compliant defiance" that permeates 
much grassroots sentiment in Mexico. Marcos is listening to people 
who have different kinds of grievances, but all connected in some way 
with the existing political system and the impacts of neoliberal 
capitalism. This, however, brings me to a second perspective, because 
La Otra Campaiia is very specifically framed around the idea of building 
a new Left capable of waging a more effective anti-capitalist struggle. For 
Ma.rcos the PRD is an enemy not simply because it embodies the 
systemic corruption of the political system but because it is a 
neoliberalised social democratic party incapable of confronting global 
capitalism in any meaningful way. Indigenous rights and autonomy have 
not disappeared from this discourse, but do seem to be down played. So 
perhaps this new move is the recognition of another impasse, an altempt 
to break out of the movement's imprisonment both within the terms of 
tl1e indigenous rights debate and within a comparatively small region of 
Chiapas. 
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Advance on the indigenous autonomy front is now bogged 
down in what generally seem vain efforts to get better legislation from 
state governments than the indigenous movement obtained from the 
federal Congress in 2001. The social and economic destiny of Zapatista 
territory is controlled by far larger national forces and cannot be 
changed significantly simply by sustaining a local semi-subsistence 
economy which younger people are very likely to abandon by voting 
with their feet. The wider political impact of La Otra Campaiia remains 
to be seen. It continues the EZLN's longstanding insistence that no one 
is seeking power or political office and it remains a kind of utopian 
experiment aimed at seeing what can be built by recreating a dialogue 
between different kinds of dissident movements and voices in Mexico. 
But this may be exactly what indigenous politics itself needs if it is to 
move forward. 
One of the problems with indigenous rights politics, as its critics 
point out, is that it asks that different kinds of citizens have different 
legally recognised rights. It is not clear that this is fair, particularly if 
possessing an indigenous identity gives a poor person advantages that an 
equally poor mestizo cannot claim. This is, in fact, another way of 
thinking about why indigenous identity politics have flourished in a 
neoliberal world: by playing on transnational sympathies, post-colonial 
guilt and romantic images of "ethnic others," indigenous people may be 
able to negotiate concessions from the state that other poor citizens 
cannot obtain, and tap into the special funding available from the 
multilateral agencies, which extend from targeted social development 
funds to money assigned to purchase lands to create communal 
territories. Fairness is certainly an issue, and it should be said that where 
indigenous groups have gained a legal edge in conflicts with non-
indigenous neighbours recently, the results have not always been 
attractive: however understandable in terms of past histories of 
discrimination, the eviction of some comparatively poor mestizo 
peasants from their lands has not always seemed the best way of 
correcting past mistakes. Today's mestizo peasant victims were often 
manipulated by more powerful regional actors in the past: the latter now 
tend to be long gone and enjoying upper class lifestyles in urban centres. 
There is also the danger, again stressed by Juan Pedro Viqueira 
in the Chiapas context, of creating what are in effect "reservations" in 
which indigenous people will continue to be exploited as low-cost 
producers and cheap labour by the social classes that control the 
commanding heights of the larger economy, thereby reproducing what 
is, in effect, a colonial structure of exploitation now dominated by 
transnational corporations and their Mexican business associates. 
Another problem is the emphasis on usos y costumbres. As examples 
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of the vices that might be perpetuated as a result of letting 
"communities" do things in their own way, critics often point to the 
continuing exclusion of women from some community assemblies and 
indigenous forms of justice that do not respect the rules of evidence, 
involve inhuman and degrading forms of punishment, or involve 
unreasonable sanctions against property and persons because the 
accused and their families are expelled in the interests of "harmony." 
Appeals to "traditions" that do not stand up to historical scrutiny are 
sometimes used to disqualify political opponents for threatening 
community moral integrity, and to bolster the position of dominant 
factions that are not governing in a way that protects the interests of 
minorities, such as members of non-Catholic religious groups. 19 Other 
critics point to the way that indigenous identity politics sometimes 
bolsters ethnic essentialisms that can even divide the indigenous rights 
movement itself, let alone prevent broader alliances to confront 
common problems in contemporary rural or urban life. It is quite 
common, in Oaxaca and elsewhere, for one community to adopt the 
racialised language of dominant non-indigenous groups to assert its 
difference and superiority over neighbours of another ethnicity. I found 
tendencies towards this kind of fragmentation between neighbouring 
Nahua communities in Michoacan, since they emphasised differences of 
origin and "race."20 
Yet I suggest that whatever else might be questionable in the 
EZLN strategy, it is none of the above. The EZLN does not exclude 
mestizos or foster ethnic essentialism: how could it, since it is a 
movement founded on ethnic mixing and the creation of a new regional 
peasant culture? In this respect, it belongs to a family of Mexican rural 
movements, such as the Union de Comuneros "Emiliano Zapata" in 
Michoaca.n, founded by the self-taught agrarian lawyer Efr·en Capiz who 
sadly died last year, which have tried to deconstruct the official model of 
a mestizo nation that deprecates living Indians by encouraging mestizos 
to remember their own historical ties to indigenous Mexico.21 The 
EZLN sometimes uses the language of usos y costumbres, but it has 
been at the forefront of efforts to transform the position of women in 
indigenous communities, and urged its supporters to recognise the 
values enshrined in global human rights discourses - in both cases often 
at the cost of friction amongst its base. Although it found itself trapped 
into the logic of trying to build an autonomous economy in a limited 
regional space, its aim is clearly not to create reservations but to 
19 Santin del Rio 2005. 
20 Gledhill 2004. 
21 See also Stephen 1997. 
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transform the entire economic system by combining with other 
movements and social sectors. This may remain a utopia but it is 
necessary to ask what the alternatives might be. At the moment they 
might be: dying of chemical poisoning working in a plastic tent growing 
transgenic tomatoes; working for an infra-subsistence wage in a local 
plant that enables Wal-Mart to supply goods at prices even the worst 
paid U.S. workers can afford; or trying to avoid being shot by the 
border patrol or dying of dehydration in the desert so as to become one 
of the super-vulnerable undocumented workers that Haliburton's 
subsidiary, Kellog, Brown and Root, decides not to pay for their 
contribution to the clean-up and eventual ethnic cleansing through 
redevelopment of New Orleans. Against that potential race to the 
bottom, indigenous movements seem to have a lot going for them. 
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Social Movements and the 
Questioning, Shaping, and 
Challenging of Mexican Democracy 
John Stolle-McAIIister 
The wide diversity of social movements in terms of demands, styles, and 
organisations make it difficult to coherently or fairly generalise about 
them. This diversity can be seen, for instance, in the ways that the 
Zapatistas have tried to forge broad alliances across different interest 
groups and multiple identities. Addressing an audience in Mexico City's 
Z6calo in 2001, subcomandante Marcos, after a trademarkjoke, begins: 
"Brotl1er, sister: Indigenous person, worker, carnpesino, teacher, 
student, colono, housewife, driver, fisher, taxi driver, dockworker, office 
worker, employee, street vendor, gang member, unemployed, media 
worker, professional, religious, homosexual, lesbian, transsexual, artist, 
intellectual, activist, sailor, soldier, sportsperson, legislator, bureaucrat, 
man, woman, child, teenager, elderly." It is this wide array of potential 
constituencies that the now renamed Delegate Zero is addressing and 
listening to in "La Otra.'" But it is the movements that are drawn from 
this confusing and often contradictory gamut of civil and political society 
and the ways in which they try to define themselves, advocate for their 
positions, and contribute to the shaping of public life that that I want to 
address here. 
With the caveat that these social movements are not reducible 
to any single model of analysis, I want to discuss a general theme of a 
kind of disconnect between what grassroots activists and political 
establishment figures express when they discuss their visions of the 
common good, of democracy, and of fairness . Many of the the 
important structural changes that have taken place in formal politics do 
not seem to hold much capital for many participants in social 
I La Otra Campa1a is an effort by the Zapatistas to forge a national left political alliance. It is "the 
other" in contrast to the traditional political campaigns in 2006. The Zapatistas" declared 
intention was to travel to every slate in the country and listen to the needs, hopes, and strategies 
of the country's poor and disenfranchised majority. 
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movements emerging during and since the 1990s. Although many 
activists have pushed for greater institutional transparency and greater 
representation, there exists a palpable tension between "social" activists 
and "political" institutions, with the former quite sceptical and distrustful 
of the latter. Again, it is this large, heterogeneous, and marginalised 
group to whom the Zapatistas are directing "La Otra." I will analyse two 
important, although in many ways very localised movements, one 
occurring before the 2000 transition in government and one after in 
order to argue that despite some very important differences between the 
movements, at heart there is fundamentally a cultural struggle 
intertwined with economic demands. Although in both cases there were 
certainly immediate and pressing issues (after all, those are usually the 
only ones that we stand up and fight for). Interwoven with those political 
and economic grievances were questions about identity, values, and the 
meanings of collectively held symbols and institutions. These struggles 
tie together local ideas and practices with those originating from and 
circulating through the national and global circuits of meaning that 
constitute public life. 
TEPOZTLAN AND ATENCO 
Between 1995 and 1996, activists in Tepoztlan, Morelos, organised the 
population to oppose the construction of a golf course and country club. 
As a result of the struggle, Tepoztecos expelled governmental authorities 
and elected their own officials according to the logic of already existing 
internal organisations. After the crisis waned they continued, within the 
limitations of federal electoral law, to use those renovated traditions as 
mechanisms of formal political selection. Similarly, in 2001 and 2002 
residents of Atenco, Mexico, drew upon their local identities and 
connections to their land to wage a successful campaign to stop the 
construction of Mexico City's new international airport on their ejido 
lands, claiming that their ancestral rights trumped the federal 
government's right to expropriate them. Even after the government 
cancelled the airport, activists in Atenco challenged the democratic 
credentials of the new administration by blocking elections in March 
and July 2003 to protest ongoing legal action against them and to decry 
what they characterised as an electoral farce of a fundamentally 
antidemocratic system. 
Within this context of an unsettled and unclear transition, 
locally based social movements give voice to those other versions of 
democracy that explicitly include meaningful and direct participation in 
decision making and local control over cultural and natural resources. 
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Their demands represent the fragmentation of Mexican society and 
serve as important outlets for the contentious political and cultural 
discourse that parties and state institutions are unwilling or unable to 
accommodate. Although they by no means represent an impending 
tl1reat to the current system, their flourishing deepens and complicates 
national discussions about the design and implementation of democracy 
by challenging the limits of reform that political parties attempt to 
impose. They refuse to respect the limits of the political subjectivity that 
elites are attempting to create through the transition process, opting 
instead to articulate the demands that locality and specificity play 
important roles in national discussions. 
In Tepoztlan, the movement was organised originally by a small 
group of community activists calling themselves the Committee for 
T epozteco Unity (CUT). The group drew upon much previous activist 
experience, the heterogeneous class backgrounds of members, and their 
integration within influential networks both in the nearby state capital of 
Cuernavaca and Mexico City. Beginning in 1994, the CUT researched 
tl1e proposal by the Kladt-Sobrino Group (KS) to build a $500 million 
USD luxury golf course and country club on communal, private, and 
state owned lands within the municipality.' Despite approval from 
government inspectors, CUT members were convinced of neither the 
ecological nor the social sustainability of the project. Over the course of 
several months, CUT activists gradually convinced fellow T epoztecos to 
oppose it, arguing that the project would cause considerable damage to 
the community. In August 1995; despite public and written promises to 
the contrary, the Municipal President and Ayunta.miento (Town 
Council) approved the needed permits for KS to begin construction. 
Within hours of this news, the CUT organised a rally in which 8,000 of 
the municipality's 24,000 residents took over the Municipal Offices, and 
exiled their elected officials. 
After a month in which the state governor and project 
supporter, Jorge Carrillo, refused to answer numerous requests to 
officially dissolve the municipal government and hold new elections, the 
Popular Assembly, which met nightly and was open to all residents, 
ordered the CUT to organise elections for a provisional council and 
president. Since many residents feared that the political parties would try 
to manipulate the conflict for their own advantage, they banned them 
2 In addition to communal land, to which KS hoped to gain title, it intended to use "private" land 
that it had acquired from a corporate predecessor. Legal ownership of this land was much 
disputed. Former smalllandholders charged tl1at they were tricked or coerced into selling in the 
1960s and some of the land was actually communal land tl1at had been improperly "sold" years 
earlier. The town sued KS over the ownership issue, and in 2001 the cou1ts finally agreed and 
retumed the titles to the Communal Auili01ities. 
122 John Stolle-McAIIister 
from participating. Instead, candidates were selected from 
neighbourhood assemblies convoked by the mayordomo' from each of 
the municipality's barrios. On election day, the seven highest polling 
candidates were named to the Ayuntamiento Dbre, Popular, y 
Constitucional (Free, Popular, and Constitutional Council), and sworn 
into office a week later in a ceremony symbolically presided over by 
Tepoztecatl, the community's founding figure, a god-man in regional 
mythology. 
The conflict dragged on for several months and the town was 
effectively isolated both by the barricades it had erected at all of its 
enu·ances as well as by the refusal of the state to recognise its new 
government. The state government effectively isolated the municipal 
government by withholding its funds (municipal governments' funds 
come almost exclusively from state treasuries) and refusing to recognise 
vital documents, such as birth, marriage, and death certificates, issued by 
the Ayuntamiento libre, making life in a bureaucratised society difficult. 
State officials further attempted to pressure the movement by 
imprisoning several of its leaders on falsified murder charges and 
threatening to arrest many others. In April 1996, state police ambushed 
a convoy of Tepoztecos on its way to present a letter of protest to 
President Ernesto Zedillo. One elderly activist, Marcos Olmeda, was 
shot to death and dozens of others were seriously injured. As word 
leaked out of this attack, KS found itself having to cancel the project and 
the state government began making conciliatory appeals to the 
Tepoztecos. The stalemate, however, continued through 1997 when 
regular elections could be held. Mter much internal debate, the 
Tepoztecos arrived at an agreement under which they participated in the 
elections using the centre-left Parly of the Democratic Revolution's 
(PRD) registJ-y and chose candidates d1rough the neighbourhood 
assemblies as they had done in 1995: 
In Atenco, the conflict began when the federal government 
announced in October 2001 that it was expropriating the ejidos in and 
around the municipality in order to build a new international airport to 
serve Mexico City's ever growing communication and transportation 
needs.'' Without consulting the ejiditarios, the federal government 
announced that it would pay landowners 7 pesos (70 cents U.S.) per 
3 Mayordomos <u·e neighbourhood leaders selected in an open assembly every year. They are 
charged with overseeing the neighbourhood's chapel, organizing the annual celebration, and are 
seen as spiritual leaders. 
4 See Rosas 1997; Quero 2003; and Stolle-McAllister 2005a, for a more detailed account of the 
T epozthin movement. 
5 Ejidos are communally held lands established in the land reform in the wake of the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1920). Until 1992 these lands were inalienable from their holders, who could 
only transfer ownership through inheritance. 
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square metre of land. Seasoned activists organised themselves quickly 
into the Front of Pueblos in Defence of the Land (FPDT) and 
immediately began a series of direct actions to stop what they 
characterised as the theft of their land. Like in Tepoztlan, local officials 
who had collaborated with the expropriation order were expelled as 
traitors and the Popular Assembly took responsibility for governing. 
Confrontations with state and federal officials escalated over the next 
several months as the FPDT repeatedly blocked highways and held 
marches in the capital to win support for their cause. In July 2002, state 
police attacked an FPDT march, injuring several and capturing most of 
the movement's leadership. One man, Enrique Espinoza, later died at 
least in part from the injuries he received from state police. In order to 
free their comrades, Atenco protesters marched to the regional city of 
Texcoco, seized the assistant Attorney General and some of his staff, 
blocked the main highway, and threatened to blow up two hijacked 
gasoline tanker trucks. They also armed themselves with a large cache of 
Molotov cocktails and other simple weapons to fend off any potential 
police assault. Mter several days of a tense standoff, the arrested 
Atenquenses were released on bail and the government officials freed. 
The commitment of the expropriated ejiditarios and the negative 
publicity surrounding the violence forced the Fox administration to 
cancel the project. 
As in Tepoztlan, however, the cancellation of the immediate 
project did not end the conflict because movement leaders continued to 
push other demands, particularly recognition of their autonomy and the 
dropping of legal proceedings against them. This stance resulted in an 
increasingly bitter dispute within Atenco as some residents wanted to 
end the movement and others advocated deeper reforms. The FPDT 
successfully boycotted and disrupted elections in March and July 2003 
in order to have charges against their leaders dismissed and to show 
their displeasure with what they saw as the shallowness of Mexican 
democracy. By December 2003, however, the FPDT negotiated a deal 
to allow elections and some of their members agreed to serve as local 
ayundantes to represent their neighbourhoods. ' 
CULTURAL HYBRIDITY AND THE CONTINGENCIES OF CONTEXT 
JSM: So, how do you communicate with each other? 
FPDT activist: It is quite beautiful and practical. W e use our traditions. If 
we have a meeting that we want everyone to attend, we ring the church bell 
6 See Lajous 2003; Russell 2003; and Stolle-McAJlister 2005b; for a more detailed account of the 
Atenco movement. 
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several times throughout the day. If it is an emergency we shoot off rockets, 
just like we do at fiestas and as we have always done. Well, that and cell 
phones, of course. 
One of the interesting aspects of these movements is the ways in which 
participants navigated and combined different cultural discourses. Like 
all cultures, theirs are thoroughly hybrid, that is, a mixture of different 
strands of thought, values, and practices.' One can see this hybridity in 
the juxtaposition of symbols and practices from different times and 
places common in everyday life. It is not unusual, for instance, to see 
someone with a cell phone and someone carrying a machete and 
wearing huaraches pass each other on the street. In the case of social 
movements what is particularly important in this regard is that 
movement activists are openly questioning the symbols and institutions 
that help to define their lives, therefore making some of those 
subterranean connections and meanings more open to display and 
contention. In the case of social movements, we can also observe that 
the cultural hybridity taking place is not just the random collision of 
different cultures, but the ways in which those cultural tools and 
meanings are combined is very much dependent on the context of the 
struggle and the particular leadership and convincing talents and insights 
of individual movement participants.' Although the divide is somewhat 
artificial, for explanatory purposes I will look at how the movements 
arose from and transformed local, national, and global cultural 
discourses. 
Both movements built their organisations on local networks of 
communication and articulated a sense of difference from other 
communities and from the nation as a whole. L6pez Austin (2001) 
argues that despite the constant reinvention demanded by an ever-
changing world, many of the pueblos of central and southern Mexico 
maintain, at their core, a Mesoamerican worldview defined by specific 
relationships to their territory and reproduced through rituals and 
practices stressing community history and mutual obligation. This core 
is neither homogenous to all Mesoamerican communities nor does it 
dictate any particular action. Indeed, the range of responses to demands 
for political and economic integration throughout the region would 
suggest that this common cultural heritage does not prescribe a 
particular answer. Rather it forms a common history and understanding 
that, with the right combination of circumstances and leadership, may 
serve as one of the means through which communities defend 
themselves against what they perceive to be outside encroachment on 
7 Garcia Cancl ini 1995. 
8 Stolle-McAIIister 2005a. 
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their resomces and their identities. Although, or perhaps because, this 
cultmal core was threatened by these projects, movement activists were 
able to use it to orient many participants in their decision to take direct 
action against the companies and government agencies working toward 
building them. Fmthermore, participation in the movements helped 
reinforce the importance of this cultmal core by affirming community 
members' mutual dependence on one another and by adding another 
chapter to long-running narratives concerning justified rebellion and 
local autonomy. The movements created new stories about, and 
identities of, themselves by splicing together and recycl ing fragments of 
narrative and imagery concerning their indigenous heritage, their 
communities' place in the Mexican Revolution, and their social 
positions as (or legacies of having been) peasant-farmers within national 
discomses of identity.' 
In Tepoztlan this sense of difference has been developed over 
the years in part through the cyclical reproduction of community and 
neighbomhood identities, as well as the town's important tomist trade, 
which in part, depends on a "rustic" image. The conflict, in many ways, 
was very much about locality, about protecting local interests in a 
particular territory. Given the power of their opponents, there was 
clearly a need to build internal cohesion among protest participants, a 
task made difficult by the town's long history of oftentimes bitter family, 
gender, partisan, and class divisions. The movement built internal 
solidarity by using pre-existing communicative and symbolic structures 
in the town constructed around neighbomhood religious observances 
and organisations, which allowed them to frame the conflict as an attack 
against T epozteco sovereignty and dignity. By winning the support of 
neighbomhood and religious leaders, the CUT helped establish 
legitimacy for its protests, and by emphasising the unique identities, 
fortified by locally specific festivals and rituals, they helped deepen a 
sense of difference among community residents. The ability to clearly 
identify one's community as unique made it easier for activists to rally 
support for their cause and to oppose the state and federal governments. 
When I asked one of the movement leaders, a middle-aged 
teacher and union activist, how they were able to achieve high levels of 
internal solidarity, he explained, "I have a very difficult town. We fight 
amongst omselves all the time. But when we are threatened from 
outside, we put aside our differences and come together". " Indeed this 
would seem to have been the case, as polls at the time indicated upwards 
of 90% of the inhabitants of T epoztlan supported the movement, while 
9 Stolle-McAllister, forthcoming. 
10 Interview, Tepoztlan, 1999. 
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supporters of the golf course quickly found themselves isolated and at 
times threatened for their views. "Traitor" was one of the more cordial 
epithets used to describe CUT opponents. This sense of internal 
solidarity built on a discourse of authenticity, where legitimacy was 
conferred on residents by their family's standing in the community and 
by their participation in communal activities. Since most Tepoztecos 
opposed the golf course, support of it demonstrated inauthenticity and 
delegitimised the supporter's standing within the community. 
Many residents claim to have territorial ties dating back to pre-
Conquest times and see the current neighbourhood system as an 
outgrowth of ancient calpulli organisations. Each neighbourhood holds 
an annual celebration to honour its patron saint. At the end of the 
festival, which is unique to each neighbourhood but includes music, 
food, Mass, fireworks, and visits from friends and relatives, an assembly 
is held and after much public discussion, a mayordomo is elected by a 
show of hands to oversee the needs of the chapel and organise next 
year's festival. '' This annual leadership selection, and the ritual cycle 
surrounding it, serves to reinforce a sense among Tepoztecos that 
despite their undeniable integration into larger regional, national, and 
global systems, they still maintain a distinction within those wider sets of 
relationships. 
In a similar way, activists in Atenco sought out and used local 
networks and identities to build up their struggle and consolidate 
internal solidarity. Although a general awareness of an indigenous 
legacy was not as obvious in Atenco, in fact many residents claimed to 
be coming to that awareness as a result of their struggle, the community 
found a common identity in their collective ownership of their e1i"do 
lands. Because of the ejido, they had long-standing relationships with 
each other and a history of working together toward a common goal. 
Similarly they also, despite important internal cleavages, maintained a 
sense of community identity. The day of San Salvador in Atenco brings 
people together to celebrate their patron saint and their community. 
Even at the height of bitterness and division that followed the 2003 
electoral disputes in Atenco, residents on all sides of the debate agreed 
that the annual festival "brings everyone together. At least for a little 
while, we put aside our differences. Politics does not matter then.'" ' 
Another resident summed up the feeling of mutual responsibility, 
noting: 
I joined the movement to defend my pueblo. W e are like a family here. ! ... ] 
You do what you have to in order to protect it. If you were the head of a 
11 Echeverria 1994. 
12 Interview, Atenco resident, July 2003. 
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family, and you clidn't have anything to feed them, you would go into debt 
with the milkman, you wou ld go into debt with the baker, you would go into 
debt with the butcher. You would do what you had to. It is the same thing 
here with the movement." 
The key issue in both movements, however, was the 
communities' connection to their land as both an economic and an 
ideological framework for their arguments. In TepoztJan much of the 
land was legally communal and selling the land to a private interest went 
against common understandings of the ways that people should have 
access to it. People identify very clearly with the mountains that 
surround them, both in terms of personal experience, family history, 
and local mythology. 
In Atenco, most of the families living in the municipality were in 
one way or another connected with the ejido, and even if they did not all 
earn their livings from the land, agricultural work produced at least a 
supplemental income for many, and because the ejido is inalienable, 
families have worked and profited from the land since the end of the 
Revolution. Many residents viewed the expropriation as unfair not only 
because they were offered an insultingly low price for their parcels of 
land but because those lands were also their homes. One resident 
explained that he had decided to join the movement after understanding 
the potentially devastating effects that the expropriation would have on 
his own family. 
I was never involved with politics and, to tell you the truth, had not thought 
much about the airport. But one night I came home from work and found 
my mother crying that tJlis would be the last crop that my father harvested. 
He has worked the land all of Ius life. What was he supposed to do now? It 
just wasn't fair to take all of tl1at away from him.,., 
Many of the Atenco activists pointed out that the land 
represented not only their current livelihoods but also their futures and 
their children's futures. 
The money would only last for a little while. And then what would we do? 
We may always be poor fa1mers, but at least we and our children will always 
be able to feed ourselves if we have our land. That is sometJ1ing tJ1at many 
of us have taken for granted, and having it threatened has made us more 
aware of that. " 
By arguing that they have inherited their lands from their 
grandparents and are keeping them for their children, they stress both 
13 Interview, Atenco,july 2003. 
14 Interview, FPDT activist, Atenco,july 2003. 
15 Interview, FPDT activist, Atenco,July 2003. 
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their historic connection to their territory and what they see as their best 
hope for a livable future. As James Russell points out, in the current 
economic situation of the country where the price of food has greatly 
outpaced the production of jobs and the rise in salaries (which have 
actually declined in relation to purchasing power), "it would be irrational 
for peasants willingly to give up or sell the land from which they derive a 
basic subsistence. Even apart from their cultural attachment to it and 
considering only economic interests, the often meagre subsistence that 
they derive from the land is far better than what they could hope for in 
the paid labour market.'" ' The meaning of the land, therefore, was an 
important component of local identity and defeating these projects 
became intimately tied with defending tl1e rights of the community to 
define its own identities. 
The movements, however, were not limited to just these local 
concerns . Since everyone's life is composed of elements circulating 
from numerous sources, activists also engaged these discourses and 
practices in putting together their movements. At an organisational 
level, both movements quickly put together coalitions of like-minded 
allies to support them. These organisations were present in rallies held 
in the towns as well as in Mexico City and reflected broader political and 
social issues . The anti-golf course and "free" Tepoztlan movements 
became a focal point for anti-PRI organising. The abuses of authority 
that activists suffered as well as the neoliberal trampling of local desires 
were used as evidence of the need for profound political reform. The 
very space of the town was used by regional and national groups. The 
Zapatistas, for instance, sent letters of support in 1995 and 1996, and 
Zapatista activists and leaders stayed in the town during national tours in 
1999 and 2001 . Similarly, activists in Atenco found kindred spirits in 
national organisations criticising the transition process as superficial. 
Leaders of the UNAM Student General Strike Committee offered their 
assistance and solidarity and were an obvious presence throughout the 
conflict." One of the huelgistas, for instance claimed, "what they are 
doing here is incredible. This is what we should all be doing. They 
have never backed down. Never compromised. They have remained 
truer to their beliefs than the Zapatistas."18 As they were fighting to keep 
their ejidos, therefore, the FPDT activists were also engaged with other 
national discussions about the depth, or lack thereof, of democracy in 
16 Russell 2003:23. 
17 The FPDT was harshly criticized by its opponents for being manipulated by the (vety radical) 
student committee. One FPDT leader confided in me, however, "with all due respect to the kids 
on the committee, they say that they were manipulating us, but, really we showed them a few 
things about how to organize." 
18 lnteiVicw, Atenco,.luly 2003. 
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Mexico, arguing that as long as economic inequality was so prevalent 
and the political parties were organised only for their own advancement, 
that real democracy could not exist. One FPDT supporter explained, 
"The parties come around at election time and promise us anything and 
everything. Then we never hear from them again. No, we're not stupid. 
We know they can't deliver. How can they represent us? They don't 
know us and we don't know them? What kind of democracy is that?" 19 
At a more symbolic level, activists in both movements were also 
using and transforming national meanings of the Revolution. The image 
of Zapata, for instance, accompanied marchers and figured prominently 
in movement spaces. In Tepoztlan, because Zapata is from the area and 
used Tepoztlan as a staging ground for military actions, he holds a 
particularly important place in the hearts and worldviews of many 
residents. Zapata has been mythologised by the state and social groups 
have contested his meaning for the past century. He represents, of 
course, that part of the Mexican Revolution that could not be bought off, 
that never surrendered. He was the voice of the most marginalised 
segments of Mexican society, and his mission was never complete. By 
linking their struggles to Zapata, therefore, the movements were not only 
trying to resignify his symbolic importance, but they were appropriating 
the myth-building of the very state that they were opposing. 
Furthermore, this link with Zapata connected the movements to a latent 
campesino ideology, also encouraged by the state through much of the 
populist era, which posited the values of authenticity and seriousness 
with peasant farmers. Unlike politicians and intellectuals, campesinos 
understand the true importance of events, work hard and do not get 
involved lightly in faddish political movements. Again, by linking their 
movements to these ideals, activists were signifying their rebellions as the 
fulfilment of those unfinished revolutionary and just goals of "true" 
Mexico. 
Finally, of course, these movements were engaged with the 
wider world as well. Activists were very clear about their understanding 
of how neoliberal capitalism exploited them, and they saw these projects 
as yet another example of powerful corporations and their government 
agencies taking away their resources. One Atenco resident explained, 
"The biggest problem is capitalism. They try to fool us with elections, 
but they won't change anything as long as it is the capitalists who decide 
everything. The parties and the elections only serve capitalism, and 
that's what is making us poor."20 One of the objections that the FPDT 
raised to the expropriation of their lands was that although the airport 
19 Interview, Atenco,July 2003. 
20 Interview, Atenco,July 2003. 
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was technically public property, private companies were going to benefit 
from the construction and running the airport and auxiliary services. In 
Tepoztlan, residents feared not only losing access to their lands once the 
private company put up walls around its enclave, but also losing access 
to its water, which is already inadequate in the dry season, as several 
environmental impact statements suggested that the golf course would 
use over half the town's water supply. 
Outside of identifying their opponents as part of the global 
economic system, activists in both movements also realised that they 
needed to find allies in the transnational world as well. Using contacts 
that activists had in the press, the movements very carefully projected 
their image and their message through tl1e mass media. Regularly 
scheduled press conferences and access to movement leaders were parts 
of comprehensive media strategies. Both movements reached out to 
potential allies using contemporary technologies and generated support 
in the form of press coverage, demonstrations, and letter writing 
-campaigns in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Adopting 
transnational strategies to national spaces, however, was more than just 
holding press conferences and putting up websites. They also 
incorporated transnational activist discourses, such as environmentalism 
and human rights, into the framing of their arguments. Framing land 
disputes as arguments about preserving ecological balance not only 
made their situation more easily understood by people far away, but it 
also contributed to internal rethinking about the uses of natural 
resources. One Atenco resident told me that he had never thought 
much about the land, but "the struggle has made us not take it for 
granted. We are going to learn how to take better care of it, so it is here 
for our children.'"' Police attacks were framed in terms of human rights 
violations, as was the taking of their lands. When the police attacked 
Tepozteco citizens in April 1996 it was the human rights c01mnunity 
that immediately brought pressure on KS to drop the project. In 
Atenco, the FPDT framed tl1eir right to the land using such 
transnational institutions as the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), which has specific language protecting indigenous people's lands 
from expropriation by national states. 
Culturally then, the movements emerged in very dynamic 
situations in which people were balancing, questioning, and blending 
very different and sometimes contradictory worldviews and practices. 
Because tl1e movements were challenging the status quo of at least part 
of the overall prqject of dominant society, iliey were also engaged in a 
process of fighting over ilie meanings of publicly held symbols and 
21 Interview, Atenco,]uly 2003. 
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practices. In some ways, the movements served as catalysts allowing 
these populations, within the limitations of their specific contexts, to 
work with, modify, blend, and create cultural discourses and social 
practices that made sense to them, helped them to understand the 
world, and provided a means through which they could attempt to shape 
their realities. 
CONTESTING DEMOCRACY 
How do these movements, then, contest and shape democracy in 
Mexico today? At one level, they obviously challenge political 
authorities and force them to take into account local concerns when 
enacting policies. The movements also directly questioned the model of 
democracy being promoted by political elites. To begin with, there was 
widespread scepticism over the viability of national political institutions. 
CUT leader and two-time PRD Municipal President of Tepoztlan, 
Lazaro Rodriguez, criticised the national party, asserting, "Democracy 
can only work locally, because none of the parties has the vision or 
ability to make structural changes at the national level."" Likewise, 
FPDT activists refused to work with the political parties, believing that 
the politicians affiliated with political parties were more interested in 
advancing their own careers than in actually representing and working 
for the community. Instead, both communities opted to enact a type of 
direct democracy. At the height of conflict, they turned to the historic 
tradition of the Popular Assembly, which has its roots in communal land 
holdings and ejido governance. The Popular Assembly publicly 
debated issues and decided courses of action. One participant in 
Atenco explained, "Their politics takes place inside, behind doors. 
Here if someone has an idea, they say it from the stage, and people talk 
about it, argue about, and decide whether or not it is a good idea.'"3 
Both movements also found the limits to direct democracy, as 
attendance at assemblies and interest in the time consuming process 
dropped as the crises waned. Nevertheless, they were attempting to 
enact a different kind of democracy, one that placed more importance 
in local decision making than in national or state level bodies. 
Sovereignty, for them, lay in the local community and not the federal 
state. 
At perhaps a more abstract level, the cultural struggles of these 
movements also suggest an attempt to redefine democratic directions in 
Mexico. Borrowing from Zapatista calls for autonomy, the state that 
22 Interview, Tepoztlan, 21]uly 2001. 
23 Interview, Atenco,july 2003. 
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these movements seem to suggest is one in which local identities and 
communities should form the basis of larger social relations. Part of that 
would require not only community control over natural resources, but 
also a profound respect for cultural difference. One Atenco activist 
explained: 
Autonomy is not complete independence; no one wants that. But it is the 
1ight to decide internal matters according to your own ways. No one can 
come into your house and tell you you have to do this or that. No. The 
same thing here. If we don't want an aiq)Olt or we don't want elections or 
the parties, why should we have to put up with them?' ' 
This call is for a very radical rethinking of what democracy 
ought to be. The state, for the moment, has sought to assimilate other 
perspectives and to provide more transparent mechanisms for 
transferring power than have previously existed. But these types of 
movements and the types of audiences that the Zapatistas are currently 
trying to organise demand a much more profound democratisation that 
truly accounts for a dynamic and pluricullural population. 
24 Interview, Atenco,July 2003. 
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Mexican Machos and Hombres 
Matthew C. Gutmann 
"Haven't you also lost som ething 
for following your father?~' 
Rodolfo Usigli ' 
"Are any of you married?" I asked the muchachos. 
"No, todos solterilos, all young and single," said Felipe. 
"That bozo's got two little squirts. H e's the macho m exican.o," 
said Rodrigo, pointing to Celso, the father of two children who lived 
with their mother in another city. 
"What does that mean?" I inquired. 
"Macho? That you've got kids all over," said Esteban. 
"That your ideology is very closed," said Pancho. "The 
ideology of the m acho m exican.o is very closed. He doesn't think about 
what might happen later, but mainly focuses on the present, on 
satisfaction, on pleasure, on desire. But now that's disappearing a little." 
"You're not machos?" I asked. 
"No, somas hombres, we're men."2 
My discussions witl1 these young men, the muchachos, took place in 
May 1993 in the working class neighbourhood of Santo Domingo, on 
the south side of Mexico City, where I was living and conducting 
ethnographic fieldwork on changing male identities.3 Similar to other 
l Usigli 1947:25 
2 T he word hombre may have special resonance for aficionados of Hollywood W estems. 
Expressions like 'He's a tough hombre" are regularly used to coqjure up images of Mexican 
bandits for whom life means little, and sexual conquest is but part of daily life. Historically there 
is more than a coincidental relationship between Mexican male identities and cowboys. 
3 Fieldwork was conducted 1992-93, with grants from Fulbright-Hays DDRA, W enner-Gren, 
National Science Foundation, Institute for Intercu ltural Studies , UC MEXUS, and the Center for 
Latin American Studies and Department of Anthropology al UC Berkeley, and 1993-95, under a 
grant from tl1e National Institute of Mental Health. My gratitude to the Centra de Estudios 
Sociol6gicos and the Programa Interdisciplinatio de Estudios de la Mujer, both at El Colegio de 
Mexico, atld to tl1e Depattamento de Antropologia, Universidad Aut6noma Metropolitana-
Iztapalapa, for providing institutional supp01t dllling fieldwork in Mexico City. Portions of this 
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poor areas of the Mexican capital, men and women of all ages in 
Colonia Santa Domingo have experienced dramatic transformations in 
recent years in terms of what it means to be men and women, including 
with regard to parenting, participation in political movements, paid 
work, education, sexuality, and more. At the same time, because the 
colonia was founded by land invasion and has been largely self-built, and 
because women have played a prominent role in this history, residents 
of Santa Domingo have also been challenging gender relations inherited 
from the past even more than in many other parts of Mexico. 
With so many men working outside Santa Domingo during the 
day, from its inception much of the daytime responsibility to construct 
and defend the colonia fell largely upon women. They were the ones in 
charge of communications during the early days in the 1970s, when 
private and police-connected goons swept through the community trying 
to extort or evict less than vigilant squatters. With wooden poles, clods 
of dirt, rocks, and shovels the women had to physically guard their new 
properties and those of neighbours. Such exploits on the part of many 
women became emblematic of the invasion, not simply because of the 
courage and determination they evinced, but because women 
throughout the area were coming to be widely regarded as key decision-
makers and leaders. 
This paper takes as its point of departure Michelle Rosaldo's 
insight that, with regard to the study of women, "What is needed ... is 
not so much data as questions."4 Certainly the most conscientious of 
data-gathering ethnographers, Rosaldo nonetheless was never satisfied 
with merely expanding anthropology's storehouse of empirical 
knowledge. In a similar fashion, in the study of masculinities, while we 
have much to learn about men as men, it is even truer that we need new 
ways of studying and interpreting and not simply more raw information. 
Most specifically, I wish to apply Michelle Rosaldo's emphasis on the 
need for new approaches to feminist theory and method to an 
examination of how men in Mexico have recently been characterised by 
different anthropologists and other scholars. 
paper were presented at the 1994 Latin American Studies Association Congress; the University of 
California at Davis; and a 1994 colloquium on Oscar Lewis in Mexico City. My thanks to those 
who oflered commentaries and to those who read earlier drafts of this paper, especially Stanley 
Brandes, T ere:Sita de Barbieri, Ma1y Goldsmith, M. Patricia Femandez Kelly, Michael Herzfeld, 
Gwen Kjrkpauick, Louise Lamphere, Margarita Melville, Eduardo Niv6n, Ben Orlove, N;mcy 
Scheper-Hughes, and Carol Smith. I have also greatly benefited from discussions on machismo 
with Carlos Monsivills and Roger Lancaster. Portions of this essay are excerpted with pe1mission 
from "The Meanings of Macho" by Matthew Gutmann, 2006 ©The Regents of the University of 
Califomia. Published by the University of Califomia Press. 
4 Rosa! do 1980:390 
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Why, for example, have so many writers seemed intent on 
discovering a ubiquitous, virulent, and "typically Mexican" machismo 
among men in that country? In this paper I trace the roots of such 
stereotyping in part to earlier national character studies in anthropology, 
as well as to the imposition by the media and by other social scientists in 
the United States of totalising cultural histories, including with respect to 
gender, on countries like Mexico. 
In many respects Rosaldo anticipated the critical feminist 
analysis represented by what Nancy Fraser calls the "shift from 
'differences among women' to 'multiple intersecting differences."'5 It 
was precisely such differences that Michelle Rosaldo saw as elemental to 
the creative activities of men and women to develop new social 
formations and relations. 6 Only by employing a critical feminist analysis 
and exploring multiple intersecting differences can we adequately record 
and understand emerging and diverging gender politics in societies such 
as Mexico's today. For example, although it is common to hear women 
and men in Colonia Santo Domingo say that while there used to be a lot 
of macho men, many will add that they are not as prevalent today. 
Some older men like to divide the world of males into machos and 
mandilones (meaning female-dominated men), where the term macho 
com1otes a man who is responsible in providing financially and 
otherwise for his family. For older men, to be macho more often means 
to be un hombre de honm~ an honourable man. 7 
It is far more common for younger married men in Colonia 
Santo Domingo to define themselves as belonging to a third category, 
the "non-macho" group. "Ni macho, ni mandil6n, neither macho nor 
mandi/6n," is how many men describe themselves.8 Others may define 
a friend as "your typical macho mexicano," but the same man will often 
reject the label, describing all the things he does to help his wife around 
the home, or pointing out that he does not beat his wife (one of the few 
generally agreed on attributes of machos). What is most significant is 
not simply how the terms macho, machismo, and machista are variously 
defined - there is little consensus on their meanings - but more, that 
today the terms are so widely regarded by working class men in Colonia 
Santo Domingo, Mexico City, as pejorative and not worthy of 
emulation. The same could be noted with regard to the semantic 
5 Fraser 1997:180. 
6 Rosaldo 1980:416. 
7 Beha.r (1993:40) cites an incident several decades ago involving a woman who denounced her 
husband in front of municipal authorities in a village in San Luis Potosf using these words, 'The 
fact is that he's no man. He's no man because he's not responsible for his family. He never 
treats his family well. He treats them worse than animals!' 
8 Mandil6n comes from mandil (apron) and translates literally as 'apron-er.' 
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opposite of el macho mexicano, that is, la mujer abnegada, the self-
sacrificing woman. These lwin, reified images of gender identity are 
frequently and explicitly contrasted in popular discourses in and about 
Mexico. 
For both material and ideological reasons, los hombres, men, 
and los machos are indeed valid anthropological categories in Mexico 
today. Often, though not always, these terms are popularly conceived of 
in contradistinction to las mujeres, women, and las mujeres abnegadas. 
Yet in line with Behar's call to "go beyond first world representations of 
third world women as passive, subservient, and lacking in creativity,"9 we 
should recognise that there is always both acquiescence and dissension 
with regard to these concepts, and that no category is popularly regarded 
- or should be seen - as homogenous. Nor is the following discussion 
based on a structuralist binary opposition, in this case that of 
man/woman or macho/abnegada. "Manliness" and "womanliness" are 
not original, natural, or embalmed states of being; they are gender 
categories whose precise meanings constantly shift, transform into each 
other, and ultimately make themselves into whole new entities. 
For younger men like the muchachos, then, the present period 
is largely distinguished by its liminal character with respect to male 
gender identities: as neitl1er-macho-nor-mandil6n these men are 
precisely betwixt and between marked cultural positions. This is a clear 
illustration that like other cultural identities, notions of masculinity and 
femininity must be historically understood in relation to other divergent 
cultural trajectories such as those involving class, ethnicity, and 
generation. 
ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE CREATION OF MEXICAN MACHISMO 
Because of his crispness, scope, and vigour in presentation, Oscar Lewis 
is a central anthropological ancestor for the contemporary study of 
Mexican machismo. 10 Though he contradicts himself on occasion, his 
descriptions in The Ch1ldren of Sanchez (1961) and other books are still 
a constant point of reference for all contemporary students of the 
changes and continuities of life between and among women and men in 
Mexico. His theoretical formulations are also still delightfully 
provoking, if unfortunately too often insufficiently developed, including 
with regard to the concept of machismo. 
In trying to understand Mexican men, however, some scholars 
have utilised details from Oscar Lewis' ethnographic studies to promote 
9 Behar 1993:272. 
10 See Lewis 1951,1959, and 1961. 
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sensationalist generalities that go far beyond anything Lewis himself 
wrote. For instance, in David Gilmore's widely read survey of the 
Ubiquitous (if not Universal) Male in the world, machismo is discussed 
as an extreme form of manly images and codes. 11 Modern urban 
Mexican men are useful to Gilmore mainly as exaggerated archetypes; 
with other Latin men they constitute the negative pole on a continuum -
from machismo to androgyny - of male cultural identities around the 
world. Mexican machos are thus employed as a foil against which other 
men less concerned with virility are compared. Gilmore cites Lewis to 
make his ethnographic points about Mexican men: 
In urban Latin America, for example, as described by Oscar Lewis," a man 
must prove his manhood eve1y day by standing up to challenges and insults, 
even though he goes to his death "smiling." As well as being tough and 
brave, ready to defend his family's honour at the drop of a hat, the urban 
Mexican ... must also perform adequately in sex and father many children.'" 
To be sure, such a characterisation of "the urban Mexican 
[male)" does find echoes in popular culture, for instance in the line from 
the hit song of 1948, "Traigo mi 45" ("I'm carrying my .45"), "c!Quien 
djjo miedo, muchachos, si para morir na.cimos? Who's talking scared, 
boys, if we were born to die?" 14 But even if Lewis's ethnographic 
descriptions, compiled in the 1950s, were just as valid decades later, 
Lewis did not usually generalise in this fashion about the lives of Jesus 
Sanchez and his children. His anthropology was often artfully 
composed and some of his theories were naive, but Lewis generally tried 
to keep "mere" romance and fancy out of his ethnographic 
descriptions. 15 
Before proceeding further, three general points bear 
mentioning here. First, macho (in its modern sense) and machismo (in 
any sense) have remarkably short word histories. Indeed tracing the 
historical permutations and modulations of these words is critical to 
understanding the ongoing discrepancies that exist popularly and in the 
social sciences regarding their meanings. Carlos Monsivais in particular 
has linked the emergence of the ethos of machismo especially to the 
Golden Age of Mexican Cinema in the 1940s and 1950s.16 
11 Gilmore 1990. 
12 Lewis \961:38. 
13 Gilmore 1990:16. 
14 See Monsivais 1981:108. 
15 Though Lewis did include machismo on his list of over sixty possible traits illustrative of the 
"culture of pove11y" (see Rigdon 1988:114-15) he seemed ambivalent about the efficacy of using 
the term, inserting and deleting it in his publications (see Gutmann 1994). 
16 See Monsivais 1981, 1992. 
140 Matthew C. Gutmann 
Second, machismo as discussed here is not reducible to a 
coherent set of sexist ideas. It is not simply male chauvinism. As Roger 
Lancaster stresses in his astute and pioneering study of Nicaragua, 
"machismo is resilient because it constitutes not simply a form of 
'consciousness,' not 'ideology' in the classical understanding of the 
concept, but a field of productive relations." 17 Determining the systemic 
character of machismo is predicated on following the historical tracks of 
the term. As these lead in various directions in different times and 
circumstances in Mexico and Nicaragua, for instance, the structural and 
material content of machismo must be kept in mind. 
Finally, I would point to another central, recurring focal point in 
many if not most meanings of machismo: bodily functions. These refer 
to beatings, sexual episodes, consumption of alcohol, defiance of death, 
and the not so simple problem of defining the categories of "men" and 
"women." Regardless of how confusing gender identities may seem, 
they usually share relations of mutual dependence with these somatic 
realms. 
As to some of the characteristics frequently cited as manifesting 
machismo on the part of men - wife beating, alcoholism, infidelity, 
gambling, abandonment of children, and bullying behaviour in general-
many men, and more than a few women, exhibit certain of these 
qualities and not others, at certain times and not others. There are 
historic, systemic, and bodily facets of machismo. Figuring out how 
exactly the pieces fit together is the problem. 
COWBOYS AND RACISM 
In Mexican newspapers, academic literature, and dictionary entries, the 
terms macho and machismo have been used in contradictory ways. The 
definitions employed or implied in such official circles reveal not only a 
diversity of views regarding the substance of the terms, but also ,,yjdely 
disparate conjectures as to the origins of the words and their meanings. 
Emphasising sexuality, in a frequently quoted paper on machismo, 
Stevens calls machismo "the cult of virility," adding that, "The chief 
characteristics of this cult are exaggerated aggressiveness and 
intransigence in male-to-male interpersonal relationships and arrogance 
and sexual aggression in male-to-female relationships." 18 Greenberg 
captures some of the ambivalence of machismo when he describes an 
episode in which Fortino, the protagonist of his study, "was being very 
I 7 Though machismo is not necessarily the same beast in eve1y cultural context, as we will see. 
Lancaster 1992:19. 
18 Stevens 1973:90. 
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macho, in a non-confrontational, almost womanly manner."19 Macho 
may thus be identified with non-aggressive ("womanly") behaviour.20 
Many anthropologists and psychologists writing about machismo utilise 
characterisations like manly, unmanly, and manliness without defining 
them. They seem to assume, incorrectly in my estimation, that all their 
readers share a common definition and understanding of such 
qualities. 21 
In a brilliant essay published in English in 1971, America 
Paredes provides several clues as to the word history of machismo, and 
in the process draws clear connections between the advent of machismo 
and nationalism, racism, and international relations. Paredes finds that 
prior to the 1930s and 1940s in Mexican folklore - a good indication 
today of popular speech at the time - the terms macho and machismo 
do not appear. The word macho existed, but almost as an obscenity, 
similar to later connotations of machismo. Other words, some also 
semantically related to men, were far more common at the time of the 
Mexican Revolution: hombrismo, hombria, muy hombre, hombre de 
verdad (all relating to hombre, man), and valentia, muy valiente, etc. 
(relating to valour, courage). 22 Despite the fact that during the Mexican 
Revolution the phrase muy hombre was used to describe courageous 
women as well as men, the special association of such a quality with men 
then and now indicates certain points in common regardless of whether 
the words macho and machismo were employed. 
Making a connection between courage and men during times of 
war - in which men are the main, though assuredly not the only, 
combatants - is nevertheless not the same thing as noting the full-blown 
"machismo syndrome," as it is sometimes called. To oversimplify, if 
courage was valued during the Revolution this was true for both men 
and women, though the terms used to refer to courage carried a heavy 
male accent. Beginning especially in the 1940s, the male accent itself 
19 Greenburg 1989:227. 
20 For a psychological-anthropological analysis of machismo, see also Gilmore and Gilmore 1979. 
The role of the press and popular writings in the United States have not been incidental in 
popularizing the terms macho and machismo, for instance in national character studies and their 
progeny. For the earliest published references in English to "macho," see Beals 1928:233 and 
Mailer 1959:19, 483-84. 
21 Dictionaries are in conflict over the term, tracing the etymological roots of macho to Latin and 
Portuguese words for masculine and mule, and tracing the cultural ancest:ty of macho to 
Andalusian soldie rs of the Conquest, or certain indigenous peoples of the Americas, or Yankee 
gringo invaders in the early part of this century. On the etymology of "macho," see G6mez de 
Silva 1988:427 and Moliner 1991:II:299-300. On diverse and contradictory aspects of the 
cultural history of "machismo," see Mendoza 1962; Santamaria 1959:677; and Hodges 1986:114. 
22 Even though the classic novel of the Mexican Revolution, Los de abajo (first published in 1915) 
at one point uses the expression "machito" (translated as simply "a man" in Azuela 1962:79) this 
does not constitute the widespread use of the word macho or even familiarity with the tenn in the 
sense of machismo or any of its derivatives. 
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came to prormnence as a national(ist) symbol. For better or worse, 
Mexico came to mean machismo and machismo to mean Mexico, 
providing an illustration of what Mary Louise Pratt shows to be the 
"androcentrism of the modern national imaginings" in Latin America. 23 
The consolidation of the nation-state and party machinery 
throughout the Mexican Republic and the development of the country's 
modern national cultural identity took place on a grand scale during the 
presidencies of Lazaro Cardenas and Manuel Avila Camacho (1934-
1946). Mter the turbulent years of the Revolution and the 1920s, and 
following six years of national unification under the populist presidency 
of Lazaro Cardenas, the national election campaign of 1940 opened an 
era of unparalleled industrial growth and demagogic rule in Mexico. 
Coincidentally, one of the campaign slogans of the ultimately successful 
presidential candidate Avila Camacho was: "Ca ... MACHO!" As 
Paredes points out, the president was not responsible for the use of the 
term macho, but "we must remember that names lend reality to 
things."24 
Searching for !! national identity is a very modern project in 
Mexico as elsewhere. Often remembered for his blunt diagnosis of the 
country's "inferiority complex," Samuel Ramos is also frequently cited 
as the original critic of Mexican machismo. 25 Once again, however, 
Ram os never used the terms macho or machismo. Yet the connections 
between lo mexicano and manliness (however defined) were striking in 
Ramos. He centred his account of the nation's inferiority on the "well-
known Mexican type, the pelado," whose conduct was one of "virile 
protest."26 The pelado is a male proletarian, vulgar and poorly 
educated, Ramos reports, who himself associates "his concept of virility 
with that of nationality, creating thereby the illusion that personal valour 
is the Mexican's particular characteristic."27 The particular association 
by Ramos of negative male qualities with the urban working class has 
been a prominent theme in writings on "Latin American masculinity" 
and machismo ever since his study was published in 1934. 
Notions of machismo in Mexico are connected by many 
scholars to discussions of social class. Stevens calls the popular 
acceptance of a stereotyped Latin American macho "ubiquitous in every 
social class,"28 a summation which has led some scholars whose 
23 Pratt 1990:50. See Bolton (1979) on machismo among Peruvian truckers for a recent study of 
these imaginings. 
24 Paredes 1971:23. 
25 See Ramos 1962. 
26 Ramos 1962:9. 
27 Ramos 1962:63. 
28 Stevens 1973:94. 
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geographical interests lie outside the region to utilise the concept of 
machismo in their own studies and made machos and machismo 
standard terms in the social sciences for labelling a host of negative male 
characteristics in cultures around the world.29 In contrast, Paredes links 
machismo especially to Mexico's middle classes, while Limon writing 
about working class Chicanos in south Texas effectively critiques the 
class prejudices of Ram os regarding machos pelados. 30 
The word history of machismo is but a piece of the larger 
puzzle regarding the outlooks and practices codified in tautological 
fashion as instances of machismo. For Paredes, the peculiar history of 
U.S.-Mexican relations has produced a marked antipathy on the part of 
Mexicans for their northern neighbours. The image of the frontier and 
the (Wild) West has in turn played a special role in this tempestuous 
relationship, with the annexation of two-fifths of the Mexican nation to 
the United States in 1848, and repeated U.S. economic and military 
incursions into Mexico since then, putting the lie to proclamations of 
respect for national sovereignty. 
Trade between the two countries initially included the export of 
the Mexican vaquero-cowboy to the United States, Paredes reminds us. 
In the early 19'h century, the frontiersmen of Texas and further west 
were forging the way for the expanding Jacksonian empire, and their 
combination of individualism and sacrifice for the higher national good 
came to embody the machismo ethos. Together with the pistol, the 
supreme macho symbol, such an ethos came to play a similar role in the 
consolidation of the Mexican nation, which is one reason why 
"machismo betrays a certain element of nostalgia; it is cultivated by those 
who feel they have been born too late."31 
On the other side of the border, in the United States, I would 
argue that the term machismo has a rather explicitly racist history; from 
its first appearance in print in English32 machismo has been associated 
with negative stereotypes of Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Latin 
American men. 33 Contemporary popular usage of the term machismo 
in the United States often serves to rank men according to their 
supposedly inherent national and racial characters, as in, "My boyfriend 
may not be perfect, but at least he's no Mexican macho." Such analysis 
29 See, for example, on the former Yugoslavia, Simic 1969:100, 1983; modem Muslin society, 
Mernissi 1975:5; and Micronesia, Marshall1979:90. 
30 Limon 1994. A review of recent literature regarding machismo and Chicanos is outside the 
scope of this paper, but beyond Lm6n (1989, 1994) interested readers may profitably consult 
Baca Zinn 1982; Almaguer 1991; and Mirande 1997. 
31 Paredes 1971:37. 
32 Griffith 1948:50. 
33 Representative examples of popular stereotyping of Mexican and Latin American men in the 
United States media are Reston 1967 and McDowell1984. 
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utilises non-sexist pretensions to make denigrating generalisations about 
fictitious Mexican male culture traits. 
JORGE NEGRETE AND LO MEXICANO 
The consolidation of the Mexican nation, ideologically and materially, 
was fostered early on not only in the gun battles on the wild frontier, not 
only in the voting rituals of presidential politics, but also in the imagining 
and inventing of lo mexicano, mexicanidad in the national cinema. And 
of all the movie stars of this era, one stood out as "a macho among 
machos." Ever the handsome and pistol-packing charro, singing 
cowboy, with his melodious and eminently male tenor, Jorge Negrete 
came to epitomise the swaggering Mexican nation, singing: 
I am a Mexican, and this wild land is mine. 
On the word of a macho, there's no land lovelier 
and wilder of its kind. 
I am a Mexican, and of this I am proud. 
I was born scorning life and dealh, 
And while I have bragged, I have never been cowed."' 
In the rural cantinas, the manly temples of the Golden Age of 
Mexican Cinema, the macho mood was forged. Mexico appeared on 
screen as a single entity, however internally incongruent, while within the 
nation the figures of Mexican Man and Mexican Woman loomed large. 
The former: 
... untamed, generous, cruel, womanizing, romantic, obscene, at one with 
family and friends, subjugated and reslless ... lll1e latter! obedient, seductive, 
resigned, obliging, devoted to her own and slave to her husband, to her 
lover, to her children, and to her essential failure."' 
The distinctions between being a macho and being a man were 
starting to come into clearer focus in the Mexican cinema of the 1940s: 
To be macho is now part of !he scene1y. To be macho is an attitude. There 
are gestures, movements. It is the belief ll1at genital potency holds the key lo 
ll1e universe, all that. It goes from ll1e notion of danger to the notion of 
bragging; that's the difference between macho and man ihombrei. As the 
song says, "If you've got to kill me tomOITOW, why don't you get it over will1 
34 Yo soy mexic.cmo, mi tien-a es b1-avfa. 
Palabi<1 de mad10, que no hay otJ-a u'en-a mas linda 
y m as bi<Wa que Ja u'en-a mfa. 
Yo soy mexicano, y orgullo lo tengo. 
Naci despreciando la vida y la mue1te, 
Y si he hecho bmvalas, lambien /as sostengo. 
From the song "Y o soy mexicano. " 
35 Monsivais 1992:18. 
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now." That is being very manly [ser muy hombrel. "I have four wives." 
That is being very macho [ser muy macho[. (Carlos Monsivais)" 
Then, at the end of the 1940s, Mexican machismo underwent a 
most refined dissection by Octavio Paz. Despite Paz's wish to speak 
only to a small group, "made up of those who are conscious of 
themselves, for one reason or another, as Mexicans,"37 this work more 
than any other has come to represent the official view of essential 
Mexican attributes, like machismo, loneliness, and mother worship. 
When Paz writes, "The Mexican is always remote, from the world and 
from other people. And also from himself,"38 he should not be taken 
literally but literarily. It is a beautifully written pook, and part of the 
reason for its elegance may be that Paz was creating as much as he was 
reflecting on qualities of mexicanidad. As he put it in his Return to the 
Labyrinth of Solitude, "The book is part of the attempt of literally 
marginal countries to regain consciousness: to become subjects again."39 
Paz writes with regard to men and women in Mexico, "In a 
world made in man's image, woman is only a reflection of masculine will 
and desire."40 In Mexico, "woman is always vulnerable. Her social 
situation - as a repository of honor, in the Spanish sense - and the 
misfortune of her 'open' anatomy expose her to all kinds of dangers."41 
Biology as destiny? But there is nothing inherently passive, or private, 
about vaginas in Mexico or anywhere else. Continuing with Paz, just as 
"the essential attribute of the macho" - or what the macho seeks to 
display anyway - is power, so too with "the Mexican people." Thus 
mexicanidad, Paz tells us, is concentrated in the macho forms of 
"caciques, feudal lords, hacienda owners, politicians, generals, captains 
of industry."42 
Many Mexican men are curious about what it means to be a 
Mexican, and what it means to be a man. One is not born knowing 
these things; nor are they truly discovered. They are learned and 
relearned. For some, this involves the quest for one's patrimony. 
"Pedro Paramo is my father too," declares one of Mexico's bastard 
sons. 43 Even if he is an infamous brute, a father is a father. For the 
Mexican macho and for the nation, it is better to have one than to be 
fatherless. 
36 Interview, 20 February 1993. 
37 Paz 1961:11. 
38 Paz 1961:29. 
39 Paz 1985:330. 
40 Paz 1961:35. 
41 Paz 1961:38. 
42 Paz 1961:82. 
43 Rulfo 1959:3. 
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In Paz and much of the literature of cultural nationalism m 
Mexico in recent decades: 
[ ... ] the problem of national identity was thus presented primarily as a 
problem of male identity, and it was male authors who debated its defects 
and psychoanalyzed the nation. In national allegories, women became the 
territory over which the quest for (male) national identity passed .. .''' 
MANDILONES AND DOMINATING WOMEN 
In Colonia Santo Domingo, in addition to Paz, another authoritative 
source of information about machismo and national identity which 
people use in the stories they tell about themselves is Oscar Lewis. Or 
at least what people have heard about his anthropological writings -
Lewis is "remembered" far more than he is read. 
In the social sciences Lewis continues to be the most cited 
reference with regard to conclusions about Mexican masculinity. In fact, 
three particular sentences from his Children of Sanchez (1961) are 
employed with astonishing frequency in anthropological texts to 
represent all Mexican males past, present, and future: 
In a fight I would never give up or say, "Enough," even though the other was 
killing me. I would try to go to my death smiling. That is what we mean by 
being "macho," by being manly." 
This specific passage is cited, for example, by Marshal! in his 
discussion of machismo in Micronesia, 46 by M ads en and Madsen in a 
paper on alcohol consumption in Mexico, 47 and, as quoted above, by 
Gilmore in his comparative survey of the images of masculinity. 48 A few 
sentences on page thirty-eight of Children of Sanchez have thus come to 
shoulder an immense responsibility in anthropology: to provide a 
quotable sound bite defining Mexican masculinity/machismo. 
Is this quotation really such a good and accurate concentration 
of Mexican male identity? If it were, as if by ethnographic decree, every 
male soul who finds himself south of the shallows of the Rio Grande 
and north of the highlands of Guatemala must at least try to go to his 
death smiling if he wishes to retain his Mexican male credentials. I 
doubt very much if Lewis' intention was to summarise the life 
experiences and desires of all Mexican men in this short passage. 
Perhaps most revealing of all, the sentences in question are not even 
44 Franco 1989:131. 
45 Lewis 1961:38. 
46 Marsha111979:89. 
47 Madsen and Madsen 1969:712. 
48 Gilmore 1990:16. 
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Lewis' own, but are actually part of a monologue by Manuel Sanchez, 
one of the Sanchez children. Manuel is nonetheless the man whose 
ideologically-charged comments to Lewis on one particular day in the 
mid-1950s have frequently come to speak for all Mexican men since that 
time.49 We anthropologists may well ask where this need to see 
pervasive machismo comes from, and why so many have used Lewis to 
prove their own preconceptions and prejudices. 
In Colonia Santo Domingo in Mexico City there are significant 
differences in the uses and meanings of the terms macho and 
machismo. These reflect, and often concentrate, contrasting urban and 
rural experiences, generational differences, class stratification, stages 
within individuals' lives, and, in the age of television satellites, the impact 
on people throughout Mexico of what others around the world say 
about them and their national peculiarities. 
Returning to the term mandil6n, stronger than 'henpecked' but 
not nearly as vulgar as 'pussy-whipped' in English, we see by its common 
daily use that it is an expression produced by a machista system, and that 
it is at the same time a response to machismo. 50 Angela and I were 
walking through the sobre ruedas open-air markets one day in October 
1992, shortly after we first met, and she remarked that maybe my wife 
Michelle should buy a mandil, an apron, "in Mateo's size," so I could be 
a proper mandil6n. Angela added that her son Noe, whom I had not 
yet met, was a mandil6n. I asked her why, and she responded by saying 
that Noe washed dishes, cooked, and took care of his daughter. I 
wanted to know how Noe had come to do these things. "Nolo crie para 
ser macho mexicano; I didn't raise him to be a macho mexicano," came 
the answer. I wondered aloud if N oe would accept this appellation. 
Angela insisted that he would. 
In early November, I asked Noe about being a mandil6n. "No 
soy mandil6n," corrected N oe, "I'm not a mand1l6n. It doesn't bother 
me at all to help my wife. I share everything with her." But Noe 
rejected the title of mandil6n, which he defined as, "he who is 
dominated by women." 
Noe's younger sister Norma came by our apartment in January 
because her husband Miguel had not come home, and I was the last 
person to have seen him. Mter a futbol playoff Miguel and I had gone 
over to the coach's house for tacos, beans, and beer. I had left hours 
earlier, but by 8 p.m., Mie still had not returned, and Norma was 
worried. Yet she could not go looking for him herself, she said, because 
49 Another U.S.-bom writer, Ernest Hemingway, is perhaps more responsible for popularizing 
ideas about Latin heroics, also known as machismo, in the United States. See the discussion of 
defiance in the face of death on the part ofHemingway's characters in Capellan 1985. 
50 Another way to refer to a man-as-mandil6n, is, "El es muy dejado; He's very put upon." 
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that might make him look like a mandil6n in front of the other young 
men: a wife coming to fetch her (presumably) drunk husband. 
Not labelling a man a mandil6n is not merely a matter of 
helping him save face, however, because for many women as well as 
men it carries negative connotations. That is, being a mandil6n is seen 
as a positive opposite of macho to some like Angela, but to others it is 
but an inverse form of the macho's empty boasting. In both cases the 
definitions of mandil6n reflect awareness of power differences between 
men and women, that is, a contradictory consciousness, to engage 
Gramsci's formulation, with respect to male identities. 51 
"I don't want a man who's either macho or JnandJ16n," one 
young woman told me. 
"Why not mandil6n?" I asked. 
"Because who wants someone who can't stick up for himself, 
who's used to getting bossed around and likes it that way." In other 
words, life is hard enough as it is, and a young woman can ill-afford 
depending on a mandil6n for her husband. Instead, one needs a 
partner who can make things happen and not just wait for orders from 
others, his wife included. 
Among men in their twenties and thirties in Colonia Santa 
Domingo, it was rare to hear anyone claim the title of macho for 
himself. "Why, I wash dishes and cook," some would protest when 
called macho by a friend. Machos do neither of these things, nor do 
they spend a lot of time with their children, many felt. Even more than 
these activities, however, the most common reason for not accepting the 
name of macho was, "I don't beat my wife." A grandfather of sixty-
seven explained to me that he was no macho, and that his own father 
before him had not been either. "Why, he never drank a beer in front 
of the kids," my friend told me, "and he never beat his wife." 
Today among the young in Mexico City the model of aggressive 
masculinity is no longer the pistol-packing charro cowboy of yore 
looking for a tranquil rancho where he can hang his sombrero. He has 
been replaced by the submachinegun-spraying Rambo launching assaults 
on the Vietnams or Afghanistans of the moment. No one would argue 
that Rambo is a product of Mexico, yet there and in his land of origin is 
he not known as the ultimate macho? Local symbols become globalised 
and then relocalised and reglobalised. 
For some men today, "the macho" is also a playful role they can 
perform on demand. I stifled my displeasure one evening when, at her 
three year-old granddaughter's birthday party, and in her capacity of 
patron saint of my research project, Angela took me by the hand and 
51 Gramsci 1929-35:333. 
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introduced me to several men whom she said were "genuine 
representatives of Mexican machismo." After being so presented to one 
young man, Angela demanded of him, "Where's your wife?" A sly 
smile crossed the man's face, "I sent her to the bathroom." His wife was 
seven months pregnant, the man added, so like the good macho Angela 
accused him of being, he had to send her to the bathroom a lot. Often 
such jokes were followed by remarks that revealed an acute sensitivity to 
the cultural beliefs about Mexican men which many in Mexico think are 
held by North Americans. "That's really what you gringos believe about 
us, isn't it?" people would sometimes comment when I raised the image 
of Mexican men preferring to go their death smiling than lose face. 
The ethnographic authority of anthropologists to expound on 
issues of supposed "national character traits" has a long history in 
Mexico and elsewhere, stemming back to World War II and the need 
at the time to place clear national labels on enemy and allied 
characters." Not only is such a quest for national characteristics 
premised upon the notion that cultures are in some reasonable sense 
"whole" and sealed, but anthropology in particular has been 
instrumental in "discovering" common cultural beliefs and practices, 
thus linking nation-states to particular ideas and behaviours. Hence 
were born theories of cultural difference and national otherness. Of 
course, if this starting point of dividing the world into national others is 
found wanting - i.e., if with Michelle Rosaldo we insist on asking the 
right questions and not simply gathering more documentation for 
evident truths - then the whole framework of Mexican male attributes 
collapses in a heap of national(ist) essentialising.53 
In the dramas that people in colonias populares offer about 
their own and others' marriages, the parts played by self-designated 
machos are not all playful by any means. "We cheat on our wives 
because we're men," said one acquaintance. "We want to be macho." 
What does this mean, "we want to be macho," except that "to be 
macho" is an ideological stance which can only be sanctified by others -
men and women - and by oneself? In my discussion with the 
muchachos, while one of them said that they were not machos but 
rather they were hombres, men, Celso insisted that, as men, by 
definition they were machos. He said that if they needed to call 
52 See Fabian 1983. 
53 An illustration of the influence of the United States on macho self-perceptions among Mexicans 
was provided for me on 5 July 1993, when I participated in the Mexico City-based, nationally 
televised talk show, 'Maria Victoria Uamas." I was invited to speak to the theme "A lo macho," 
and asked to make two points: (1) machismo is not just a problem in Mexico, and (2) based on 
my research it was clear that not all men in Mexico were machos. I was informed that this would 
sound especially convincing coming from a North American anthropologist. 
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themselves something, mand1l6n and marica (queer) were obviously 
inappropriate. So what else did this leave except macho?54 
The description provided by Celso makes it appear that the 
youths rummage around in an identity grab-bag, pulling out whatever 
they happen to seize upon, as long as it is culturally distinct. One 
minute these muchachos identify themselves as machos who enjoy 
bragging about controlling women and morally and physically weaker 
men. The next minute the same young men express bitterness at being 
the ones on the bottom. 
REDEFINITIONS 
Delineating cultural identities and defining cultural categories, one's own 
and those of others, is not simply the pastime of ethnographers. Despite 
the fact that creating typologies of Mexican masculinity can result in 
parodies without living referents, and overlooking for the moment the 
not unimportant issue of how men and women in Colonia Santa 
Domingo understand manliness and define what ser hombre, to be a 
man, means, there is purpose to the social science quest for better ways 
to categorise men in Mexico. 
So while no one in Santa Domingo might explicitly divide the 
population of men this way, I think most would recognise the following 
four male gender groups: the macho, the mandil6n, the neither-macho-
nor-mandil6n, and the broad category of men who have sex with other 
men. But the fact that few men or women do or would care to divide 
the male population in this manner reveals more than simply a lack of 
familiarity with the methods of Weberian ideal typologising. 
Masculinity, like other cultural identities, is not confined so neatly in 
box-like categories like macho or mandil6n. Identities only make sense 
in relation to other identities, and they are never firmly established for 
individuals or groups. Further, consensus will rarely be found as to 
whether a particular man deserves a label such as neither-macho-nor-
mandil6n. He will likely think of himself as a man in a variety of ways, 
none of which necessarily coincides with the views of his family and 
friends. 
' In terms of the group of men who have sex with other men, this 
includes among others the male prostitute putos who have sex for 
money with other men and always play the "active role," and the 
homosexuales (maricas, maricones, and so on) who are marked not only 
by their preference for male sex partners, but more generally by the low 
54 On the issue of men's sexuality, and especially sex between men, see Gulmann 1996:Chapter 5. 
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cultural esteem in which they are held by many in society. Men who 
have sex with other men are by some people's definition outside the 
bounds of masculinity altogether, and would not even constitute a 
separate male gender type. 
Yet while this taxonomy may indicate some important lines of 
demarcation, like all ideal typologising it hopelessly obscures salient 
differences which are so numerous that they can hardly be considered 
exceptions. And this is undoubtedly all the more true during liminal 
moments historically in which cultural categories lack clearly 
circumscribed boundaries. No man today in Santo Domingo neatly fits 
into any of the four categories, either at specific moments or much less 
throughout the course of his life. Further, definitions such as these resist 
other relevant but complicating factors like class, ethnicity, and historical 
epoch. "El mexicano es muy hablador; habla mucho y no cumple; The 
Mexican man is a big talker; he talks a lot but doesn't come through," 
one of the muchachos told me at the end of our discussion. So who 
represents the more archetypal macho mexicano: the man who wants 
many (male) offspring and later abandons them, or the man who wants 
few, works hard to earn money for them, and calls these his manly 
duties? 
To unravel these stereotyped social roles, we must return to the 
point raised by Lancaster: machismo, in whatever guise, is not simply a 
matter of ideology.55 Machismo in Colonia Santo Domingo has been 
challenged ideologically, especially by grassroots feminism and more 
indirectly by the mainly middle class feminist and gay rights 
movements. 56 But it has also faced real if usually ambiguous challenges 
in the forms of the strains of migration, falling birthrates, exposure to 
alternative cultures on TV, and so on. These economic and 
sociocultural changes have not automatically led to corresponding shifts 
in male domination, in the home, the work place, or society at large. 
But many men's authority has been undermined in material, if limited, 
ways, and this changing position for men as husbands and fathers, 
breadwinners and masters has in turn had real consequences for 
machismo in Santo Domingo. 
To be a macho for most people in Colonia Santo Domingo 
involves qualities of personal belligerence, especially though not only as 
directed toward women, and in this sense it is very tied to appearances 
and style. In substance, this veneer of arrogance and hostility derives on 
the part of some men from feelings of superiority - and repeated and 
55 Lancaster 1992. Though it includes this aspect, as Femandez Kelly (1976) makes clear in a 
paper on some of the ideological foundations of the notion of machismo. 
56 See Massolo 1992; Stephen 1997. 
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regular actions to back up these sentiments. At the same time, in Santo 
Domingo some men may seek to hide deep fears of physical inadequacy 
and losing male prerogative behind the guise of the macho. Women in 
particular talk of men who match the second description, referring to 
them in terms of disdain, ridicule, and even pity. 
MEXICAN MACHISMO: THE USE AND ABUSE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 
The words macho and machismo have become a form of calumny, 
shorthand terms in social science and journalistic writing for labelling a 
host of negative male characteristics in cultures around the world. A 
researcher at the Center for Gender Studies in Moscow told a reporter 
in 1994, "Before the view of Russian men were as creatures without 
willpower who drink too much. Now they have the ability to make 
money, they want everything in this life. They have that macho 
feeling." 57 This is illuminating: men who drink too much are not called 
macho, yet those who have money more easily acquire "that macho 
feeling." In earlier examples cited, male sexual conquest and 
procreation are central themes, as are bragging and defiance of death. 
And the writings of Oscar Lewis continue to be cited by 
anthropologists as the empirical source for more recent analyses of 
Mexican masculinity. The use of Lewis to prove alleged "national" traits 
like machismo seems particularly abusive because despite the fact that 
Lewis was writing at the high tide of national character studies in 
anthropology, in contrast to the homogenising portraits created by other 
ethnographers, Lewis consistently emphasised the diversity of cultural 
life along the lines of class, ethnicity, and age, in Mexico as in all 
countries where he conducted his research. Yet in spite of these efforts, 
to this day, one way or another, the prevalent assumption in 
anthropology and more popularly continues to be that we all know what 
machismo means and what machos do and that the task of social 
scientists after Oscar Lewis is principally to find cultures in which 
machos flourish as much as they supposedly do in Mexico. 
An equation of machismo with Mexican culture as a whole has 
occurred well beyond the confines of mere social science, of course; it 
has also been common in the stories Mexicans tell about themselves, 
both in daily discussions among Mexicans as well as in the grand 
proclamations of the scholarly elite. Stereotypes about machismo are 
critical ingredients in the symbolic capital operated by ordinary 
Mexicans. Even if verbally denigrated by many, machismo is widely 
57 Cited in Stanley 1994:7. 
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regarded in Mexico as constituting part of the national patrimony in the 
same way as the country's oil deposits are a source of national if not 
necessarily individual self-identity. In this manner machismo has 
become part of the more general political economy of cultural values in 
Mexico. 
Authoritative discussions of machismo in Mexico, or what later 
came to be known as machismo in some form,58 have all made 
connections between the macho who "represents the masculine pole of 
life"59 and the broader social and political world of 20"' century 
Mexico. 60 just as Lafaye has shown with regard to the Virgen de 
Guadalupe,61 so too with Mexican masculinity: it has not always 
represented the same kind of national symbol, but rather has been used 
for different purposes at various times to emphasise particular cultural 
nationalist qualities by a vast array of social forces. 62 
In Colonia Santo Domingo, as elsewhere in the Republic, the 
fate of machismo as an archetype of masculinity has always been closely 
tied to Mexican cultural nationalism. My good friend Cesar commented 
to me one day about drinking in his youth, "More than anything we 
consumed tequila. We liked it, maybe because we felt more like 
Mexicans, more like lugarenos [equivalent to homeboys)." 
For better or for worse, Ramos and Paz gave tequila-swilling 
machismo pride of place in the panoply of national character traits. 
Through their efforts and those of journalists and social scientists on 
both sides of the Rio Bravo/Grande, the macho became "the Mexican." 
This is ironic, for it represents the product of a cultural nationalist 
invention: you note something (machismo) as existing, and in the 
process• help foster its very existence. Mexican machismo as national 
artefact was in this sense partially declared into being. 
And from the beginning the portrayal of machismo (or its 
pelado forerunner) has been uniquely linked to the poor, 
unsophisticated, uncosmopolitan, and un-North American. From the 
1920s on in Mexico, the bourgeoisie and the middle classes were, in 
Monsivais' words, "obstinate in seeing nationalism as the most fruitful 
for their progress and internal coherence."63 The macho-pelado, always 
eminently male, was either like J orge N egrete, the homespun figure 
from Mexico's rural past, or he was the essential backwardness of the 
58 See Ramos 1962, Paz 1961. 
59 Paz 1961:81. 
60 On Mexican national identity, nationalism, mexicanidad, and lo mexicano, most recently, see 
B;utra 1992 and Lomnitz-Adler 1992. 
61 Lafaye 1976. 
62 See also Bushnell 1958; Wolf 1958; Alarc6n 1990. 
63 Monsivais 1976:194. 
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nation, rural and urban, which needed to be exposed and eradicated. 
On the other side of the class ledger, nearly all union leaders and many 
leftist intellectuals in Mexico for much of this century have championed 
the cause of national progress by promoting the heroic figure of the 
proletarian male militant. In all versions, Mexican masculinity has been 
at the heart of defining a Mexican nation, its past and its future. 
Defining the words macho and machismo must not be done 
arbitrarily. Is macho to be considered brutish, gallant, or cowardly? 
These things change over time for various sectors of Mexican society, 
and we must not ignore the often elusive and mutually exclusive ways in 
which these catchwords are today employed in Mexico. And, needless 
to say, social scientists in the United States must not assume that they are 
privy to the sole legitimate understanding of the terms. Nor should we 
forget that masculinity, like the family, is not simply a precondition but is 
a product of men and women's cultural efforts. Michelle Rosaldo made 
this clear in writing that, "To claim that family shapes women is, 
ultimately, to forget that families themselves are things that men and 
women actively create and that these vary with particulars of social 
context."64 
Like religiousness, individualism, modernity, and other 
convenient concepts machismo is used and understood in many ways. 
And history in the form of nationalism, feminism, and socioeconomic 
coqjunctures impinges directly on gender identities in Mexico, including 
on what masculinity and machismo mean and how they are variously 
regarded. We either accept the multiple and shifting meanings of 
macho and machismo or we essentialise what were already reified 
generalisations about Mexican men in the first place. Like any identity, 
male identities in Mexico City do not reveal anything intrinsic about 
men there. Their sense and experience of being hombres and machos 
is but part of the reigning chaos of tl1e lives of men in Colonia Santo 
Domingo at least as much as the imagined national coherence imposed 
from without. 
64 Rosaldo 1980:416. 
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Nosotras 
Representations of Gender and Class 
Identities of Female Office Workers in 
Post -Revolutionary Mexico 1 
Susie S. Porte~ 
"We are shorthand typists! lVhat a lot of unsettling questions 
are made by those who surround us. How they criticize and condemn 
us, and how little they know and understand us. If we triumph, they 
attribute it to chance or to our coquetry." 
Sarah Batiza, Nosotras, !as taquigrafas (1949) 2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1949 Sarah Batiza published Nosotras, las taquigrafas (We women, 
the shorthand typists), which she prefaced with a brief meditation on the 
condition of female office workers, from which the opening quote of 
this essay was selected. The preface frames Batiza's work, first by 
positioning the pages that follow as truths that will belie 
misunderstandings of female office workers. While the book is written 
as a novel, it takes the tone of documentary loosely held together by 
1 This essay was written as a presentation for the Independent Study Committee on Mexico at 
York University, Canada. I would like to commend, and thank, the students who organized this 
impressive conference, especially jessica Perkins. 
2 All quotes appear in their original language in the footnotes. "jSomos taquigrafas! jCuantas 
inquietantes preguntas se hacen a nuestro alrededor! jComo se nos critica y condena y que poco 
se nos conoce y comprende! Si obtenemos un triunfo, se atribuye a la casualidad o a nuestra 
coqueteria." Sarah Batiza Berkowics, Nosotras, !as taquigralas (Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial 
Stylo, 1950, 1949 publishing), 9-10. Batiza (b. 20 Mar. 1914, Mexico City), studied typing and 
shorthand at the Miguel Lerdo de Tejada Commercial School in Mexico City. Batiza went on to 
publish several more novels and stories that appeared in e/ Magazine Dominica! de El Universal. 
Nosotras, !as taquigrafas, was awarded the Ce1tamen Cultural de Ios Talleres Graficos de la 
Naci6n, en 1949. In 1950 Alfonso Patiiio G6mez adapted the novel into a film, which was 
produced by Salvador Elizondo and directed by Emilio G6mez Muriel. 
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fictional narrative. The fictional tone serves to soften the edges of the 
critique of social conditions described therein. Batiza's personal history 
as an employee in the Ministry of Finance further validated the 
observations contained in the novel. Indeed, it was Batiza's experiences 
as a shorthand secretary in the Ministry of Finance that served as the 
basis for this, her first novel. The selection from the preface also points 
to two issues, one regarding representation: what is the relative weight 
and power of "unsettling questions"? And two, a question of the 
representation of the conditions of work for women: how does 
femininity - "coquetry" - define job skills for female office workers? 
The relationship between work discipline and the disciplining force of 
gender was a two-way relationship. Within the logic of representation, 
the conditions of work served as a disciplining force in shaping gender 
norms. The conditions of work, in part, include class identities and 
associated characteristics and include representation of the female body, 
virtue, and ethnicity. I argue that class-bound gender norms came to 
. form the basis of the empleada (female office worker) skill-set- to use 
an anachronistic term; or in other words, femininity was a requirement 
of the job. 
Historians generally view gender as the web of ideas by which 
societies understand what it means to be male and female; it includes 
concepts of relations between and among the sexes, as well as categories 
of understanding power relations associated with gender difference.3 
One of these relations of power is class. While class is frequently 
discussed as an aspect of material conditions - occupation, salary, 
standard of living -in this study, like gender, class also functions on an 
ideological level. That is to say, class is constructed through both 
material and discursive conditions. Class is a category of understanding 
that may or may not correlate to the material position of the speaker, or 
the subject. This essay examines a series of texts and takes inspiration 
from the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, who has written extensively on 
how to think about class as an ideological and material construct.4 In 
part, class identity was created through the association of a series of 
cultural practices with class status. If femininity played a central role in 
marking class, then specific aspects of femininity were all the more 
fundamental than others, namely female virtue and sexual morality. 5 
3 ]oan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics o[Histmy (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), 42-43. 
4 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Source Cn'tique of the .Judgment oF Taste, Richard Nice, trans. 
(London: Routledge, 1984), 482-84. 
5 For a complementary analysis of women in office work in the United States today, see Jennifer 
Johnson, Getting By On The Minimum: The Lives OF Worlu.l:Jg-Class Women (New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
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Again, Bourdieu is useful when he shows us how cultural practices, 
which in my work are femininity, evolve from arbitrary individual taste 
to cultural legitimacy employed in the service of defining status/class. 
Goods and bodies are transformed into distinctive signs of class. In 
post-revolutionary Mexico norms of femininity evolved from individual 
gestures, or "taste," to become part of the cultural legitimacy of female 
office workers. 
Most recent studies of public employees in Latin America have 
construed the middle class as male. 6 This statement could be qualified 
by mention of the i:nportant exception of teachers, for whom education 
proffered middle class status, despite low salaries; however, while the 
rich scholarly literature on teachers has addressed many important 
issues, it gives scant attention to the question of class. Although this 
association of middle class with male resonates with historical 
perceptions of public administration, it ignores the feminisation of 
government work that occurred in the post-revolutionary period. Yet 
other histories of women have included women who the author 
identifies as middle class, usually a female reformer imposing her values 
on working class families; however, class is used to indicate power 
inequities and is not taken as a contested identity. 
"RESPECTABLE WORK FOR WOMEN" 
To fully understand representations of empleadas, it is important to 
note that women entered into office work in the late 19'" century, during 
which time important associations between office work and middle class 
status emerged.? During the almost continuous thirty-five year rule of 
Porfirio Dfaz (1876-1911), known as the Porfiriato, Mexicans frequently 
spoke of occupation in government offices as the prerogative and even 
foundation of the middle class. Indeed, public administration work has 
long been thought of as the provenance and sustenance of the middle 
class in Latin America. 8 During the 1890s women had entered into a 
wide range of new occupations, many of them in factories and 
6 David Stuatt Parker, The Idea o/"the Middle Class; White-Collar W oi*CIS and Pe111vian Society, 
/900-1950 (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvat1ia State University Press, 1998) . On teachers see, for 
exatnple, Mary Kay Vaughan, The State, Education, and Social Class in Mexico, 1880-1928 
(DeKalb: Northem Illinois University Press, 1982). 
7 Susie S. P01ter, "Empleadas: la necesidad econ6mica, la moral sexual, habitos de consumo, y el 
derecho de la mttier al t:rabajo," Signos hist61icos (Jat1.-]une 2004): 40-63. 
8 On the relationship between public administration at1d the middle class in Latin America see 
David Stuart Parker, 99, 101 , 149; Brian P. Owensby, Intimate Ironies, Modemily and the 
Making of Middle-Class Lives in BI<?Zil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 54. For 
Mexico see Soledad Loaeza, Clases medias y politica en Mexico (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 
1988). 
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workshops. For many Mexicans the opening of government offices to 
the employment of women during the Porfiriato was as a sign of 
progress. Office work represented a new option, and those who viewed 
it favourably hailed office work as clean, non-manual, and as a fortunate 
new opportunity for "respectable" women. The term "respectable" was 
a means of speaking about middle class status, which included non-
manual labour. The newspaper La Convenci6n Radical Obrera praised 
the opening of government offices to women, stating that "[it) all 
contributes to the preparation of the poor woman a decent means of 
subsistence, in the midst of overwhelming social needs, separating her 
from the path to perdition. 9 At the same time, prevailing notions that 
middle class women did not work outside of the home led others to 
necessarily consider any woman who did work outside of the home, 
even in an office, as therefore outside of the middle class. 
Throughout Latin America, education has been one of the 
markers of middle class status. 10 The status conferred to a position in a 
government office was due more to the cultural attainments of the job 
than to the salary paid for the work. One of those cultural attainments 
was work that required an education and was sometimes characterised as 
"intellectual," in this instance a word used to signify non-manual. A 
non-manual job filled by a person who received an education 
contributed to the characterisation of that job as "respectable." 
However, while civil service jobs were qualified as non-manual, the 
salaries paid to many government employees ill-afforded the trappings 
of middle class life. The wages received by both male and female 
teachers, for example, often did not provide for a middle class standard 
of living. In 1877 Adolfo Guillermoprieto lamented that teacher's wages 
were on par with that of taxi drivers. 11 An 1894 article in La 
Convenci6n Radical Obrera expressed concern that although women 
could get the education required for an office job, the cost of it well 
exceeded the benefits of the salary for "trabajo intelectual."12 
DAUGHTERS OF THE REVOLUTION 
The Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) and conversations about gender 
and class identities in the post-revolutionary periods profoundly shaped 
9 "Todo contJibuye a preparar para la mujer pobre un modo decente de subsistencia, en medio de 
las imperiosas necesidades sociales, apartandola de la carrera de la perdici6n." 
I 0 See footnote 8 for suggested reading. 
11 Moises Gonza!ez Navarro, La vida social. 
12 Anonymous, "Para las damas. Porvenir de la mujer", La Convenci6n Radical Obrera, viii:867 
and 868 (22 Apr. 1894 and 6 May 1894): 2-3 and 2. On teachers' sala.Jies see Vaughan, The 
St:lte, Education, ;wd Social Class, 64. 
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the contours of portrayals of female office workers in Mexico. The 
Mexican Revolution was a multi class uprising against the Porfrriato. In 
post-revolutionary Mexico (1917-1940) and the subsequent decade of 
the 1940s, the female office worker was often portrayed as a product, 
somewhat unfortunate and unwilling, of the Revolution. The roots of 
this ambiguity can be found in the cross-currents of class identities, both 
its treatment by contemporary scholars as a subject of study, and in 
terms of how class relations were understood in post-revolutionary 
Mexico. While historians have devoted considerable time to analysing 
the role of rural and urban workers, and indigenous communities, their 
attention to the pivotal role of upper and middle class actors, while 
noted, as been less sustained. 13 Authors in post-revolutionary Mexic~ 
positioned the female office worker in a somewhat ambiguous position 
within class relations in Mexico, caught between the working class and 
the middle class, and sometimes as embodying perceived contradictions 
between these two classes. Political rhetoric that privileged the working 
class, whether or not that rhetoric was reflective of the distribution of 
resources and power, also informed the fictional portrayal of female 
office workers. 14 Analysis of the representation of female office workers 
gives us entree into some of the issues at stake in the formation of 
middle class identities in post-revolutionary Mexico. 
The initial entrance of women into office work during the 
Porfiriato, and the values associated with that work, laid the foundation 
for the rapid expansion of women's places in government offices 
between 1920 and the early 1940s. The main impetus of expansion in 
the numbers of women in office work was in public administration, and 
was an integral part of the expansion of government work overall. As 
the leaders of the Revolution implemented new programmes, women 
filled government offices. Revolutionary leaders' projects included the 
creation of new offices and the integration of new personnel. Scholars 
have given the most sustained attention to teachers; however, a wide 
range of employees also worked in the offices that managed the reform 
of labour, agriculture, and social life so closely associated with the 
revolutionary project. They headed up newly formed government 
offices, staffed these offices as functionaries, consultants, managers, 
teachers, inspectors, secretaries, bookkeepers, workers, and service 
13 Michael F. ]imenez, "The Elision of the Middle Class and Beyond : History, Politics, and 
Development Studies in Latin America's 'Short Twentieth Century'", in Jeremy Adelman, ed. , 
Colom'al Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 207-228. Soledad Loaeza, C/ases medias y polft.ica en Mexico (Mexico: El 
Colegio de Mexico, 1988), 69-70. 
14 See, for example, Kevin Middlebrook, The Pa.1:adox of' Revolution; Lab01; dJe State, and 
Aut.horita1ianism in Mexico (Baltimore: The.Jolms Hopk.ins University Press, 1995). 
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workers. In 1921 there were 14,171 people employed in public 
administration, and by 1930 they numbered 47,000.15 Furthermore, the 
insurance and banking industries grew, and along with commerce, hired 
growing numbers of women to work as sales clerks, secretaries, and 
filers, to nan1e a few of the many new occupations. 
Two important shifts in women's participation in public 
administration occurred during the late 1930s. First, women took to 
government work in growing numbers, at a rate of increase that 
exceeded that of men. Between 1921 and 1930 the number of women 
in public administration increased by 2,000%. During this same time 
the number of men increased by 300%, also representing rapid growth, 
though less so compared to that of women. Despite the impressive 
percentage increase in women, men continued to dominate public 
administration in 1930 when they were 87% of those workers. 16 Second, 
women played an increasingly visible role in bureaucratic spaces 
unrelated to the "female occupation" of education.17 In 1938 the 
number of female employees (12,838) surpassed the number of female 
teachers (12,126). Nevertheless, women as a percentage of occupations 
unrelated to the field of education remained a minority of that 
workforce in 1938; women were 24% of the total of 53,160 empleados 
(as distinguished from maestros (teachers) in the census). 18 Even with 
such gains, women did not outstrip men in public administration in 
numbers, as a percentage of the workforce, or in career advancement. 
The changes that did occur occasioned important cultural shifts that 
came to life in novels, short stories, magazines, and movies. 
The authors of the two novels here under consideration wrote 
about female government employees and portrayed those women as 
products of the Revolution. The first novel was written by Mariano 
Azuela, who himself had worked for the Mexican government in the 
1930s. Mariano Azuela is the author of Los de Abajo (The Underdogs), 
among the most celebrated novels of the Mexican Revolution, which 
charts the rise and fall of humble people in rural Mexico as they are 
swept up in the chaos of the war that ravaged Mexico for at least seven 
years. A central quality of the novel is Azuela's cynicism regarding 
individual opportunism in the context of revolutionary idealism and 
bloody civil war. Los de Abajo is paradigmatic of the approach novelists 
and scholars have taken to write about the Mexican Revolution, 
inasmuch as rural Mexico has been the focus of subsequent historical 
15 Alicia Alva, "La Mujer en el Trabajo," El Nacional, 27 July 1933. 
16 Alva. 
17 Sex-typing of teaching as feminine work was a relatively recent phenomenon, dating to the 
1890s. 
18 Mexico. Direcci6n de Pensiones Civiles. Tercer Censo de empleados federales, 1938:36, 51. 
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studies, and has formed the backbone of Mexican historical studies. 
Less known is Azuela's novel Regina Landa, the story of a young female 
shorthand typist (of the same name) in 1930s Mexico City. 19 That a 
novel about urban life that focuses on a female office worker did not rise 
to the prominence of Los de Abajo is perhaps indicative of the lack of a 
cultural space for that which was female and urban. Nevertheless, 
Azuela describes Regina as a virtuous daughter of the Revolution. 
Regina's father had been a combatant who had not, like so many others, 
taken advantage of the spoils of war. As a consequence, Regina found 
herself in financial straights and left to fend for herself. The family had 
managed to get by due to the good economy of Regina's housewife 
mother. However, when her father dies, Regina goes to live with her 
sister and brother-in-law and is forced to find work outside of the home 
in order to contribute to the household. The circumstances that bring 
Regina to office work are relevant to establishing a genealogy that traces 
back to the Revolution, and the bureaucratic State that claimed it. 20 
Although Sarah Batiza published Nosotras, las taquigrafas in 
1949, more than a decade later than Regina Landa and well after what 
many would think of as the culmination of the Revolution, Batiza also 
construes her story as a legacy of the Revolution. The character Bertha 
is from Torre6n, for example, and comes from a family that lost its land 
and hacienda in a government-sponsored land redistribution 
programme. Bertha's family then migrates to Mexico City and requires 
the labour of their daughter to maintain their standard of living. Alex 
and Esther, two other central characters in the office, come from 
families of the provincial elite, and who due to circumstances associated 
with the Revolution, are forced to migrate to Mexico City and to find 
work. That these various characters are daughters of the Revolution 
takes on significance because it allows these authors to construe 
empleadas as reluctant, and therefore imperfect, participants in the 
world of work. It also reflects the rapid expansion in the number of 
women who worked for the government during the 1930s. Both Azuela 
and Batiza echo cultural understandings prevalent in post-revolutionary 
Mexico, such as the idea that women worked in offices, and should only 
work outside of the home in the absence of a male provider; and, that 
the State stood in the stead of that male breadwinner. 
19 Mariano Azuela, Regina Lwda (Mexico: ediciones Botas de Mexico, 1939). 
20 Azuela 7-8. Azuela reiterates his critique of post-revolutionary plunder in the virtuous portrayal 
of Regina's friend Esther Mediola, from the north, a family with properly and money that the 
revolutionaries stole; father and brother shot during the revolution. On the inte11wined nature of 
state bureaucracy, political party, and the Revolution, see Luis Javier Garrido, el partido de la 
revoluci6n institucionalizada; la f01maci6n del nuevo estado en Mexico (1928-1945) (Mexico: 
siglo veintiuno editores, 1982). 
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The legacy of the Revolution goes beyond the explicit portrayal 
of female office workers as a product of the Revolution. The fictional 
portrayal of empleadas is also shaped by ideological influences of post-
revolutionary rhetoric. In the post-revolutionary period, especially 
during the 1930s and the presidency of Lazaro Cirdenas (1934-1940), 
the state privileged work-based identities, be thei rural or urban, upon 
which citizens could make claims for both financial and political 
resources. Historians have documented the way cultural categories such 
as campesino came into being as they framed the means by which a 
range of rural workers and landowners could make demands on the 
State for resources, both material and political. 21 When Azuela and 
Batiza associate empleadas with the identity of worker, they seek to 
create sympathy in the reader for the female employee. At the same 
time, Mexicans associated ofiice work with "respectability," non-manual 
labour, and middle class status. Given these coexistent tendencies, 
Azuela, Batiza, and even contributors to the magazine Nosotras 
(discussed in detail below) cultivate contradictory associations of female 
office employees with both the identity of worker and with that of the 
middle class. 
Mariano Azuela opens the novel Regina Landa with a 
description of the office where the protagonist, Regina, seeks 
employment. Azuela offers the reader the government office as a grey 
and factory-like workplace. 22 The voice of the narrator refers to office 
work as slavery, and comments that "every gesture of liberty offends." 
Mter a survey of the office, the narrator states: "there is nothing enviable 
in being an empleada."23 Mter her first day at work, Regina feels 
dejected and humiliated by how she is treated and the conditions of 
work. She states that she will never return to the office, that she will 
work as a maid, but not in an office. 24 This comment builds on 
prevailing conceptions of hierarchies of occupations, and places office 
work at the lowest rung of work occupations for women. At other times 
Azuela refers to Regina as being of "extremely humble" origins. 25 Later 
in the novel, the character Miguel Angel accuses a man of being 
bourgeois, because he employs, and by implication exploits, a 
seamstress, while Miguel Angel praises Regina as "proletariat" because 
she works by the labour of her hands that type. 
21 Christopher R. Boyer, Becoming Campesino: Politics, Identity and Agranan Struggle in 
Postrevolutiona1y Michoacan, 1920-1935(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
22 Azuela 11. 
23 Azuela 18, 26, 27. 
24Azuela 13,177. 
25 Azuela 54. 
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The office as factory was a portrayal that would last into the 
1940s. In 1944 a group of female office workers came together to 
publish the magazine Nosotras; el boletin de las empleadas para ]as 
empleadas, (which ran from February 1944-1964). The women who 
promoted and contributed to Nosostras worked almost exclusively in 
private industry, and especially in the banking and insurance industries. 
Most of the women were members of the Interparroquial Circle of 
Female Employees of Mexico, a member of the Diocesan Committee of 
the Female Mexican Catholic Youth organisation (Cfrculo 
Interparroquial de Empleadas de Mexico, dependiente del Comite 
Diocesano de la JCFM de la Union Diocesana de Mexico), itself a 
member of Catholic Action (Acci6n Cat6lica). 26 Contributors to the 
magazine differed from Azuela and Batiza in an important way when 
they associated female office workers not with the Revolution, but with 
"la vida moderna." As employees in private industry, contributors to 
Nosotras disassociated themselves from the Mexican state and the 
women employees in its bureaucracy. 27 Nevertheless, some of those 
women would categorise the office in ways that echo the association of 
office work with a working-class occupation, when, for example, one 
contributor wrote "the ambience, so often monotonous and depressing, 
of the office, where one only hears the typing of the machines, feverish 
and hurried labours deaden and tire."28 
The representation of empleadas as associated with the identity 
of worker came into conflict, however, with older associations of office 
work as a middle class occupation. The texts here under consideration 
worked with several codes of middle class identity: education, "culture," 
and presentations of the body - which included modesty in dress; 
restraiht in the use of cosmetics, and cleanliness; and, female sexual 
virtue. 
One of the factors that contributed to distinguishing office work 
from manual labour was its association with education. Almost every 
issue of the magazine Nosotras included an article on how women could 
further their job prospects by furthering their education. Education was 
not, however, a direct means to an end; it was not simply about learning 
to type or to take dictation; indeed, commercial schools taught 
languages, piano, and physical education, in addition to typing, filing, 
26 Monthly publications. Director, Margarita Baz; Chief Editor, Ma. Elena Mmguia Q; 
Administration, Ana Ma. Patit'io. Annual subscription cost $1.50, or $0.15 per individual issue. 
In Nosotras? 1:2 (Mar.), 4. 
27 Interview conducted by Susie S. Porter with Senora Rosa Margot Ochoa, a contributor to 
Nosotras in tlte early 1940s, conducted on 12 Apr. 2006. 
28 Angelina, "jSurge!," Nosotras 1:3 (Apr. 1944), 8. "El ambiente, tantas veces mon6tono y 
deprimente, de la oficina, donde solo se oye el ritmico tecleteo de !as maquinas, donde enerva y 
cansa la tarea febril y apresurada." 
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and shorthand.29 Rather, for empleadas education was in part a means 
of acquiring cultural capital. For example, Batiza notes that the central 
character Marfa Eugenia had studied to be a secretary to expand her 
general knowledge, not with the intention of actually having to work.30 
The texts speak of education with a forked tongue; while education is 
first an acquisition that women do not intend, or should not utilise, it is 
secondarily one that a woman can use, if the need arose. 
In Mexico, the word "education" could mean schooling but it 
could also mean what Mexicans then referred to as "culture," and what 
Pierre Bourdieu would term symbolic capital. An article in Nosotras 
(magazine) exemplifies this. The column appeared regularly and 
followed a format of qualifying appropriate and inappropriate behaviour 
under the headings "Yes" and "No." A picture and description of a 
woman in simple dress applying makeup is accompanied with the 
words: 
Yes .. .lt is one of the things we have always recommended. Cleanliness and 
tidiness are indispensable. A light touch on your lips and cheeks; a hairdo 
(of course showing all due discretion); ]and] No ... to convert public 
transportation into a powder room says very little of your good educational 
Characters in Batiza's novel also equate beauty with being well-dressed, 
both of which they qualify as an expression of "education."32 
The magazine Nosotras stands out as one of the means by 
which contributors sought to disassociate office work from manual 
labour, and that was in its construal of office work as spiritual work. As 
a magazine sponsored by Catholic Action it is not surprising to find that 
religion, spirituality, and Catholicism specifically filled the pages of the 
magazine. It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that contributors often stated 
explicitly that the spiritual aspect of a woman's workday made the work 
non-manual. 33 Rosa M argot Ochoa, who worked for several decades at 
BANAMEX as an executive secretary, and who was a frequent 
contributor to Nosotras, thought of herself as middle class. And 
although she described herself as not actively religious, she held as a 
cherished possession a golden crucifix given to her by her employer. In 
addition to her contributions to Nosotras, Ochoa also wrote for the 
BANAMEX employee magazine, the pages of which were filled with 
29 Porter, Empleadas. 
30 Batiza 40. 
31 "Si ... Es una de las cosas que siempre hemos recomendado. La limpieza y el aneglo son 
indispensables. Un ligero toque en tus labios y mejillas; un peinado (todo con discreci6n desde 
luego). No ... El convertir los transp01tes, la calle y otros sitios p(tblicos en tocador, dice muy poca 
de tu buena educaci6n.""Si... No ... " s.a. (2:21, 10-11 nov.) 
32 Batiza, 7 4. 
33 For example, see Angelina, " jSurge!" 8. 
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news of Catholic weddings, baptisms, and other Church-related cultural 
events.34 
Given the confluence of different class identities associated with 
office work, it is not surprising then that contradictions in class 
identification emerged. What can we make of these contradictions? 
For one, perhaps the place of the work and occupation did not serve as 
the primary site of identity formation for female office workers. The 
characters that inhabit the offices in the two novels (Regina Landa, 1939 
and Nosotras, 1949) come from a variety of social backgrounds, and the 
differences in the portrayal of class status of the characters are 
significant. 35 Mariano Azuela insinuates that women of "culture" ended 
up having to work with women "without culture," or at least that some 
viewed it that way. Women working in the same office, in the same 
occupation, are described as having distinct class status. This was the 
case of Cuca and Maria Eugenia in Nosotras, las taqufgrafas. The titles 
of two of the texts give us a lead. The title "Nosotras" suggests the 
importance of gender in the work-identity of female office workers. 
One could argue that rhetorically, female office workers, whether in 
private business or government office, all required similar skills and 
faced similar working conditions. 36 Whether or not this was indeed the 
case remains to be seen through further investigation. 
One of the factors that shaped the working conditions of all 
female office workers in all these texts is virtue. For the contributors to 
Nosotras (magazine), and perhaps to its readers, the work of employees 
was the result of "la vida moderna."37 For this new occupation, women 
required new skills. And while many of those new skills included the 
more obvious ones of dictation, typing, and filing, the skills to which 
commentators gave the most attention was that of navigating the turgid 
seas of moral threat. 38 Luz Maria Rivadeneyra, contributor to Nosotras 
(magazine), lamented that when a young woman goes to work in an 
office, business, bureau, or any of the many other places women now 
work, that they ask after their preparation, referring to her intellectual 
preparation or technical skills, not her moral preparation, the latter of 
34 lnteiView with Sefiora Rosa Margot Ochoa, conducted by Susie S. Porter, 12 Apr. 2006. 
35 "Evita Quedar Atrapada por !as Deudas" NosotJ<1S 1:4 (8, 13 May), 8, 14; and "Cual de Ios 3?" 
Nosoll-as 1:1 (Feb.),13. 
36 "Cualidades esenciales del trabajo", Nosollas 1:5 Gu1y), 6, 9. "Las necesidades de la vida te 
obligan a abandonar el hogar familiar en donde encontrarias abrigo y tus ocupaciones normales. 
Sales cada maiiana, llena de valor y buen humor, a la conquista del pan. Entras a! taller, a! 
almacen, a la oficina, y ahi encuentras compaiieras que, como tu, tienen necesidad de trabajar 
para vivir. .. " 
37 Luz Maria Rivadeneyra, "Virt11des; cCuales son !as Virtudes Necesarias para la Mujer que 
Trabaja?", Nosotms 1:2 (Mar. 1944). 
38 Hivadeneyra. 
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which, she argued, "is the one which will determine her capacity, energy, 
and tact to fulfil her obligations."39 
Social relations among women, and between women and men, 
play a central role in all of the texts here under consideration. Indeed, 
such social relations serve as proxy for an analysis of workplace 
relations. Friendship and betrayal; loyalties and jealousies; camaraderie 
or courtship; and, love and the prospect of marriage: all of these topics 
filled the pages of the novels, short stories, and articles written by and 
directed at empleadas. 40 Rather than consider these issues as diversions 
from the drudgery of work, I suggest we look at these as workplace 
relations that the empleada had to negotiate with skill, to the benefit or 
detriment of her job. Two points regarding context: First, the entrance 
of women into a new workplace implied a new space of interaction with 
men. Rules of the game had to be worked out. Similar to when women 
took to factory work in large numbers at the turn of the century. 41 
Second, marriage was still thought of as the primary vocation for 
women. So if one is at work all day, and the goal is to get married, not 
to progress in one's career, then clearly these issues will arise.42 Women 
who took jobs as empleadas, though, were caught in a contradiction 
within the context of unequal power relations between the men and 
women in the workplace, both because of gender privilege (of men) and 
the work advantage of the men who had degrees and almost always 
occupied positions above women.43 In all the texts presented in this 
essay, class circumstances impede an easy path to marriage, most often 
to the detriment of women. Azuela's work associates access to male 
licenciados, higher ups, with corrupted female honour; characters argue 
that "women wanting to marry up make themselves ugly." A virtuous 
woman might marry a man she met in the office, but leave the 
workplace before doing so. 
Youth, too, serves as a definer of marketability. Azuela portrays 
all office women as single; those women who marry leave their 
employment. 44 Sarah Batiza treats the issue in painful detail in 
Nosotras, las taqufgrafas, while those who do not marry are usually 
portrayed with sympathy, it is clear that being an old maid (quedada) is 
not an enviable status. And the window for marriage is brief. A woman 
39 Rivadeneyra. 
40 Comisi6n Central de Empleadas de la]CFM, "Noviazgo", Nosotras 1:3 (10-11 April). 
41 Susie S. Porter, Working Women in Mexico City; Public Discourses and Material Conditions, 
1879-1931 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003) . 
42 AJexandra Pita Gonzalez, "Las mujeres y el matrimonio en !as obras de Mariano Azuela," in 
Alvaro Ochoa Serrano, coord., EsCiitores y escritos de la revolufia (Zamora: El Colegio de 
Michoacan, 2004). 
43 Batiza 36. 
44 Azuela 103. 
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of 25 is already considered as out of the market pool. The magazine 
Nosotras printed numerous articles celebrating female youth, and one 
author even arrived at mathematical calculations that left women with 
approximately three years to work and find a husband, at which time she 
would leave work.45 A new model of the modern wife thus emerges 
from the new conditions of employment presented in office work. 
Both Azuela and Batiza include characters that serve the 
function of expressing arguments against marriage; however, these 
characters function to discredit such opinions as either too caught up in 
the vogue of leftist rhetoric, or as simply unrealistic. In Regina Landa, 
Emma is president of "Izquierdas Femininas" a government-affiliated 
women's organisation that claimed its position on the left of the political 
spectrum; she is also "a famed orator" in the political and literary salon 
"Letras y Artes." Emma tells Regina that her idea of getting married and 
having lots of kids is "bourgeois."46' Batiza portrays Blanca, a university-
educated woman, as one who does not need a job and simply plays at 
work. Blanca is, nevertheless, vehement about women's independence. 
The voice of judgment is that of M aria Eugenia, who laments that for all 
her independence, Blanca has missed out on the better things in life, 
such as love. 
Sarah Batiza provides a more complex take on the question of 
courtship, marriage, and inequalityin the workplace.47 She lays bare the 
double standard for men, for whom dating is a cavalier pastime without 
consequence, while for women, courtship and marriage is, in effect, tied 
to job stability and promotion, as well as a path out of the workplace.48 
Male licenciados hold sway over female secretaries and typists, both as 
men and as highe).ups at work. More often than not, men also are 
portrayed in Batiz;'~, novel as of a better-off socioeconomic status. Men 
I 
45 Margarita, "Progresa en "tu trabajo", Nosotras 1:1 (Feb.), 10-11. "Yo quiero suponer que 
trabajaras por un lapso de tiempo relativamente cmto, unos cuatro o cinco aiios, y luego 
cont:raer;\s matrimonio con un hombre adinerado. No creo que la cultura que obtengas, con 
miras de progresar, te sobre en el futuro; por el contrario, te permitira conversar y aun 
comprender mejor a tu esposo ... Todo esta en que tengas la suficiente inteligencia para que no 
por cultivarte, te vuelvas pedante; no por recibir un buen sueldo, te vuelvas derrochadora; ni por 
la independencia que el trabajo pueda proporcionarte o la categoria del puesto que desempeiies, 
te conviertas en unajoven dominante, altanera, "o desp6tica. Por el contrario, tengo la seguridad 
de que la mujer que trabaja, que tiene noci6n del valor del dinero ganado a fuerza de trabajo, que 
progresa debido a su esfuerzo, esta mas capacitada para apreciar y comprender muchas cosas en 
su futuro esposo; nerviosidad o cansancio provocados por el exceso de trabajo, exigencias y 
molestias causadas por el, necesidad de encontrar en su hogar reposo y tranquilidad cariiio y 
comprensi6n." 
46 Azuela 27-28. 
47 Azuela 92, 102, 107, 136. "El jefe ha dicho en voz alta que antes de una semana seras suyo." 
Sanchitos gives her the advice: "una reputaci6n que se pierde es una vida que se trunca. El 
matrimonio noes una mera formula ni rutina social." 
48 Batiza 34. 
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drive cars while women take public transportation; men dine in fancy 
restaurants while women eat at home; men purchase for women the nice 
clothes that they "need" for work. This is a situation only made more 
difficult by the significant number of women looking for work. 49 
Through the character Lupita, Batiza acknowledges the desire 
for middle class status and the lack of recognition of this status. Lupita, 
though an office worker herself, is the daughter of a servant. As an 
office worker, Lupita says "I can't marry someone of my same category 
now, now that I have known new worlds."50 Office work, in Batiza's 
novel, has an acculturating effect on women from modest means. 
One of the important ramifications of the folding in of gender 
norms into the repertoire of job skills was that gender norms took on a 
significance that competed with skills and qualities like seniority, etc. 
One story in Nosotras tells of a girl who is offended because a pretty girl, 
less qualified, was promoted ahead of her: "[Unfortunately], I am so 
sensitive ... For example, the other day the boss wanted to dictate a letter 
· and he called on Senorita Gomez- he said it and called right in front of 
me - when he knows that I have more time working than her and I am 
more competent and faster than her."51 The advice columnist 
responded to her complaint by pointing out "these little jealousies or 
perhaps omissions committed without any ill intention cause much 
suffering and at times are capable of making one fail, cutting off perhaps 
a brilliant future."52 Two counter examples that reinforce the same 
argument, because they are meant as a surprise in the narrative, are that 
in Regina Landa and NosotrasJ las taqufgrafas the main characters are 
both pretty AND competent. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the entrance of women into office work in the 1890s, through the 
post-revolutionary period, the portrayal of empleadas in print culture 
went though an important transformation, shifting from identification 
with qualities associated with the middle class to more close association 
with working-class identity. While this essay does not touch on the 
subject of how women themselves construed their class position, it does 
49 Bat:iza 35. 
50 Bat:iza 46. Later in passage, "El individuo que se escuda solamente con el nombre, es porque 
no vale, es porque de esa manera trata de que Ios demas lo consideren supe1ior ... " (46) 
51 "En el Empleo", Nosotras 1:5 Gune). "Por ejemplo, el ot:ro dia el jefe dijo que queria dictar una 
carta muy importante y llam6 a la senorita G6mez -lo dijo y la llam6 en frente de mi - cuando 
sabe que yo tengo mas t:iempo de trabajar que ella y que soy mas competente y mas rapida. 
52 "En el Empleo", Nosotms. "Esas pequdias envidias o acaso omisiones comet:idas sin ninguna 
mala intenci6n causan muchos pesares y a veces son capaces de hacer fracasar, cortando tal vez 
un brillante porvenir." 
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show how novelists and journalists contributed to the class identities of 
empleadas. As the first opportunities for office work opened to women 
in Mexico City, many Mexicans hailed such work as a "respectable" 
option for women. Newspaper articles portrayed office work as 
"intellectual," clean work. It was work for which many women had 
obtained an education. All of these qualities were ones associated with 
middle class identity. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 ushered in new 
political languages that privileged working-class identity. Within this 
context, Mariano Azuela, and later Saral1 Batiza, as well as contributors 
to the magazine Nosotras, associated female office workers, and the 
office itself, with working-class culture. So while in the realm of national 
politics President Lizaro Cardenas distributed political and material 
resources to those who identified as "working class," so too Mariano 
Azuela distributed the resource of audience sympathy by calling on 
working-class identity. In 1949, Sarah Batiza presents a series of 
representations of office workers that account for socio-economic and 
racial diversity yet continues to associate virtue with female working-class 
identily. 
Although class identity is central to the portrayal of female office 
workers, at important moments gender identity supersedes, and at times, 
is conflated with, class identity. Normative femininity and sexuality 
stand in for work relations. Friendship, courtship, dating, and sexual 
relations stand in for "labour relations," promotion, and job success. In 
fictional and non-fictional portrayals of female office workers in post-
revolutionary Mexico, qualities associated with femininity came to form 
an integral aspect of work and class identity. The intertwining of the 
identities contributed to their longevity. Norms of femininily and 
sexuality continue to shape labour relations in diverse sectors of the 
Mexican labour force, perhaps most visibly in maquiladoras.53 
53 orma lglesias Prieto, Beautiful Flowers of the i\1aqw1adot<l: Ltfe HisLOJies of Women 
WOJkeJ:s in Tijuana, Michael Stone, trans. wilh Gabrielle Winkler (Austin: University of Texas 
Press , Institute of Latin American Studies, 1997). 
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